Christopher Witko

Federalism and American Inequality

Studies of the political determinants of economic inequality have usually focused on the national government, but in federalist systems subnational governments may also be important. In recent decades, the U.S. national government has been less active in fighting inequality, but increasing devolution means that states wanting to address this problem have had a greater incentive and perhaps means by which to do so. Applying power resources theory, we argue that in states where left parties are stronger and more liberal politics are enacted, the government will reduce inequality and that this state effect becomes more pronounced as middle- and lower-class power wanes nationally. In the analysis we find that both federal and state governments influence inequality, and since the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995, the states have played a more important role in shaping the income distribution.

PACs, Issue Context, and Congressional Decisionmaking

Scholars have claimed that PAC influence on congressional behavior is more likely on certain types of issues. After considering both roll-call voting and committee participation, I argue that the conditions making PAC influence on voting most likely make influence on participation least likely, and vice versa. The analysis of 20 legislative proposals indicates that PACs are able to influence voting on non-ideological/non-visible issues, but are more likely to influence participation on ideological/visible issues. Unlike previous studies, these findings demonstrate that PACs can influence behavior across different contexts, but that the route to influence differs depending on the type of issue being considered.

Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation

Scholars are beginning to consider how state campaign finance regulation influences political behavior and elections, but they lack the systematic measure of these regulations needed to do so. This article describes a simple measure of state campaign finance regulation stringency that is based on state statutes in 2002. Further, this article explains the construction of the measure and assesses its validity and reliability. The index generally confirms qualitative assessments of state campaign finance regulation, and it is correlated with measures of related aspects of state campaign finance regulation, campaign spending, and fundraising.

Conditional Status Quo Bias and Top Income Shares: How U.S. Political Institutions Have Benefited the Rich

This article develops and tests a model of conditional status quo bias and American inequality. We find that institutional features that bias policy outcomes toward the status quo have played a central role in the path of inequality. Using time-series analysis of top income shares during the post-Depression period, we identify the Senate as a key actor in the politics of income inequality. Our findings suggest that the supermajoritarian nature of the Senate and policy stagnation, when coupled with economic and social factors that produce rising inequality, create a situation in which inequality becomes difficult to reverse.

Inequality, Self-Interest, and Public Support for "Robin Hood" Tax Policies

Influential economic models predict that as inequality increases, the public will demand greater redistribution. However, there is limited research into the determinants of support for redistributive tax increases because such proposals have been so rare in America in recent decades. We use Washington State’s Proposition 1098 to examine how economic self-interest, concerns about inequality, and partisanship influence support for redistributive taxation. The results show that all of these factors influenced support, with strong support among the lower income, indicating that when the distributional implications of policies are clear, citizens can translate their self-interest and broad attitudes into congruent redistributive preferences.

Explaining Increases in the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation, 1993–2002:

Recent research has taught us much about the effects of campaign finance laws, but we know little about why states adopt the regulations that they do. I address this question by examining why states increased the stringency of their campaign finance laws from 1993 to 2002. As is the case with other policies regulating the conduct of elected officials, the popular perception exists that politicians resist stringent campaign finance out of a concern for their own electoral self-interest. As a result, I test whether campaign finance policymaking results from the selfish electoral incentives that politicians allegedly have on this issue or decisions on this issue are influenced by factors that influence other types of policies. I find evidence to support both views. Specifically, the initiative option, a liberal government, strong good government groups, legislative professionalism, and scandal increase the likelihood of a state increasing the stringency of their regulations, while states with expensive legislative elections are less willing to do so.

The Ecology of Party–Organized Interest Relationships

The relationship between political parties and organized interests is critical to understanding democratic politics, yet few scholars have systematically studied this topic in recent decades. In the following essay, I review the American politics literature examining the interactions between parties and organized interests and assess the current state of our knowledge. I then argue that we should make more explicit and systematic use of the understanding of symbiotic relationships from the field of ecology, which is already either explicitly or implicitly used in many studies, to improve our understanding of interactions between parties and organized interests. By applying these ideas, we can better understand the formation and internal dynamics of symbiotic relationships between political parties and organized interests, as well as the larger questions of how party–organized interest interactions help to shape broader outcomes, which I discuss in the conclusion.

Breastfeeding and Trajectories of Children's Cognitive Development.

The aim of this study was to examine the association of breastfeeding practices with the growth trajectories of childrens cognitive development. We used data from the Child Development Supplement (CDS) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) with variables on presence and duration of breastfeeding and standardized test scores obtained during three different panel waves (N = 2681). After adjusting for covariates we found that breastfed children had higher test scores but that breastfed and non-breastfed children had similar growth trajectories in test scores over time. The results indicate that breastfeeding has an important association with test scores, and that subsequent schooling and other experiences during adolescence do not eliminate the breastfeeding gap that appears in very early childhood.

Does the amount of school choice matter for student engagement

Abstract School choice may increase student engagement by enabling students to attend schools that more closely match their needs and preferences. But this effect on engagement may depend on the characteristics of the choices available. Therefore, we consider how the amount of educational choice of different types in a local educational marketplace affects student engagement using a large, national population of 8th grade students. We find that more choice of regular public schools in the elementary and middle school years is associated with a lower likelihood that students will be severely disengaged in eighth grade, and more choices of public schools of choice has a similar effect but only in urban areas. In contrast, more private sector choice does not have such a general beneficial effect.

Class Bias in Voter Turnout, Representation, and Income Inequality

The mass franchise led to more responsive government and a more equitable distribution of resources in the United States and other democracies. Recently in America, however, voter participation has been low and increasingly biased toward the wealthy. We investigate whether this electoral “class bias” shapes government ideology, the substance of economic policy, and distributional outcomes, thereby shedding light on both the old question of whether who votes matters and the newer question of how politics has contributed to growing income inequality. Because both lower and upper income groups try to use their resources to mobilize their supporters and demobilize their opponents, we argue that variation in class bias in turnout is a good indicator of the balance of power between upper and lower income groups. And because lower income voters favor more liberal governments and economic policies we expect that less class bias will be associated with these outcomes and a more equal income distribution. Our analysis of data from the U.S. states confirms that class bias matters for these outcomes.