Ian Speller

An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964

This article examines the response of the British government to the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964. It demonstrates that, once the safety of British nationals had been assured, British concerns centred upon the possibility that the new regime might become susceptible to communist influence. These fears appeared to be realised as British influence in Zanzibar diminished and the new government welcomed communist aid and advisers. In the aftermath of successful military interventions in support of moderate regimes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and under pressure from Washington to take decisive action, the British prepared a series of plans for military action in Zanzibar. None of these was enacted and the final plan was scrapped in December. The paper examines the range of factors that undermined British diplomacy and inhibited the government from taking military action in Zanzibar. In doing so it illustrates the complexity of Britains relationship with postcolonial regimes in East Africa and the difficulties that it faced when trying to exert influence in a region recognised by both London and Washington as a British sphere of influence.

A Splutter of Musketry? The British military response to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 1951.

This article examines the British response to the crisis that resulted from the Iranian decision to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. The British government contemplated the use of military force from the outset of the crisis and a series of plans were developed. Unfortunately, in a manner similar to the Suez Crisis five years later, the military were unable to provide a suitable response until political considerations had made the use of force unattractive. Despite this, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff continued to press for an armed response. This article uses newly released archival sources to examine the military plans and preparations and to analyse the way in which these interacted with political considerations to undermine the British position in Iran.

The Royal Navy and maritime power in the twentieth century

Foreword Admiral Sir Julian Oswald Introduction Ian Speller Chapter 1. The Transition to War: The hunt for the Goeben and Breslau, 1914 Andrew Gordon Chapter 2. Sea Control in Narrow Waters: The battles of Taranto and Matapan Jon Robb-Webb Chapter 3. Sea Denial, Interdiction and Diplomacy: The Royal Navy and the Role of Malta, 1939-43 Greg Kennedy Chapter 4. Air Power and Evacuations: Crete, 1942 Stephen Prince Chapter 5. Amphibious Operations: The Royal Navy and the Italian campaign, 1943-1945 Christopher Tuck Chapter 6. Complex Crises: The Royal Navy and the Undeclared War with Vichy France, 1940-1942 Stuart Griffin Chapter 7. Quarantine Operations: The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol Geoffrey Till Chapter 8. Maritime Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea Stuart Thomson Chapter 9. Naval Diplomacy: Operation Vantage, 1961 Ian Speller Chapter 10. Operations in a War Zone: The Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s Warren Chin Chapter 11. Peacekeeping, Peace Support and Peace Enforcement: The Royal Navy in the 1990s Andrew Dorman

Hampshire, E. (2013). From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic: British Naval Policy, 1964–70

As the title suggests, this book examines British naval policy from 1964 to 1970. It focuses, in particular, on the decision taken in 1966 to phase out the Royal Navy’s ageing fleet of aircraft carriers, not to proceed with plans for a new ship (CVA-01), and instead to rely only on land-based aircraft to protect British interests ‘east of Suez.’ It also examines the later decision to abandon entirely that role and the impact that this had on naval plans. Despite the title, the book does not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of navy policy and activity in the manner of Eric Grove’s From Vanguard to Trident (London: Bodley Head, 1987). There is little of detail here, for example, for those interested in the evolution of the submarine arm although the examination of naval priorities would provide very useful context for research into that subject. Instead the author concentrates on three key research questions: why was CVA-01 cancelled; how did the naval leadership react and respond to the cancellation; and, to what extent did the Royal Navy abandon its world role and concentrate on the Eastern Atlantic. In some respects this is already ground well trodden, not least by Grove. However, and as the author notes, most major studies that concentrate on the Royal Navy during this period were written before the records became available and thus there is an opportunity here to test their conclusions based on newly available primary sources. There are, of course, a large number of recent chapters and articles that have examined aspects of the carrier debate or the east of Suez decision and these have enjoyed access to the relevant sources. However, when this book was written none had examined the matter in such depth or detail and none have so successfully set the debate within the context of wider naval and defence policy. The topic is certainly an interesting one and the author succeeds in his attempt to shed new light upon it. As he candidly admits, many of the conclusions drawn by previous authors have been borne out by his research. He confirms existing ideas about the impact of the weakening of the Service Ministries under the Central Coordination of Defence, the declining influence of Mountbatten as a pro-navy Chief of Defence Staff, the manner in which the process of Functional Costing uniquely disadvantaged the carrier

