Thanassis Samaras

Leisure in Classical Greek Philosophy

The concept of leisure plays a significant part in the ethical and political thinking of the Greek philosophers of the classical era. For both Plato and Aristotle leisure, in the sense not of inactivity but of freedom from the need to work in order to secure the necessities of life, is a prerequisite for the achievement of the highest form of human flourishing, eudaimonia. But what kind of leisure is necessary for eudaimonia, and which social groups may possibly attain it, is a question to which Plato gives, generally speaking, two different answers in his career. The first one, proposed in the Republic, represents a more demanding and elitist idea of human perfection, according to which involvement in any productive economic activity, including farming, makes it impossible for a human being to achieve virtue and eudaimonia. The second one, found in the late dialogue called Laws, allows for a lowest kind of virtue and flourishing which is achievable by practising farmers, though not by anyone engaging in craftsmanship or commerce. Aristotle appears to be closer to the earliest Platonic concept of the connection between leisure on the one hand and virtue and eudaimonia on the other, although some passages may suggest that citizens who are in some way engaged in farming may become virtuous. This understanding of leisure involves revisiting the ideal of the Homeric hero so that activities like fighting in war and hunting remain compatible with virtue, while at the same time promoting a notion of virtue that fits the framework of the classical polis. It also involves the repudiation of an alternative ethos which emphasizes the moral value of physical labour. This ethos is expressed in the poems of the major archaic Greek poet Hesiod and is adopted by the “middling” class, a class that rejects the aristocratic standpoint and, in the fifth and fourth century BC, becomes the social bedrock of classical Greek democracy.

Who Believes in Socrates’ Innocence? The Religious charges against Socrates and the Intended Audience of Plato’s Apology

This article argues for two theses: first, that Plato’s Apology is not directed to the Athenian public in general, but to an elite audience. Second, that because of this fact, the argument advanced by Vlastos that the Apology must be close to the historical defence of Socrates, because Plato could not present a fictional Socrates to his compatriots, is not compelling. The paper looks at the way Plato’s Socrates responds to the religious charges and concludes that he successfully refutes the charge of atheism (Apology 26b–27a) but evades the charge of heterodoxy. Although sufficient from a legal point of view and from the perspective of a highly educated audience, Socrates’ defence against the religious charges is actually ineffective from the point of view of the average Athenian. Burnyeat is therefore right to say that the Athenians correctly convicted Socrates of heterodoxy. This fact, along with Ledger’s recent stylometric evidence which places the Apology in 387 BC, effectively making it a middle dialogue, indicates that the work may never have been meant as a reasonably close reiteration of what Socrates said in his trial. On the question of the historicity of the Apology, then, the only reasonable response is to remain agnostic.