Christof Heyns

The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level

Preface. Overview of Study Results. Country Studies. 1. Australia. 2. Brazil. 3. Canada. 4. Colombia. 5. Czech Republic. 6. Egypt. 7. Estonia. 8. Finland. 9. India. 10. Iran. 11. Jamaica. 12. Japan. 13. Mexico. 14. Philippines. 15. Romania. 16. Russia. 17. Senegal. 18. South Africa. 19. Spain. 20. Zambia. Annexures.

Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death

Introduction The ever-increasing power of computers is arguably one of the defining characteristics of our time. Computers affect almost all aspects of our lives and have become an integral part not only of our world but also of our very identity as human beings. They offer major advantages and pose serious threats. One of the main challenges of our era is how to respond to this development: to make sure computers enhance and do not undermine human objectives. The imposition of force by one individual against another has always been an intensely personal affair – a human being was physically present at the point of the release of force and took the decision that it would be done. It is inherently a highly controversial issue because of the intrusion on peoples bodies and even lives. Ethical and legal norms have developed over the millennia to determine when one human may use force against another, in peace and in war, and have assigned responsibility for violations of these norms. Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the rise of computer power is to be found in the fact that we are on the brink of an era when decisions on the use of force against human beings – in the context of armed conflict as well as during law enforcement, lethal and non-lethal – could soon be taken by robots. Unmanned or human-replacing weapons systems first took the form of armed drones and other remote-controlled devices, which allowed human beings to be physically absent from the battlefield. Decisions to release force, however, were still taken by human operatives, albeit from a distance. The increased autonomy in weapons release now points to an era where humans will be able to be not only physically absent from the battlefield but also psychologically absent, in the sense that computers will determine when and against whom force is released. The depersonalization of the use of force brought about by remote-controlled systems is thus taken to a next level through the introduction of the autonomous release of force.

The International Law framework regulating the use of armed drones.

This article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike.

Comparação esquemática dos sistemas regionais de direitos humanos: uma atualização

There are three regional systems for the protection of human rights in the world today, namely the African, Inter-American and European systems. This article is a comparative presentation of their salient features and focuses on key procedural and substantive aspects.

Autonomous weapons in armed conflict and the right to a dignified life: an African perspective

Abstract Autonomous weapons are weapons that, once activated, can without further human intervention select and engage targets. This raises the possibility that computers will determine whether people will live or die. The possible use of autonomous weapons against humans in armed conflict clearly has potential right to life implications. This contribution argues that the right to dignity angle must also be brought into play. The first concern raised by autonomous weapons is ‘can they do it?’: Can autonomus targeting conform with the requirements of international humanitarian law, in particular the rules of distinction and proportionality? If machines cannot do proper targeting, such use of force will be ‘arbitrary’ and thus violate the right to life. Moreover, the right to life requires accountability, but it is not clear who is to be held responsible when robots get it wrong. Secondly: ‘Should they do it?’ Should robots have the power of life and death over humans? This may violate the rights to life as well as the right to dignity. The question whether there is ‘meaningful human control’ over the release of force is emerging as a helpful tool to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable autonomous targeting, and I argue that it also makes sense from a human rights perspective. The question that will haunt the debate in the future is: What if technology develops to the point where it is clear that fully autonomous weapons surpass human targeting, and can potentially save many lives? Would human rights considerations in such a case not militate for the use of autonomous weapons, instead of against it? I argue that the rights to life and dignity demand that even under such circumstances, full autonomy in force delivery should not be allowed. The article emphasises the importance placed on the concept of a ‘dignified life’ in the African human rights system.