Dapo Akande

The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a one-superpower world have brought about what one may call the resurrection of the Security Council and a reactivation of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Powers of a coercive nature vested by the Charter in the Security Council which for decades seemed like a dead letter have been rediscovered since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Security Council, which until then had been deadlocked through the threat or use of the veto, has now come alive. Up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 the Security Council had passed 659 resolutions in its 45 years of existence. In the six years since then it has passed over 400 resolutions. What is more important, however, is that mandatory sanctions, which until 1990 had been ordered only twice—the comprehensive sanctions on Rhodesia and arms embargo on South Africa—have since been used by the Security Council in relation to at least eleven countries. This new and increased activity of the Security Council has provoked debate in recent years as to whether the Council is subject to any limitations when it is acting to maintain or restore international peace and security. The problem has shifted from one of trying to get the Council to work as it was intended, to one of trying to control the work of the Council. In particular there has been renewed interest in the question whether there is any room for judicial control, by the International Court of Justice, of decisions made by the political organs of the United Nations.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IMMUNITIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The tension between the protection of human rights and the demands of state sovereignty is reflected in the debate on whether state officials should be held responsible in external fora for international crimes committed while in office. This debate involves the interplay between two branches of international law. Firstly, there is the well-established law according immunities to the state and its agents from the jurisdiction of other states (state and diplomatic immunities). This law proceeds from notions of sovereign equality and is aimed at ensuring that states do not unduly interfere with other states and their agents. On the other hand, there are those newer principles of international law that are based on humanitarian values and define certain types of conduct as crimes under international law (international criminal law). One of the challenges in this latter area has been to develop international and national mechanisms by which individuals who commit these crimes may be held responsible. Since states often fail to institute domestic prosecution of their own officials and agents alleged to have committed international crimes, renewed attention has been paid to the possibility of subjecting state agents to prosecution in foreign domestic courts or in international courts. For such prosecution in foreign domestic courts to take place, it will usually have to be shown (1) that those courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners (i.e..universalorquasi-universal jurisdiction),and (2) that such jurisdiction extends to state agents (i.e., that international law immunities are unavailable). Recent years have seen a significant increase in attempts to institute prosecutions for alleged international crimes in the national courts of states other than that where the acts occurred. However, it has not proved easy to establish the two propositions identified above. Indeed, it has become apparent that the views that states possess universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed abroad and that incumbent and former state officials are subject to foreign domestic prosecution for such crimes are by no means universally held.

Assessing the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome State of the International Criminal Court

This article assesses the African Union’s (AU) concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It seeks to articulate a clearer picture of the law and politics of deferrals within the context of the AU’s repeated calls to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC, or the Council) to invoke Article 16 to suspend the processes initiated by the ICC against President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan. The UNSC’s failure to accede to the AU request led African States to formally withhold cooperation from the ICC in respect to the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese leader. Given the AU’s continued concerns, and the current impasse, fundamental questions have arisen about the Council’s authority to exercise, or not exercise, its deferral power. This culminated into a November 2009 African proposal for an amendment to the Rome Statute to empower the UN General Assembly to act should the UNSC fail to act on a deferral request after six months. Although ICC States Parties have so far shown limited public support for the AU’s proposed amendment to the deferral provision, this article examines its merits because a failure to engage the “Article 16 problem” could impact international accountability efforts in the Sudan, and further damage the ICC’s credibility in Africa. This unresolved issue also has wider significance given that the matters underlying the tension – how ICC prosecutions may be reconciled with peacemaking initiatives and the role and power of the Council in ICC business – will likely arise in future situations from around the world.

Promoting Compliance with the Rules Regulating Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict: Some Challenges

In recent years, the increasingly frequent and, in certain contexts, extremely severe, impediments to the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need have focused attention on how to enhance compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) regulating humanitarian relief operations. Efforts to hold accountable parties to armed conflict and persons responsible for unlawfully impeding humanitarian relief operations face the challenge that the underlying rules give parties latitude as to how to implement the central obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian supplies, equipment and personnel. The present article outlines the rules of IHL regulating humanitarian relief operations and highlights the difficulties in determining, in the majority of situations, whether they have been violated. It then presents current endeavours to promote accountability. It concludes with some reflections on whether the threat of accountability is the most effective way of enhancing compliance with this area of IHL, at least while efforts are underway to negotiate access.

The International Law framework regulating the use of armed drones.

This article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike.

Introduction to Symposium on Koh & Buchwald, “The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective”

In June 2010, the States Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court gathered in Kampala, Uganda, at the first conference to review the Statute. One of the main items on the agenda was a proposal to amend the Statute so as to operationalize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) over aggression. Article 5(1) of the Statute of the Court adopted in Rome (“Rome Statute”/ “ICC Statute”) adopted in 1998 had included the crime of aggression as one the four crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction, together with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, despite the fact that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals which were convened at the end of World War II had prosecuted individuals for crimes against peace, states which attended the Rome Conference in 1998 were unable to agree on a definition of aggression or on the conditions under which the ICC should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime. For that reason, Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute provided that: