J. Anthony Blair

The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments

The chapter investigates the extension of argument into the realm of visual expression. Although images can be influential in affecting attitudes and beliefs it does not follow that such images are arguments. So we should at the outset investigate whether there can be visual arguments. To do so, we need to know what a visual argument would look like if we encountered one. How, if at all, are visual and verbal arguments related? An account of a concept of visual argument serves to establish the possibility that they exist. If they are possible in a non-metaphorical way, are there any visual arguments? Examples show that they do exist: in paintings and sculpture, in print advertisements, in TV commercials and in political cartoons. But visual arguments are not distinct in essence from verbal arguments. The argument is always a propositional entity, merely expressed differently in the two cases. And the effectiveness in much visual persuasion is not due to any arguments conveyed.

The Rhetoric of Visual Arguments

The chapter is about visual arguments. I address the relationships among these three: rhetoric, argument, and the visual. How can there be visual arguments when arguments as we usually know them are verbal? And if there can be visual arguments, what is their rhetorical aspect? Since arguments are supposed to be tools of persuasion and rhetoric is often thought of as including (but not exhausted by) the study and use of the instruments of persuasion, I first explore the relationships among rhetoric, argument and persuasion. Then I turn to the difficulties and opportunities that present themselves when considering visual argument in particular. The chapter ends by taking up the question: What does being visual add to arguments? It adds drama and force of a much greater order. Beyond that it can use such devices as references to cultural icons and other kinds of symbolism, dramatization and narrative to make a powerfully compelling case for its conclusion. The visual has an immediacy, a verisimilitude, and a concreteness that help influence acceptance and that are not available to the verbal. When argument is visual, it is, above all, visual rhetoric.

The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument

In the chapter I characterize argument-dialogues according to increasing levels of the complexity of the argument ingredient at each turn of a dialogue. I contend that at a certain stage in the increasing complexity of the argument turns, there is a qualitative change in the nature of the dialogue. The arguments in the latter “dialogues,” while addressed to another side, are solo performances. Such non-engaged, or quasi-engaged, dialogues are to be contrasted to the simpler types, like a Socratic dialogue, which are of necessity engaged. The arguments of such engaged dialogues are like duets. Solo “dialogue” arguments differ from duet “dialogue” arguments in at least three respects: the participation of the “respondent,” the composition of the “respondent” and the rules or norms that apply. For instance several of the discussion rules as the 10 “commandments” of the pragma-dialectical theory do not apply to “solo” dialogue arguments. It would help to distinguish the dialectical properties of arguments from their properties as dialogues.

Argument and Its Uses

The chapter raises an alarm about the direction that theorizing seems to be taking. For understandable reasons there has been a focus on the persuasive use of arguments to such a degree that many now define argument as a tool of persuasion. But there are plenty of other uses of arguments and it is possible, and indeed desirable, to define “argument” without reference to any particular use. Arguments are reasons for beliefs or for believing, reasons for attitudes or for emotions, or reasons for decisions about what to do—that is, in Mill’s phrase, “considerations … capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent.” It is important to focus on arguments so defined because we have not yet finished the job of providing a complete account of their logical norms. I sketch one way of framing their norms within the Toulmin model that assimilates a lot of the recent work of various theorists. And I join those who insist that assessing the logic of an argument is not all there is to evaluating arguments.

Walton’s Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning: A Critique and Development

The aim of the paper is to advance the theory of argument or inference schemes by suggesting answers to questions raised by Waltons Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996), specifically on: the relation between argument and reasoning; distinguishing deductive from presumptive schemes, the origin of schemes and the probative force of their use; and the motivation and justification for their associated critical questions.

The Keegstra Affair: A Test Case for Critical Thinking

The so-called “Keegstra affair” is offered as a test case for the teaching of critical thinking skills in high school history and social studies classes. James Keegstra was a high school history teacher in Alberta, Canada, who taught his students that there is a Jewish conspiracy to rule the world and that the Holocaust did not occur. His teaching is analyzed in terms of three of its salient features: his theory of history, his historical methodology and the way he taught history. His theory of history is a prioristic rather than empirical. His methodology was to appeal to the Bible and such sources as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion—the former being a mix of religion, ethics and history; the latter being thoroughly discredited by reliable authorities. He taught history by offering evidence supporting his interpretations, but without seeking out and considering evidence against them, except to discredit it. It is argued that students need to learn how to think critically about history in the specific ways needed to recognize, understand and avoid the flaws of Keegstra’s approach.

Pragma-Dialectics and Pragma-Dialectics

The hypothesis of this chapter is that the Pragma-Dialectical theory is one particular version—the Amsterdam version—of a general pragma-dialectical type of theory. It is thus possible to accept the general theory without accepting every feature of the specific instance of that theory, but not conversely. Another implication is that the general theory might have other versions that apply where the Pragma-Dialectical theory strictly-construed does not, and so, by being more general, the former is more powerful than the latter. I outline six of the distinctive characteristics of the Pragma-Dialectical approach, then catalogue nine possible lines of criticism of that approach that are consistent with taking a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. I argue that, if successful, some of the criticisms undermine the Pragma-Dialectical version of pragma-dialectics, whereas others just require repairs or modifications.

A Theory of Normative Reasoning Schemes

The argument of the chapter is that the theory of normative reasoning schemes constitutes at least one part of the theory of probative reasoning—reasoning the inferences of which are neither deductively valid nor quantitatively inductively strong, yet which, nonetheless, can be cogent. Normative reasoning schemes capture the structure of such reasoning, including its warrants, and thereby display how such inferences are rational, even though they are not logical entailments and not scientific inductions. This rationality is not left to “intuition,” but in each case can be traced to a particular way in which rationality is manifest. The application of normative reasoning schemes requires an understanding of these local manifestations of rationality, often in considerable specific detail, for such rationality is highly contextual, and the conditions of its exercise are, accordingly, specific to those contexts. These conditions are monitored by the so-called critical questions that theorists have associated with reasoning schemes, and these critical questions thus play an integral role in the application of these schemes.

Relationships Among Logic, Dialectic and Rhetoric

The chapter is an account of the relationships of the three fields or perspectives: logic, dialectic and rhetoric. I first explain the senses of these terms as they are used in the chapter. My thesis is that there is no one type of relationship among these three, but rather several—at least four, and there may be more. One is a conceptual or logical relation, for instance such that the properties of any one are logically independent of those of the others. A second is a contingent or empirical relationship, for instance such that there is a contingent correlation of some of the properties of one perspective with those of another. A third is a relationship of normative priority, such that for instance dialectical norms are always overriding. A fourth is a relationship of theoretical priority, such that for instance that the rhetorical perspective is theoretically basic. For each of these types of ways the three can be related, the question arises as to how they in fact are related. For each type there is not always only one way the three are related.

Relevance, Acceptability and Sufficiency Today

The chapter is a reconsideration of the three criteria of a logically good argument—relevance, acceptability and sufficiency—30 years after Johnson and Blair introduced them in Logical Self-Defense (1977). The primary role of relevance is in the interpretation of discourse and judgments of probative relevance to identify the components of arguments to be found therein. Both acceptability and sufficiency are best understood as placeholders. In the case of acceptability, the use to which the argument is being put makes a difference. Similarly for sufficiency. Special fields such as the various sciences or professions will have standards peculiar to them for arguments about their subject matters. General guidelines for such things as the credibility of testimony or the trustworthiness of one’s own experience can be and have been formulated. Thorough arguments will have a dialectical dimension as well, with objections to the thesis or to the arguments for it acknowledged and answers to them provided.