Christopher T. Taylor

A Variance Screen for Collusion

In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by sixteen percent, the standard deviation increased by over two hundred percent. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for “pockets” of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002.

Retail Gasoline Pricing: What Do We Know?

We use a data set consisting of a three year panel of prices from a sample of gasoline stations located in suburban Washington DC and a corresponding census of the regions stations to develop three new empirical findings about retail gasoline pricing. First, while average retail margins vary substantially over time (by more than 50% over the three years we analyze), the shape of the margin distribution remains relatively constant. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity in pricing behavior: stations charging very low or very high prices are more likely to maintain their pricing position than stations charging prices near the mean. Third, retail gasoline pricing is dynamic. Despite the heterogeneity in station pricing behavior, stations frequently change their relative pricing position in this distribution, sometimes dramatically. We then relate these three findings to relevant theories of retail pricing. While many models of retail pricing are consistent with some of our findings, we find that all have serious shortcomings.

The Economic Effects of the Marathon - Ashland Joint Venture: The Importance of Industry Supply Shocks and Vertical Market Structure

This study measures the effects of the Marathon/Ashland Petroleum (MAP) joint venture on rack and retail reformulated (RFG) gasoline prices in the four cities where both firms sold RFG before the joint venture. MAP was an early transaction in the recent era of petroleum mergers and resulted in large regional increases in concentration. While wholesale (rack) prices increased in the two cities experiencing the largest change in market structure in the year following the transaction, retail prices did not increase. Our results also highlight the importance of identifying the marginal source of supply in correctly identifying merger effects.

Do Gasoline Mergers Affect Consumer Prices? The Marathon Ashland Petroleum and Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Transaction

In 1999, Marathon Ashland Petroleum (MAP) acquired the Michigan assets of Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS), which increased MAP’s share of terminal storage in Michigan from about 16 percent to about 25 percent and increased the share of gasoline stations bearing a MAP brand from about 16 percent to about 24 percent. In this paper, we examine whether this acquisition affected the retail price of gasoline. We use a difference‐in‐differences model to compare price movements in six Michigan cities affected by the acquisition with price movements in two nearby cities unaffected by the acquisition. Using this model, we find no evidence that this acquisition led to higher prices for consumers.

The economic effects of withdrawn antidumping investigations: is there evidence of collusive settlements?

Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of antidumping cases initiated from 1990 to 1997 that ended in withdrawn petitions without a suspension agreement or voluntary restraint agreement. Monthly import data are used to estimate the price and quantity effects of the withdrawn cases. The estimated effects of the petition being withdrawn do not support the accepted wisdom that withdrawn petitions are a signal of collusion. This is an important issue, since out-of-court settlements of unfair trade cases which restrict quantities or increase prices are not only welfare reducing but are also actionable under the antitrust laws; they are not exempt under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine.

A Review of West Coast Gasoline Pricing and the Impact of Regulations

There have been numerous proposals for legislating restrictions on vertical supply relationships on the West Coast and elsewhere. However, there has not been a systematic examination of gasoline prices on the West Cost, relative to the rest of the country, to understand the size of possible pricing anomalies. We examine the differences in the price of gasoline on the West Coast and the Gulf Coast both at the rack (wholesale) and retail. We also examine structural factors that have kept average West Coast prices higher than elsewhere, such as the higher costs to produce CARB gasoline and higher opportunity costs to produce conventional gasoline, higher shipping costs, Unocals patents on CARB gasoline blending, higher taxes, Oregons ban on self-service gasoline, and higher land costs. While a number of these factors are difficult to quantify, they would appear to explain most or possibly all of the measured difference in average prices.

Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Comment

In a paper in the March 2004 AER, Justine Hastings concludes that the acquisition of an independent gasoline retailer, Thrifty, by a vertically integrated firm, ARCO, is associated with sizable price increases at competing stations. To better understand the novel mechanism to which she attributes this effect - which combines vertical integration and rebranding - we attempted but ultimately failed to reproduce the results using alternative data. In addition, we show that the welfare effects of the transaction are ambiguous in the theoretical model which she posits as underlying the empirical results.

The Cash Recovery Method of Calculating Profitability: An Application to Pharmaceutical Firms

The problems with commonly used accounting profit rates are well documented. In this paper an alternative to accounting profit rates, the cash recovery method is investigated and improved. This improved method is used as a means to estimate profitability in the pharmaceutical industry on a firm level. The profitability estimates give a similar rank order to the accounting profitability rates, but have different magnitudes.

Michigan Gasoline Pricing and the Marathon - Ashland and Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Transaction

Marathon-Ashland Petroleums (MAP) 1999 acquisition of the Michigan assets of Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS) increased MAPs share of terminal storage in Michigan from about 16 percent to about 25 percent and increased the share of gasoline stations bearing a MAP brand from about 16 percent to about 24 percent. In this paper, we examine whether this acquisition affected the retail price of gasoline. We use a difference-in-differences model to compare price movements in six Michigan cities affected by the acquisition with price movements in two nearby cities unaffected by the acquisition. Using this model, we find no evidence that this acquisition led to higher prices for consumers.

Edgeworth Price Cycles in Gasoline: Evidence from the U.S.

Studies of gasoline prices in multiple countries have found a repeated sequence of asymmetric cycles where a sharp price increase is followed by gradual decreases. This price pattern is linked to Maskin & Tirole’s (1988) theoretical duopoly pricing game that produces a similar pattern, Edgeworth price cycles. We examine data on average daily city-level retail gasoline and diesel prices for 355 cities in the U.S. from 2001-2007 using multiple methods to identify price cycles. We show that a relatively small number of U.S. cities concentrated in a number of contiguous upper Midwestern states evidence Edgeworth cycle-like pricing behavior. Within our data set cities tend to either cycle in all years or they do not cycle at all. We examine prices in cycling and non-cycling cites controlling for other factors and find consumers are no worse off, and likely better off, on average, in cycling than non-cycling cities. Finally, unlike previous studies, we find that some vertically integrated (branded) retail gasoline stations are themselves potentially important drivers of the scale and scope of cycling in retail gasoline prices. REVISED: May 2011