Christopher Shaw

The dangerous limits of dangerous limits: climate change and the precautionary principle

The European Union (EU) is commonly described as a world leader in the building of international environmental agreements (Jordan, 2008; Schlosberg and Rinfret, 2008; Gerhardsa and Lengfeldb, 2008). It was the driving force behind the Kyoto Protocol: this is the only existing international climate change treaty to include legally binding targets for reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide and requires developed countries to cut carbon dioxide emissions by an average of 5 per cent by 2012. It is, however, unlikely that EU member states will achieve these targets (Anderson and Bows, 2008). Despite this failure, the EU has already unilaterally committed itself to further reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide, with targets of 20% cuts by 2020, and 60% by 2050, in order to avoid warming the earth by more than two degrees centigrade over the preindustrial average (Europa, 2009). However, a new discourse is emerging which claims that two degrees is in excess of anything that might be considered safe, and that we are already living with dangerous climate change (Anderson and Bows, 2008; Harvey, 2007a, 2007b; Hansen et al., 2008; Schneider, 2008). Identifying if, or when, climate change becomes dangerous is made difficult by the absence of any consensus on what counts as ‘dangerous’ climate change (Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005; Hulme, 2007). This difficulty stems in large part from the fact that attitudes to risk and concepts of danger are socially and culturally embedded (Douglas and Wildalvsky, 1982). In addition, vulnerability to changes in the climate is not distributed evenly across all the world’s ecosystems and human communities. The variable nature of the way climate change is understood and experienced places a question mark over the idea that there can be one dangerous limit for the whole earth. Examination of these issues has been neglected by the mainstream media and NGOs, which have, alongside the state and elements of the corporate sector, been central to reproducing the discourse of a two degree dangerous limit. This acceptance of an overly simplistic account of dangerous climate change has been attributed to a strong and ongoing desire to discuss risk in a way ‘that circumvents or at least limits the complications inherent in drawing on the social science perspective or incorporating value judgments’ (Oppenheimer, 2005: 1401). This aversion to ethics and

Reframing climate risk to build public support for radical emission reductions: the role of deliberative democracy

Some commentators have responded to the diminishing possibility of limiting warming to a global average of 2°C by stressing the need for immediate and radical cuts in emissions. Other commentators have responded by asking whether we should abandon the 2°C target altogether. This paper intervenes in this emerging debate by asking who should be involved in deciding what is to be done. It is argued that deciding the future of the 2°C target should be conducted through democratic deliberation in order to build awareness of the climate risks that radical emission cuts are seeking to avoid. Allowing subordinate perspectives into the newly emergent 2°C policy space will allow for a co-production of knowledge about humanity’s options at this historic moment. This process is intended to build positive public engagement with the radical emissions reduction plan and widen the palette of socially acceptable policy options.

The role of rights, risks and responsibilities in the climate justice debate

Purpose This paper aims to use the results of a synthesis of six social science fellowships to explore how alternative framings of the climate justice debate can support fairer climate policies. Design/methodology/approach The original fellowships drew on sociology, economics, geography, psychology and international relations. Cross-cutting themes of rights, risks and responsibilities were identified following a series of workshops. Results of these workshops were discussed in a number of policy fora. Analysis of the feedback from that fora is used to propose the case for a rights, risks and responsibilities approach to building a more accessible climate justice debate. Findings Existing climate policy unjustly displaces a) responsibility for emission reductions, b) risks from climate impacts and c) loss of rights. Foundational questions of acceptable risk have been ignored and a just climate policy requires procedurally just ways of revisiting this first-order question. Research limitations/implications The contribution a rights, risks and responsibilities framework can bring to a process of educating for climate stewardship is at this stage theoretical. It is only through trialling a rights, risks and responsibilities approach to climate justice debates with the relevant stakeholders that its true potential can be assessed. Practical implications Policy actors expressed strong resistance to the idea of overhauling current decision-making processes and policy frameworks. However, moving forward from this point with a more nuanced and tactical understanding of the dialectical relationship between rights, risks and responsibilities has the potential to improve those processes. Social implications Educating for climate stewardship will be more effective if it adopts an approach which seeks a co-production of knowledge. Beginning with the foundational question of what counts as an acceptable level of climate risk offers an inclusive entry point into the debate. Originality/value Reveals limits to public engagement with climate policy generated by a ‘justice’ framing.

Climate crisis and the democratic prospect. Participatory governance in sustainable communities

In this wide ranging and timely book, Frank Fischer poses an important question – what are the prospects for democracy in a world of accelerating climate change? In his search for an answer, the au...

Framing Risk and Uncertainty in Social Science Articles on Climate Change, 1995–2012

The issue of climate change is intimately linked to notions of risk and uncertainty, concepts that pose challenges to climate science, climate change communication, and science-society interactions. While a large majority of climate scientists are increasingly certain about the causes of climate change and the risks posed by its impacts (see IPCC, 2013 and 2014), public perception of climate change is still largely framed by uncertainty, especially regarding impacts (Poortinga et al., 2011). Social scientists and communication researchers have begun to advocate moving from a framing of climate change in terms of uncertainty to one that focuses on risk (Painter, 2013; Silverman, 2013) and they hope that this shift in framing may generate greater public support for climate mitigation policies.