‘Hit hard, move fast and sustain action’ The Replacement of the Royal Navy's Amphibious Warfare Squadron and the Rationale for HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid

This article examines the circumstances in which the old ships and craft of the post-1945 Royal Navys Amphibious Warfare Squadron were replaced by the new assault ships HMS Fearless and Intrepid. It analyses the impact on the requirement for amphibious forces of the change in emphasis in the late 1950s from major war contingencies to a new focus on mobile and flexible forces capable of responding to limited crises overseas. This called for a radically different type of capability than had been provided by the Amphibious Warfare Squadron and eventually resulted in a force built around two commando carriers, two new assault ships and six logistic landing ships. The article analyses alternative plans for the shape and size of the new amphibious force and examines the different design studies that resulted. It identifies a number of different ship types that were considered and demonstrates that the requirement to be able to land a joint all-arms force of up to a brigade group, supported by tanks and artillery, was key to the eventual decision to build Fearless and Intrepid and establishes the strategic rationale that underpinned the construction of these ships and demonstrates why they were built as amphibious transport docks in favour of the other design options.

Corbett, Liddell Hart and the ‘British Way in Warfare’ in the 1960s

The notion that there is, or at least was, a peculiarly ‘British way in warfare’, based around the use of maritime forces and the avoidance of major military commitments on the continent of Europe, has been the cause of one of the more enduring debates within the history of British defence policy. The debate has been a lively one that, in many respects, has revealed as much about the predilections of the various commentators as it has shed light on the past. Critics on both sides of the argument have not been averse to using and abusing the historical record for their own purposes. One of the reasons for this is that the debate is not just of academic interest. Arguments over the ‘British way in warfare’ have often been marshalled in support of a particular national strategy and, by extension, in favour of devoting greater or lesser resources to different military capabilities. To cut a complex story rather short, if one believes in the ‘British way’ then this suggests a focus on maritime capabilities whereas if one believes the alternative view, in the necessity and efficacy of a major military commitment to Europe, then the army and associated tactical air forces deserve a greater share. Such debates, always lively, take on a particular significance when resources are scarce and governments need to make hard decisions over priorities

The seaborne/airborne concept: Littoral Manoeuvre in the 1960s?

Abstract This article examines the seaborne/airborne concept, an approach to expeditionary warfare developed in Britain in the early 1960s. It identifies the strategic challenges that forced Britain to reassess its approach to the projection of power overseas and identifies the ways in which the new concept sought to meet these challenges. The ‘lessons’ learned from experience at Suez (1956) and Kuwait (1961) and their impact on procurement and on inter-service relations is addressed. The study also examines modern British doctrine for maritime expeditionary warfare and argues that contemporary concepts such as ‘Littoral Manoeuvre’ reflect the basic principles established in the 1960s.

Delayed reaction: UK maritime expeditionary capabilities and the lessons of the Falklands conflict

On 2 April 1982 Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands and the next day they occupied South Georgia. The small British garrisons based in both of these locations put up a spirited defense but were forced to capitulate in the face of overwhelming numbers. The Falkland Islands are situated in the South Atlantic, 400 miles to the west of Argentina and 8,000 miles southwest of the United Kingdom (UK). There are two main islands, West Falkland and East Falkland and the only town of any size, Port Stanley, is situated on the latter. South Georgia lies 800 miles to the south-east of the Falklands. To the apparent surprise of the Argentinean ruling Junta, the British dispatched a maritime task force to the South Atlantic intent on restoring British administration to the islands. The first ships of this task force sailed from the UK on 5 April. By 25 April British forces had recaptured South Georgia and on 14 June the Royal Marine commanding British land forces in the Falklands, Major-General Jeremy Moore, accepted the surrender of all Argentine forces in the Islands.