Christopher J. R. Roney

The theory of uncertainty orientation: a mathematical reformulation

In this paper, we present a mathematical formulation derived from the theory of uncertainty orientation (In R.M. Sorrehtino, & E.T. Higgins (Eds.), the handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behaviour, Vol. 1 (pp. 379-403). New York: The Guilford press; The uncertain mind: Individual differences in facing the unknown. London: Erlbaum (UK), Taylor & Francis). This formulation integrates affective and informational influences on thought and action. It is a model of self-regulation where the need to maintain clarity and the need to attain clarity are considered as two independent informational tendencies. These informational tendencies are influenced by the degree of self-relevance and the amount of perceived situational uncertainty. In addition, they are multiplicative with affective approach and avoidance tendencies, leading to accentuation or inhibition of behaviours expressed in action. It is further demonstrated that when the nondominant action tendency is instigated, secondary source of motivation are expressed. This model not only accounts for past data, but also permits exploration using computer simulation. In addition, many new and testable hypotheses, including those related to affect and dynamical decision theory, are generated.

Explaining the gambler's fallacy: Testing a gestalt explanation versus the “law of small numbers”

The present study tests a gestalt (closure) explanation for the gamblers fallacy which posits that runs in random events will be expected to reverse only when the run is open or ongoing. This is contrasted with the law of small numbers explanation suggesting that people expect random outcomes to balance out generally. Sixty-one university students placed hypothetical guesses and bets on a series of coin tosses. Either heads or tails were dominant (8 versus 4). In a closed run condition the run ended prior to the critical trial (e.g., HHHT), and in an open run condition the run remained open (e.g., THHH). As hypothesised, participants showed the gamblers fallacy in the open run condition, but not in the closed run condition. This difference is not due to differential memory for the outcomes. Men, and people with more previous experience gambling, were also found to be more prone to the gamblers fallacy. It is argued that the gestalt explanation best explains the results.

A Theory of Uncertainty Orientation

Based on the empirical evidence from our own past research, we have presented what we believe to be the first synergistic model of motivation and cognition that links individual differences in information processing to individual differences in motivation. This model takes into account not only the informational aspects of situations, such as attaining or maintaining clarity, but the affective components, such as feeling good or bad about the self. Although the empirical data set is primarily in the domain of achievement behavior, we believe it can be extended to most areas of behavior where the role of the self and self-regulation are important. This formulation translates the conceptual meaning of “flow” into specific informational and affective components, and introduces the term “anti-flow” to incorporate the negative state one may go through in matched situations or situations important to the individual. It also suggests when and where the full range of affective consequences of undertaking an activity should occur. Future research testing the model should lead to some exciting discoveries on how and when one thinks, acts, and feels.

Losses and external outcomes interact to produce the gambler's fallacy

When making serial predictions in a binary decision task, there is a clear tendency to assume that after a series of the same external outcome (e.g., heads in a coin flip), the next outcome will be the opposing one (e.g., tails), even when the outcomes are independent of one another. This so-called “gambler’s fallacy” has been replicated robustly. However, what drives gambler’s fallacy behavior is unclear. Here we demonstrate that a run of the same external outcome by itself does not lead to gambler’s fallacy behavior. However, when a run of external outcomes is accompanied by a concurrent run of failed guesses, gambler’s fallacy behavior is predominant. These results do not depend on how participants’ attention is directed. Thus, it appears that gambler’s fallacy behavior is driven by a combination of an external series of events and a concurrent series of failure experiences.

Variation in How We Cope with Uncertainty@@@The Uncertain Mind: Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown

Preface. The Uncertain Mind. Uncertainty and Society. Previous Approaches. Individual Differences in Uncertainty Orientation. The Development of Uncertainty Orientation . Theory of Personality Functioning and Change. Cognitive, Moral, and Ego-Identity Development. Cultural Differences in Uncertainty Orientation. The Self,/b> . Theories of Self. The Uncertainty-Oriented Person and the Self. The Self and Achievement Behavior. Self Discrepancy Theory. Achievement Behavior . The Theory of Achievement Motivation. Integration of Motivational and Cognitive Theories. Cognition. Uncertainty and Certainty Schema. Social Influence and Information Processing. Social Comparison. Memory and Categorization Differences. Attitude Change. Group Dynamics. Close Relationships. Cooperative Learning. Social Identity. Groupthink. Intergroup Conflict. Power. Psychopathology . Depression and Control. Self-Penetration Theory. Prevention and Protection Motivation. General Issues. Conscious Thought and Rational Behavior. The Dynamics of Action. Uncertainty Orientation and Society. Appendix.