Christopher Mitchell

International migration international relations and foreign policy.

Recent literature on migration, international relations and foreign policy is reviewed in this article, stressing applications of global systems paradigms, studies of state entry and exit rules, and anatomies of domestic policy-setting processes on migration. After a concise assessment of the contemporary theory of global political economy, the paper argues for seeking midrange generalizations on the international relations of migration. It also suggests that analysis begin with the policy-setting processes of the state. Especially through the use of comparative perspectives available from domestic policymaking studies and from the field of international comparative public policy, this approach offers the opportunity to fix empirically the political roles of transnational social forces, which often present themselves as participants in domestic policy contests. Promising future directions in the study of state-to-state relations are also evaluated, with the anticipation that verifying regional or other intermediate patterns of world migration politics may contribute to more general theories of international political economy.

Oolong: asynchronous distributed applications made easy

We present Oolong, a distributed programming framework designed for sparse asynchronous applications such as distributed web crawling, shortest paths, and connected components. Oolong stores program state in distributed in-memory key-value tables on which user-defined triggers may be set. Triggers can be activated whenever a key-value pair is modified. The event-driven nature of triggers is particularly appropriate for asynchronous computation where workers can independently process part of the state towards convergence without any need for global synchronization. Using Oolong, we have implemented solutions for several large-scale asynchronous computation problems, achieving good performance and robust fault tolerance.

U.S. Policy toward Haitian Boat People, 1972-93

In the early 1970s, Haitians began migrating by sea to south Florida without authorization. Influential economic and social elites in that region pressed for federal action to deter this population stream. Until 1981, arriving Haitian boat people were detained in Florida, and most were deported as rapidly as possible. Since 1981, the U.S. government has used the Coast Guard to intercept boats laden with Haitian migrants. Since May 1992, “interdicted” Haitian vessels have been escorted back to Haiti, without affording passengers an opportunity to request political asylum in the United States. Although this policy has aroused condemnation from many observers as inhumane and discriminatory, the U.S. government arguably has the administrative, legal, and political ability to uphold it. Political criticism of the interception policy has helped induce the U.S. government to act in favor of a democratic regime in Haiti. Such a political trend would undercut the argument that Haitian boat people are fleeing political persecution and would bolster the policy of repatriation. As both U.S. political leaders and the general public become more restrictionist, the policy of returning Haitian boat people may, unfortunately, come to seem normal rather than anomalous.

LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA 2007:BUSCANDO LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD

Se examinan aspectos economicos y sociales de los eventos dominicanos de 2007, enfatizando la continuacion de un manejo neoliberal de los asuntos macroeconomicos. Los resultados han incluido un incremento en la estabilidad politica, junto con un descontento social apreciable. Los preparativos para los comicios presidenciales del ano 2008 reciben atencion, y se sugiere que el sistema politico puede evolucionarse hacia un sistema bipartidista. Se discuten varias politicas publicas especificas, entre ellas la seguridad ciudadana, la educacion, el manejo de desastres naturales (especialmente tormentas tropicales), la corrupcion, y la construccion de un Metro en Santo Domingo. Se analiza el anhelo bastante difundido de una institucionalidad politica mayor, junto con los obstaculos que impiden la realizacion de esa aspiracion.

Assessing Alternative Explanations of Dominican Decentralization

Two competing theoretical accounts of Dominican decentralization focus, respectively, on economic shocks and on the interests of individual political parties. Neither model explains the course of Dominican events well. The nation did experience major economic traumas in 1984 and 1990, but the state reacted by revising the nation’s basic macro-economic model, not by spinning off responsibilities and revenue to subnational governments. The national government retained most policy functions, linked closely to vital fl ows of patronage. Kathleen O’Neill posits that a political party may strengthen local governments if it anticipates both losing national power and enjoying stronger future local-level support. The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) initiated many decentralizing reforms, but as part of a project to attain and hold presidential power, not to prepare for national defeat.

Pro-decentralization Strategies for the Future

To meet the challenge of promoting decentralization under a two-party political system, Dominican pro-municipal advocates might consider action in five areas: craft ing and communicating clear messages justifying power-diff usion; undertaking innovative policy eff orts in the municipal arena, perhaps through well-defined pilot programs; strengthening ties with infl uential interest groups in business, religion, and the NGO sector; promoting regional institutions as a buff er between the central state and municipalities; and sponsoring additional research that might identify new paths to decentralization or aid in removing obstacles to its progress. The municipalista coalition has shown a penchant for deft utilization of the existing political system in order to promote reform, and continuing that inventive tradition offers promise for the future.

Pushback against Decentralization, and Its Links with Infl uence over Nominations

The central government has systematically evaded sharing revenue at the legally-required level, possibly under pressure from the International Monetary Fund. In 2010 a new constitution canceled non-concurrent local elections, viewed by many national politicians as providing leverage to municipal leaders. Cabinet-level action also weakened the pro-decentralization research unit at the local office of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and abolished the National Council for State Reform (CONARE). Congressional representatives’ willingness to eliminate nonconcurrent elections may stem in part from the continuing power over nominations enjoyed by central party elites. Contemporary accounts of the four off -year elections held since 1998 reveal enduring — indeed, increasing – latitude for national party committees in electoral slate-making. Alliances among major parties in such elections have augmented central nominating prerogatives.

The Deep Roots and Local Consequences of Dominican Centralism

The Dominican state developed as an exceptionally centralized entity, in law from the time of independence in 1844 and in practice from the early 20th century. Communication advances bequeathed by a U.S. military occupation (1916–1924) facilitated the sweeping dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo (1930–1961). In a very poor nation, centralism was accepted by many population groups as one road to development. By the late 1980s, municipalities oft en could not discharge the few administrative functions (including street cleaning, garbage collection, and oversight of parks, markets, and cemeteries) that they were assigned. Social discontent and protest movements grew in urban areas during this period, placing improvement in town and city services on the national agenda for reform.

A Decentralizing Coalition Finds Political Leverage

Pro-municipal activists included politicians (in both the local and national arenas), technocrats, academics, jurists, and international aid agencies. Th is coalition endorsed decentralization to improve both local administration and the quality of democratic participation. Trends toward decentralization became strong enough to support some advocates’ careers in the field. The infl uence of municipalista forces grew when three-party competition came to dominate national politics, between 1986 and 2004. Election results since 1978 (national vote percentages, numbers of parliament members elected, and municipalities controlled) demonstrate these changes in party structure. The comparative literature on three-party competition is examined, and the roles of mini-parties, factions, and perceptual lags in party strategizing are described.

Party Alliances, the Municipios, and Decentralization

Nine crucial episodes in the maneuvering over decentralization are analyzed in detail. These include the establishment of non-concurrent elections, the election of a pro-municipal politician to lead the central state’s Municipal League, and the founding of a more autonomous Federation of Municipalities. In addition, combinations among parties led to two increases in revenue-sharing (1997 and 2003), and the capital city was sub-divided. A spontaneous local movement launched Participatory Budgeting (PB), which spread rapidly; important new laws also reduced the Municipal League’s power and made PB mandatory. The eff ects of these legal and policy innovations are evaluated, on the dimensions of institutional architecture, legislation, financial resources, and political momentum. The presence of shift ing party coalitions during this period is verified from relevant literature, and types of coalitions that may promote reform are distinguished.