Claire Macher

Optimal Selectivity and Effort Cost A Simple Bioeconomic Model with an Application to the Bay of Biscay Nephrops Fishery

Abstract This article investigates the relationship between optimal gear selectivity and effort cost in the fishing industry. We first show that optimal selectivity depends negatively on the level of effort cost, but that this relationship is not continuous. Optimal selectivity switches when real effort cost goes beyond a certain level, and this switch induces a non-marginal reduction in the level of fishing effort. In the second part of this article, we show that the current level of real effort cost in the Nephrops fishery of the Bay of Biscay is far below the switch point, which makes high selectivity optimal. The discrepancy between optimal and current selectivity may be explained by the state of the fishery management and also by the fact that selectivity is hardly observable with the type of gear presently used. JEL Classification Codes: Q22, Q57, H23

Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution

ABSTRACT Most fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions. JEL Codes: Q22, J33, M52.