Christopher W. Tindale

A Concept Divided: Ralph Johnson's Definition of Argument

Ralph Johnsons Manifest Rationality (2000) is a major contribution to the field of informal logic, but the concept of argument that is central to its project suffers from a tension between the components that comprise it. This paper explores and addresses that tension by examining the implications of each of five aspects of the definition of ‘argument’.

Audiences, relevance, and cognitive environments

This paper discusses the fundamental sense in which the components of an argument should be relevant to the intended audience. In particular, the evidence advanced should be relevant to the facts and assumptions that are manifest in the cognitive environment of the audience. A version of Sperber and Wilsons concept of the cognitive environment is applied to argumentative concerns, and from this certain features of audience-relevance are explored: that the relevance of a premise can vary with the audience; that irrelevant premises can be made relevant; that evidence can be relevant by degrees; and that this notion of relevance will assist the argumentation analyst in the identification and assessment of hidden premises.

Ways of Being Reasonable: Perelman and the Philosophers

In 1958, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca published Traité de l ’argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique , the culmination of many years study. A seminal work in philosophy and rhetoric, it aimed to bring classical Aristotelian rhetoric into the modern era and present a model of argumentation that promoted action and reasonableness. One distinctive feature of the dense account found in this work is the claim that the success of argumentation can in part be measured by the responses of the audience for which it is intended. By that standard, the project of the new rhetoric appears unsuccessful, because the audience for whom Perelman (and Olbrechts-Tyteca) expressly wrote was the audience least captivated by his ideas. Writing as a philosopher for philosophers, Perelman strove to provide “for the sake of the logicians, a philosophical defense in favor of an enlarged conception of proof and reason,” “to show that philosophers cannot do without a rhetorical conception of reason” (1979, 42). Against the backdrop of positivism’s arid thought, he looked to establish, having emerged himself from an immersion in the intricacies of Frege’s logic, what at the time seemed at odds with the direction in which philosophical thought was fl owing—a logic of value.

Fallacies, Blunders, and Dialogue Shifts: Walton‘s Contributions to the Fallacy Debate

The paper examines Walton‘s concept of fallacy as it develops throughthree stages of his work: from the early series of papers co-authored withJohn Woods; through a second phase of involvement with thepragma-dialectical perspective; and on to the final phase in which heoffers a distinct pragmatic theory that reaches beyond the perceived limitsof the pragma-dialectical account while still exhibiting a debt to thatperspective and the early investigations with Woods. It is observed how Walton‘s model of fallacy is established in distinction to its competitors,and its various problems and successes are discussed.

From Syllogisms to Audiences: The Prospect for Logic in a Rhetorical Model of Argumentation

Central elements of formal and informal logics are examined in order to show that the product-oriented (logical) approach does not in itself constitute an adequate model of argumentation. Rather, the logical must be grounded in a rhetorical account of argumentation with its fuller treatment of context and richer notion of relevance. Ch. Perelmans model is a particularly suitable candidate for this. Contrary to the claims of some theorists, logical features are important to Perelmans overall treatment of argumentation.

Logical fallacies and invasion biology

AbstractLeading invasion biologists sometimes dismiss critics and criticisms of their field by invoking “the straw man” fallacy. Critics of invasion biology are also labelled as a small group of “naysayers” or “contrarians”, who are sometimes engaging in “science denialism”. Such unfortunate labels can be seen as a way to possibly suppress legitimate debates and dismiss or minimize reasonable concerns about some aspects of invasion biology, including the uncertainties about the geographic origins and complex environmental impacts of species, and the control programs against species perceived as “invasive”. In assessing the quality of the debate in this area, we examine the validity of the use of various strategies, including the “straw man” concept, and explore a range of potential logical fallacies present in some recent prominent discussions about invasion biology and so-called “invasive” species. The goal is to add some clarity to the concepts involved, point out some problematic issues, and improve the quality of the debates as the discussions move forward.

Narratives and the Concept of Argument

One approach to the question of narrative argument is to explore the nature of narratives and their argumentative potential. This is to understand an established tradition of argument, with set understandings of the key concept, into which narratives must fit if they are to be deemed arguments or argumentative. Another approach is to revisit the nature of argument itself so that traditional conditions are not imposed on any new forms. Doing this is not to decide in advance how ‘argument’ should be understood such that narratives are precluded in advance (or required to meet standards that they have difficulty meeting). It is the second approach that I take in the paper, drawing on a dynamic sense of argument that allows a richer range of discourses to qualify. This approach proved fruitful for those working on visual arguments, the lessons of which promise to be of value here. I will illustrate my argument with several examples that show how narrative arguments engage an audience in a particularly vivid way, inviting them to experience aspects of an issue in a way that enhances the persuasive power of the argument.

The Emotions’ Impact on Audience Judgments and Decision-Making in Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Early in Book I of his Rhetoric, Aristotle claims that audiences are persuaded when led by a speech to feel emotion. We do not give the same judgment when grieved as we do when we are rejoicing, or when being friendly as when we are hostile. It would seem, then, that emotions ground judgment. But Aristotle never explicitly addresses the question of how emotion comes to affect judgment. The answer to this question lies in the social nature of Aristotle’s account of the emotions and the structure of intentionality that this implies. In this paper, we draw out both the social account of the emotions and the type of intentionality that this reveals. Part I explores the ways in which the account of the emotions in the Rhetoric is other-regarding. In each case, emotional responses find us outside of ourselves in the world, navigating difficult interpersonal matters that can be understood and converted to sources of persuasion. Anger is directed toward others, for example; fear is of others. The common element here is the social nature of the emotions. Building on this account, we turn in Part II to argue that the mainstream concept of intentionality is insufficient to capture social emotions as presented by Aristotle in the second book of his Rhetoric. What is required is a different model of intentionality that captures the move from individual existence to social existence. Social emotions are embedded in social interactions and thus such emotions require a structure of intentionality that is both other-directed and directed back on the agent. The nature of this structure is illustrated by modelling it on a game. This understanding of full intentionality then presents the foundation for what we call ‘person worth’ (or person value—the value or worth that is assigned to people, things, and even situations), developed in Part III of the paper. Here, we discuss the personal worth of the speaker or arguer, who comes to a sense of self-value through what is reflected back from an audience. Each emotional state involves deliberation about the agent’s social situations and the expectations they have of others and that others have of them. Individuals thus strive to maintain a sense of emotional coherence with respect to these social situations and the judgments made with respect to them. And this in turn involves matters of ethos. From our study of emotion in the Rhetoric, we see that Aristotle’s theory of argumentation is richer and more complex than often imagined. He embeds emotions into intentional social interactions in the context of argumentation that addresses the mind-set of a deliberative audience in order to influence that audience’s beliefs and actions. In this sense emotions are other-accessible and de-privatized.