Christophe Jaffrelot

Patterns of middle class consumption in India and China

This is a book about the emerging patterns of consumption among the middle classes of India and China. The book compares cultural shifts as a result of liberalization and globalization in these two emerging Asian powers. This volume does not compare India and China to the West, as books on similar subjects have done in the past. Instead they are compared with each other. This book is well-timed, considering that both these countries have so much in common in terms of scale, civilization, history, and as emerging economies. The chapters in this book have been written by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists rather than by economists, so the emphasis is on cultural shifts rather than economic statistics. Transnational developments, like tourism, karaoke, soap operas, and the art market, have all been extensively covered in this book

India's look east policy: an Asianist strategy in perspective

Indian nationalist leaders developed a strong interest in Asia right from the early nineteenth century. Jawarharlal Nehru articulated an Asianist ideology based on the cultural affinities between India and China and the geopolitical interest in Greater India. This approach, which culminated in the Bandung summit, was put into parenthesis after the 1962 war. The Cold War, during which India and South East Asia were in different camps, prompted differing paths towards in emulating the economic progress of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, and different approaches towards the development of the ASEAN. Indias Asianist policy met an uneven fate but, by and large, there has been a significant rapprochement between India and East Asia. This move materialized in the investments of several Asian countries – including South Korea – in India and the entry of India in the ARF. Yet the symbiosis between India and Southeast Asia remains hindered by the rather nationalistic view of the latter region that the Hindutva movement is still propagating: like in the colonial period, Asianism remains part of an instrumentalist strategy.

Gujarat Elections: The Sub-Text of Modi’s ‘Hattrick’—High Tech Populism and the ‘Neo-middle Class’

This article, while it will pay attention to the opposition parties—the Congress and the GPP—intends, in its first part, to scrutinize the mainstays of Narendra Modi’s election campaign with special references to high tech populism, his banalization of Hindutva, his notion of Gujarati patriotism and his defence of what he calls the ‘neo-middle class’. The second part that deals with the electoral results and the citizens’ voting behaviour, will show that Modi’s constituency is a by-product of an increasingly polarized pattern of social change and economic growth, the BJP receiving stronger support from urban dwellers, whatever their caste, gender and level of education may be.

Refining the moderation thesis. Two religious parties and Indian democracy: the Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindutva radicalism and coalition politics

The inclusion of Hindu nationalist parties in Indias democratic process has not resulted in their moderation in a linear manner. Since 1947, the parties have oscillated between a sectarian strategy of religious mobilization and a more moderate one of abiding by democratic processes and liberal norms. While the former has led to radicalization, the latter has facilitated democratic coalition building. Whether the Hindu nationalist parties opted for the path of radicalization or that of moderation has chiefly depended on their relation with their mother organization, the perception of Muslims that prevails at a given time in India, and the electoral strategies of the other parties.

India and Pakistan: Interpreting the Divergence of Two Political Trajectories

While suggestions were made in the 1990s that Pakistani and Indian political trajectories were converging as Pakistan took steps towards democratisation and India showed increasing signs of authoritarian centralisation, the following analysis offers a more historically sensitive view that suggests the opposite is true. In over fifty years of independence, institutional and societal structures have worked to create the political systems that we see on the Indian subcontinent today, and have helped define the potentially explosive Indo-Pakistan relationship so threatening in todays world. By analysing the ways in which different historical legacies act upon the current political cultures in both India and Pakistan, we engage in a fuller understanding of the contributing factors to the status quo in each. Further, historical analysis may shed some light on the expected trajectories of these two countries as they attempt to reinvent themselves at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

What ‘Gujarat Model’?—Growth without Development—and with Socio-Political Polarisation

As chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi claimed that his state was a ‘model’ of development. While his government achieved a remarkable growth rate, his public policies as well as his politics have been on par with growing inequalities. The collaboration between the state and the corporate sector—an old tradition in Gujarat—gained momentum under Modi, businessmen benefitting from low wages, acquiring land more quickly and at a better price, and obtaining more tax breaks, etc. Simultaneously, Gujarat spent less than most of the other states of India on education and health. Even though the ‘Gujarat model’ cultivates social polarisation, Narendra Modi was able to win elections three times in the state for two major reasons. First, the main casualties of this political economy have been Muslims, Dalits and Adivasis, who do not represent more than 30 percent of society. Second, the beneficiaries of this ‘model’ were not only the middle class, but also a ‘neo-middle class’ made up of those who have begun to be part of the urban economy or who hope to benefit from it—the ‘neo-middle class’ is primarily aspirational. These groups were numerous enough to allow Modis BJP to win successive elections in Gujarat. The BJP got more than 50 percent of the votes only once, in 2002, but the main party can get an absolute majority with less in a first-past-the-post system. While the BJP is known for its expertise in religious polarisation, this is clearly a case of social polarisation in which the ethno-religious identity quest of the middle and neo-middle classes continues to play a role.

Quota for Patels? The Neo-middle-class Syndrome and the (partial) Return of Caste Politics in Gujarat

The Patels, a dominant caste of Gujarat, rallied around the Congress in the 1920s and remained behind the ruling party until the 1980s, when they shifted to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) because of the pro-Other Backward Classes (OBCs) reservation policy of the Congress Chief Minister Madhavsinh Solanki. As evident from the 2015 local elections, rural Patels are getting back to Congress. They resent the fact that the BJP, the ruling party for almost two decades, refuses to include Patels on the list of the OBCs. This demand, articulated by Hardik Patel, and other youth leaders, reflects the growing socio-economic inequalities within this caste group, not only because of the gap between peasants and urban dwellers but also because of the scarcity of good jobs in the private sectors, one of the outcomes of the ‘Gujarat model’.

Hindu Nationalism and the Social Welfare Strategy

The rise of Hindu nationalism has been one of the most significant developments in Indian politics over the past 20 years. It is a recent phenomenon in terms of election results: the party most representative of this political trend, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP-Party of the Indian People) increased its number of seats from 2 out of 542 in the general elections of 1984 to 85 in 1989, 120 in 1991, 160 in 1996, 178 in 1998 the year when it rose to power as the leading force of the ruling coalition. Though it lost the 2004 election it remained only seven seats behind the Congress party.

Narendra Modi between Hindutva and subnationalism: The Gujarati asmita of a Hindu Hriday Samrat

ABSTRACT After the 2002 pogrom, Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, shifted his political repertoire from that of a Hindu Hriday Samrat (King of Hindus’ heart) to that of development and Gujaratiness. He claimed that he was a development man (Vikas Purush) and that he represented the 60 million Gujaratis as an aam admi (common man). He projected himself as an embodiment of their identity—asmita. This populist repertoire, which was explicitly articulated during the Sadbhavna mission in 2012, is in tune with the general trend of Indian politics where most of the Chief Ministers claim to epitomize one subnationalism. In the case of Narendra Modi, however, this regional identity was defined in religious terms and reflected a banalization of Hindutva, an original process that was more likely to happen in Gujarat because of the traditional definition of the state’s identity.

The Impact of Urbanization on the Electoral Results of the 2014 Indian Elections: With Special Reference to the BJP Vote:

During the 16th Lok Sabha elections, the BJP achieved unprecedented successes in rural as well as urban constituencies. Its progress has resulted from its growing popularity among almost every social group, its expansion being significant beyond its core supporters cutting across various classes, castes and communities—except the Muslims. While it remained more popular in the urban constituencies, the BJP has therefore largely blurred the traditional urban–rural divide. But this distinction has not been totally neutralized, as is evident from regional and social variations which need to be explained. The impact of the rural–urban divide remained particularly strong in UP, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Karnataka where the village dwellers voted significantly less for the BJP than the urban citizens. These variations mostly stem from the new attraction for the BJP among OBCs and, to a lesser extent, Dalits residing in urban settings. Their rallying around the BJP probably reflects their joining of the ‘neo-middle class’, which identified more closely with Narendra Modi’s development agenda. Urbanization has also favoured the BJP as the crucible of communal polarization, a process which explains that the more urban they are, the more inclined to vote Congress the Muslims are, whatever their caste or class.