Christopher Bobonich

Akrasia and agency in Plato's «Laws» and «Republic»

Philosophers from Plato to Davidson have long found akratic action puzzling. One well-known sign of Platos puzzlement is that although he rejects the possibility of akratic action in the Protagoras, he reworks his moral psychology in the Republic to accommodate its possibility. But what has not been noticed is that the Republic is not the final resolution of Platos puzzlement. In the Laws, Plato returns to the problem of akratic action. As in the Republic, Plato accepts its possibility, but in the Laws he offers a new analysis of what goes on inside an agent who acts akratically. As the shift in Platos position from the Protagoras to the Republic required a revision in Platos moral psychology, so the new analysis of akratic action in the Laws requires an important revision in the moral psychology of the Republic. The Republics explanation of the nature of the conflict present in the agent who acts akratically makes essential reference to different parts of the soul which are themselves agent-like. The Laws explains akratic action without invoking agent-like parts of the soul, and the agent-like parts of the soul of the Republic are absent from the moral psychology of the Laws.

Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's Laws

One of the distinctions that Plato in the Laws stresses most heavily in his discussion of the proper relation between the individual citizen and the laws of the city is that between persuasion and compulsion. Law, Plato believes, should try to persuade rather than compel the citizens. Near the end of the fourth book of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger, Platos spokesman in this dialogue, asks whether the lawgiver for their new city of Magnesia should in making laws ‘explain straightaway what must and must not be done, add the threat of a penalty, and turn to another law, without adding a single bit of encouragement or persuasion [παραμυθας δ κα πeιθος … ἓν] to his legislative edicts’ (Laws 720a 1–2). A few lines later, the Athenian Stranger himself condemns such a procedure as ‘the worse and more savage alternative’ (τo χeῖρον τοῖν δυοῖν κα γριώτeρον 720e4). The better method is for the laws themselves to try to persuade (πeθeιν) the citizens to act in the manner that they prescribe. And as a means of doing this, Plato proposes attaching preludes (προομια) to particular laws and to the legal code as a whole: such preludes will supplement the sanctions attached to the laws and will aim at persuading the citizens to act in the way that the laws direct for reasons other than fear of the penalties attached to the law. Such a practice, Plato believes, is an innovation: it is something that no lawgiver has ever thought of doing before (722b–e). And we have no reason to think that Plato is here excluding his earlier self, e.g. the Plato of the Republic and the Politicus, from this criticism.

Socrates and Eudaimonia

introduction It has long been a commonplace that ancient ethical thought is characterized by its eudaimonism. The great nineteenth-century moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick, for example, remarks that “in the whole ethical controversy of ancient Greece … it was assumed on all sides that a rational individual would make the pursuit of his own good his supreme aim.” Sidgwick also thinks that its commitment to eudaimonism is one of the most important features that distinguishes ancient ethical reflection from that of the moderns from the time of Bishop Butler on. 1 Whether or not we accept Sidgwick’s claims, eudaimonia (typically translated as “happiness”) is a central concept in ancient Greek ethical and political philosophy. In this chapter, I shall examine the idea of eudaimonia or happiness in Socrates’ thought and consider what place it has in his views about how to live and how to act, what content he gives it, and its relation to other important notions, such as virtue and knowledge. But before turning to these substantive issues, I begin by marking out the territory that I shall be exploring. Many scholarly controversies surround any discussion of Socrates. For example, what evidence do we have for the views of the historical Socrates? How reliable are the depictions of Socrates by Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and other “Socratic” writers? Can we reliably date Plato’s dialogues so as to isolate those that are closest in time to his association with Socrates? Since other essays in this volume consider these disputes in greater detail, I shall simply state the limitations of my discussion without examining the arguments justifying them. My way of carving up this territory, although certainly not the only plausible one, is fairly common.

WHY SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS RULE? PLATO'S REPUBLIC AND ARISTOTLE'S PROTREPTICUS

I examine Platos claim in the Republic that philosophers must rule in a good city and Aristotles attitude towards this claim in his early, and little discussed, work, the Protrepticus . I argue that in the Republic , Platos main reason for having philosophers rule is that they alone understand the role of philosophical knowledge in a good life and how to produce characters that love such knowledge. He does not think that philosophic knowledge is necessary for getting right the vast majority of judgments about actions open to assessment as virtuous or vicious. I argue that in the Protrepticus Aristotle accepts similar reasons for the rule of philosophers, but goes beyond the Republic and seems to suggest that philosophic knowledge is required for getting right ethical and political judgments in general. I close by noting some connections with Aristotles later views in the Eudemian Ethics , the Nicomachean Ethics , and the Politics .

Politics, Books VII and VIII

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. TRANSLATION. COMMENTARY. TEXTUAL NOTE. BIBLIOGRAPHY. GLOSSARY. INDEXES.