Jung Chul Park

Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Risk

We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.

Equity-Based Incentives, Risk Aversion, and Merger-Related Risk-Taking Behavior

We find that post-merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in-the-money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post-merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option-based compensation does not necessarily increase risk-taking behavior by CEOs.

Idiosyncratic Volatility: An Indicator of Noise Trading?

We investigate the market efficiency implications of firm-specific return variation measured by absolute idiosyncratic volatility. We find that the absolute idiosyncratic volatility (the variance of the residual from an asset-pricing model) displays a positive and robust relationship to mispricing, which reflects an increasing role of noise traders. Previous literature has produced similar – or opposing – results. We deepen our understanding of the previous conflicting results by showing that (1) market volatility by itself is associated with mispricing, (2) absolute idiosyncratic volatility is associated with mispricing even when controlling for market volatility, (3) the strength of the association between absolute idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing depends on the level of market volatility, and (4) absolute and relative measures of idiosyncratic volatility have opposing associations with mispricing. Our findings contribute to the existing literature by reconciling the mixed results for the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing displayed in the previous literature.

Policy Uncertainty and the Dual Role of Corporate Political Strategies

Firms use active political strategies not only to mitigate uncertainty emanating from legislative activity, but also to enhance their growth opportunities. We find that the impact of such policy uncertainty on systematic risk (beta) can be hedged away by employing various political strategies involving the presence of former politicians on corporate boards of directors, contributions to political campaigns, and corporate lobbying activities. In addition, we show that active political strategies can boost firms’ growth opportunities; they are associated with greater firm heterogeneity and make real options more value-relevant as potential drivers of competitive advantages in uncertain environments.

CEO Overconfidence and Strategic Flexibility:Evidence from Real Options Investment

While real options theory has been applied with the rationality assumption, the actual real options investments are made by managers, who are often subjective to cognitive biases, especially under ...