Christos Pantzalis

Political elections and the resolution of uncertainty: The international evidence

Abstract We investigate the behavior of stock market indices across 33 countries around political election dates during the sample period 1974–1995. We find a positive abnormal return during the two-week period prior to the election week. The positive reaction of the stock market to elections is shown to be a function of a country’s degree of political, economic and press freedom, and a function of the election timing and the success of the incumbent in being re-elected. In particular, we find strong positive abnormal returns leading up to the elections (i) in less free countries won by the opposition, and (ii) called early and lost by the incumbent government. These results are consistent with the uncertain information hypothesis (UIH) of Brown et al. (Brown, K.C., Harlow, W.V., Tinic, S.M., 1988. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 355–385) and the model of election behavior of Harrington (Harrington, J.E., 1993. The American Economic Review 83, 27–42).

Geographic Diversification and Agency Costs of Debt of Multinational Firms

In one general embodiment, a method includes forming a slot on a tape bearing surface of at least a chip having a thin film layer with a plurality of transducers therein, the slot defining a skiving edge. A second operation is performed on the tape bearing surface of at least the chip for removing a portion of the chip positioned on an opposite side of the slot as the transducers.

A Test of the Errors-in-Expectations Explanation of the Value/Glamour Stock Returns Performance: Evidence from Analysts' Forecasts

Several empirical studies show that investment strategies that favor the purchase of stocks with low prices relative to conventional measures of value yield higher returns. Some of these studies imply that investors are too optimistic about (glamour) stocks that have had good performance in the recent past and too pessimistic about (value) stocks that have performed poorly. We examine whether investors systematically overestimate (underestimate) the future earnings performance of glamour (value) stocks over the 1976 to 1997 period. Our results fail to support the extrapolation hypothesis that posits that the superior performance of value stocks is because investors make systematic errors in predicting future growth in earnings of out-of-favor stocks. Copyright The American Finance Association 2002.

The Two Faces of Analyst Coverage

We find that positive excess (strong) analyst coverage is associated with overvaluation and low future returns. This finding is consistent with the view that excessive analyst coverage, driven by investment banking incentives and analyst self-interests, raises investor optimism causing share prices to trade above fundamental value. However, weak analyst coverage causes stocks to trade below fundamental values. This finding indicates that investors tend to believe that these firms are more likely to be plagued by information asymmetries and agency problems. The results remain robust after controlling for the possible endogenous nature of analyst coverage and analysts¿ self-selection bias.

Security Analysis, Agency Costs and UK Firm Characteristics

In this paper we appraise the monitoring activity of security analysis from the manager-shareholder conflict perspective. Using a data set of more than 7000 firm-year observations for manufacturing firms tracked by security analysts over the 1988-1994 period, our evidence supports the view that security analysis acts as a monitoring mechanism in reducing agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. However, we also find that security analysts are more effective in reducing managerial non-value maximizing behavior for single-focused than multi-segment (diversified) firms. In addition, the shareholder gains from the monitoring activity of security analysis are found to be larger for focused than for diversified firms.

Arbitrage Risk and Stock Mispricing

In this paper we examine the relation between equity mispricing and arbitrage risk and find that stocks with high arbitrage risk have higher estimated mispricing than stocks with low arbitrage risk. These results are not limited to high book-to-market or small capitalization stocks, and they are not sensitive to transaction and short-selling costs. In addition, they remain robust to alternative multifactor return generating specification models and mispricing measures. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the conjecture that mispricing is a manifestation of the inability of arbitrageurs to hedge idiosyncratic risk, a major deterrent to arbitrage activity.

Firmwide Risk Management of Foreign Exchange Exposure by U.S. Multinational Corporations

This paper investigates the impact of firmwide risk management practices on the foreign exchange exposure of 208 U.S. multinational corporations (MNC) over the period 1994 to 1998. Firmwide risk management is the coordinated use of both financial hedges, such as currency derivatives, and operational hedges, described by the structure of a firms MNC foreign subsidiary network, to manage currency risk. We find that the use of currency derivatives, particularly forward contracts, is associated with reduced levels of foreign-exchange exposure. Furthermore, MNCs with dispersed operating networks have lower levels of currency exposure. These findings are robust to alternative ways of measuring foreign-exchange exposure. Finally, our results strongly support the view that MNCs hedging in a coordinated manner can significantly reduce exposure to currency risk. These results strongly suggest that operational and financial hedges are complementary risk management strategies.

Market Valuation and Equity Ownership Structure: The Case of Agency Conflict Regimes

This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firms performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.

Corporate Foreign Exchange Speculation and Integrated Risk Management

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate how non-finance departmental involvement in the management of exchange rate risks impacts the extent of foreign exchange speculation in non-financial firms. Design/methodology/approach - Non-financial firms in a small open economy (Denmark) are surveyed to investigate the extent of foreign exchange speculation and how it is related to the degree of nonfinance departmental involvement in the management of exchange rate risks. The authors employ binary and ordered probit regression analysis. Findings - A positive link is found between the extent to which departments other than the finance department are involved in the management of exchange rate risks; and second, the extent to which the firm is likely to speculate – whether in the form of selective hedging or active speculation – on the foreign exchange market. Practical implications - The findings indicate that the trend towards a more integrated risk management approach in which the finance department is not the only department responsible for risk management may have the (unforeseen) consequence that foreign exchange speculation increases. Originality/value - The papers findings are important because the link between the extent of foreign exchange speculation and a more integrated risk management approach has not been addressed previously.

Security Analyst Incentives and Quality of Analyst Generated Information

We investigate the relationship between security analyst coverage characteristics and analyst-related incentives in order to determine whether the quality of analyst-generated information, (as measured by the absolute median forecast error of estimates, analyst uncertainty, diversity of opinion among analysts, and excessive analyst optimism) improves if higher trading commissions and fees can be earned, or when there is greater investor interest and scrutiny. We find strong evidence that incentives influence the quality of analyst information. The implication of our findings is that it would serve investors well to distinguish between high quality and low quality analyst forecasts and recommendations. We recommend that investors estimate the “information risk” associated with analyst reports.