Christopher Pass

Measures of international competitiveness: A critical survey∗ †

An examination of the extant literature on competitiveness reveals a wide variety of notions and extreme difficulties of measurement and application. Single measures of competitiveness do not capture all the elements of the concept. Useful measures have to specify the level of analysis (national, industry, firm or product) and encompass competitive performance, its sustainability through the generation of competitive potential and the management of the competitive process. The interrelationship between these three key elements are also important in a dynamic context. The effectiveness of management is essential to this analysis and the concept of industrial effectiveness at the management level enables a link to be established between the concept of competitiveness and an empirical investigation of decision making. A framework is derived which is of general use and specific measures are proposed to fill the “empty boxes” suggested.

Corporate governance and the role of non‐executive directors in large UK companies: an empirical study

In the 1990s various committees (Cadbury, Greenbury, Hempel) reported on governance issues, including the role played by non‐executive directors in promoting “best practice”. Following public concern at cases of “excessive” pay awards to executive directors and financial irregularities the government has recently appointed the Higgs Committee to review again the contribution of non‐executive directors. This paper presents an empirical study of the involvement of non‐executives in large UK companies, assesses the extent to which these companies now “conform” to the recommendations of “best practice” proposed by the earlier committees and looks at the general and specific controversies surrounding the employment of non‐executives as part of companies corporate governance structures.

The revised Combined Code and corporate governance

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which a sample of large UK companies comply with the main provisions of the revised 2003 Combined Code on corporate governance. The new Code incorporates a number of key principles of compliance with regard to the roles of a companys chairperson and chief executive, the composition of its Board of Directors and the composition of the Boards three main committees – the Nominations, Remuneration and Audit Committees. Companies are expected to fully comply with the provisions of the Code or proffer an “acceptable” explanation as to why they have not done so under the Codes “comply or explain” philosophy. The Code gives greater prominence to the role of non‐executive directors in a companys corporate governance structures and decision‐making processes and emphasizes the importance of non‐executive directors being “independent”.Design/methodology/approach – The paper looks at the extent of compliance in respect of the governance provisions...

Foreign Market Servicing by Multinationals: An Integrated Treatment

In conventional international business literature, the marketing and transport functions are either ignored or assumed to be governed by the same factors that determine production. An attempt is made to introduce the integration that is long overdue. The factors which determine the decisions of location and internalisation are examined, and analysis is made of the important role played by information flows in the planning of an integrated channel system. The conclusion is that simplistic categorisations are too crude, and that an integrated treatment, recognising the interdependencies and cost implications of each function, is essential for a complete conceptualisation of the foreign market servicing decision.

Performance criteria of corporate option and long‐term incentive plans: a survey of 150 UK companies 1994‐1998

A substantial number of companies now operate long‐term incentive schemes as a means of motivating executive directors to improve corporate financial performance and thus align their interests more closely with those of the company’s shareholders. This paper presents an empirical study of the option/long term incentive plans (LTIP) performance criteria used by a sample of UK companies to illustrate current practice and provides details of the importance of performance‐related remuneration in overall executive remuneration packages.

Long‐term incentive schemes, executive remuneration and corporate performance: an empirical study

UK plcs use option schemes and increasingly long‐term incentive plans (LTIP’s) to reward their executive directors in order to improve corporate performance and align their interests more closely with those of the shareholders of the company. This paper presents a study of the option and LTIP arrangements used by a sample of 51 large UK companies over the period 1994‐2001. The general finding is that a substantial proportion of the schemes are “undemanding” rewarding average rather than exceptional performance.

Canada-UK bilateral trade and investment relations

Preface and Acknowledgements - Introduction - PART 1 CANADA AND THE UK IN THE WORLD ECONOMY - Canada and the UK in World Trade: An Overview - Canada, the UK and Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview - Foreign Trade: Theory, Policy and Institutions - Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Policy and Institutions - UK Canadian Trade and Direct Investment - PART 2 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CANADIAN AND UK FIRMS - Background to the Survey - Foreign Market Servicing Strategies - Economic Integration - Competitiveness - Conclusion - Bibliography - Index

The configuration of long‐term executive directors incentive schemes

Purpose – The Article seeks to identify the configuration of executive directors conditional option and LTIP arrangements used to align the interest of the company’s directors and shareholders.Design/methodology/approach – The article presents an empirical study of the option and LTIP arrangements (current and previous) of 51 major UK companies. The article focuses on the configuration of option schemes and LTIPs in respect of three critical elements: the performance target selected, the comparator used to benchmark performance and the quantitative performance target level requirement to be achieved to trigger rewards. The period 1989‐2002, covered by the research indicates a substantial degree of “experimentation” with many companies amending their original option schemes and LTIPs and a larger number of other companies introducing new arrangements. A substantial number of schemes can be characterised as being “undemanding” rewarding average rather than excellent performance.Research limitations/implicat...

Non‐executive directors and the UK's new combined code on corporate governance

Purpose – A revised Combined Code on corporate governance was introduced in the UK in 2003 which set out a number of new provisions relating to the composition of the companys Board of Directors and its main Committees. The Code gives greater prominence to the role of non‐executive directors in a companys corporate governance structures and decision‐making processes. This paper examines the main provisions of the Code relating to non‐executive directors and the emphasis it places on the importance of non‐executives being “independent”.Design/methodology/approach – The paper discusses the main issues concerning the effectiveness of non‐executive directors, drawing in part of the evidence provided by a sample of large UK companies.Findings – Most companies “comply” with the Codes requirements relating to non‐executive directors and endorse the positive contribution they make to Board and Committee work.Practical implications – Considers the pros and cons of the role of non‐executives and the issue of wha...

Executive incentive pay strategies in entrepreneurial UK initial public offering companies: an empirical study

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to use a sample of UK entrepreneurial initial public offering (IPO) companies to investigate whether they change their compensation strategies as they undertake the crucial transformation of the business from private to public status.Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the agency perspective to underpin an examination of the changes within the compensation packages of companies at the stage of the initial public offering, particularly with regard to the use of executive director incentive schemes, and compares this to “best practice” guidelines issued within the UK.Findings – The paper discovers that even though incentive schemes are adopted, the majority are unconditional and requiring only an improvement in share price and the executive to remain employed in order for gains to be made. The general finding is that before IPO most companies did not have an incentive pay scheme in place, and those that did, operated unconditional option schemes. However, afte...