Christopher Tuck

Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency

approach to counter-insurgency (COIN). These consistencies consist of two linked themes: the political nature of counter-insurgency; and the discriminatory use of military power. The former of these reflects the British assumption that success depends crucially on political as well as military action. In historical practice, this consistency has been realized through a structure of command and control, usually a committee system, to facilitate civilian control of, and inputs into, military activities. The latter theme reflects the recognition that the military aspect of counter-insurgency needs to be carefully calibrated; it has been expressed historically through a tactical approach that has focused on minimum force, the central importance of good intelligence, and flexibility in application. However, it is worth noting, because it is central to the argument which follows, that an important distinction can be made between general assumptions about the effective conduct of counter-insurgency and their detailed implementation in a given context. In explaining the distinctions between the understanding of theory and its application in practice, Thomas R. Mockaitis notes the distinction that needs to be made between methods and principles. Whereas British principles towards the proper conduct of counter-insurgency existed at a general level and developed over time, British methods, in terms of operationalizing those principles in each particular context, were worked out through a process of trial and error, even in Malaya – the great British COIN triumph. Mockaitis notes that, “a considerable amount of time and many, many lives were wasted in rediscovering effective methods in each ensuing campaign”. Keith Jeffrey reinforces this point, noting that “A common characteristic of British counterinsurgency practice – at least in the early stages of a campaign – is confusion of aims, of command, of organisation and intelligence.” Habits of thought do not necessarily translate into habits of action. This is a point that a study of the British experience in Northern Ireland demonstrates powerfully. The view that success in Northern Ireland was the consequence of the patient application of Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 165–183, June 2007

Borneo 1963-66: Counter-insurgency Operations and War Termination

If they are examined at all, British counter-insurgency operations in Borneo from 1963-66 tend to be viewed as an overwhelming and, indeed, an almost inevitable success. This is a misleading and, in terms of deriving broader lessons, very dangerous conclusion. This article examines the British counter insurgency (COIN) campaign in Borneo from two perspectives. First, it examines the tactical and operational level aspects of the campaign, including command and control relationships, political constraints, and deniable operations. Second, it investigates the relationship between the COIN campaign and the strategic objectives that the British government pursued. The analysis concludes that there was a dangerous disconnect between the military and political aspects of the campaign. British success in Borneo was a contingent outcome that appeared elusive until the very last stages of the crisis.

‘All Innovation Leads to Hellfire’: Military Reform and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century

Abstract The debates on the pace, scope and nature of Ottoman military reform tend to be dominated by domestic and/or cultural explanations. Issues of military competition and efficiency, embodied in Neorealist perspectives, might appear to have little to offer as an explanatory tool in the Ottoman context. This article argues that this view is mistaken. First, despite their value, there remains an indeterminacy about domestic and cultural explanations that limits their usefulness as single-cause explanations. Second, Neorealism does generate valuable insights into the dynamics of military reform in the Ottoman Empire; issues of military competition and efficiency do matter in explaining the nature of Ottoman military reform during this period. Ultimately, domestic, cultural, and Neorealist perspectives are complementary, and mono-causal explanations of eighteenth century developments in the Ottoman military are likely to be too simplistic.

Borneo, Counter‐Insurgency and War Termination

Taylor and Francis FDEF_A_437973.sgm 10.1080/1 7024 0903377951 Defence Studies 470-2436 (pr nt)/1743-9698 (online) Original Article 2 1 & F ancis -2 0 0 00March-June 2010 ChristopherTuck ctuck.jscsc@ .mod.uk Effectiveness in counter-insurgency operations is clearly a compelling requirement for modern Western militaries. As the French 20th century strategic thinker Raymond Aron commented: ‘Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose.’ 1 One of the vexed contemporary questions of strategy thrown into importance by Afghanistan and Iraq is the relationship between counter-insurgency operations and war termination. Western conventional military capabilities have been notable for the success with which they have overmatched the enemy in symmetrical conflicts. However, where adversaries have responded by adopting strategies of irregular warfare, Western governments continued to face enduring problems in translating initial success in conventional warfare into stable peace. In the search for greater effectiveness in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, there has been a historical tendency to focus on the tactical and operational level requirements of operations; on the development of ‘principles of counter-insurgency’ the correct application of which it is assumed will result in overall success. The quality of counter-insurgency at these levels is clearly very important and will often constitute the sine qua non for eventual success. However, this paper makes two points. First, using Britain’s undeclared 1963–66 war against Indonesia (The Borneo ‘Confrontation’/ Konfratasi about the new Federation of Malaysia) as a starting point, this paper argues that, whilst tactical and operational level military success in COIN is clearly desirable, even significant military success cannot guarantee successful war termination. Effective war termination is often a matter of broader grand strategy. Second, because the successful termination of COIN campaigns is fundamentally an issue of grand strategy, it is always likely to be difficult to

'Winning While Losing:' Borneo Headquarters and the End of Confrontation, June-November 1966

From 1963 to 1966 Britain fought an undeclared war against Indonesia in the jungles of Borneo. Existing accounts of the tactical outcomes of this campaign take at face value the comments produced after the event by such key individuals as Sir Walter Walker, until March 1965 the British Director of Borneo Operations, who regarded the campaign as ‘a complete success’. This article demonstrates that this narrative is a retrospective judgement and that senior British officers at the time regarded the conclusion of the campaign as a success for Indonesia.

The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

Abstract This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.