Clara Portela

Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and foreign policy: coherence by accident?

This article investigates the relationship between the European Unions withdrawal of trade benefits for developing countries under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and its sanctions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Our expectation is that GSP withdrawals and CFSP sanctions will not cohere. However, our research reveals that GSP suspension has been coherent with CFSP sanctions when the latter exist prior to the decision-making process on GSP sanctions and when the International Labour Organisation has set up a Commission of Inquiry condemning the country, as with Myanmar/Burma and Belarus. The presence of separate institutional frameworks explains the GSP suspension towards Sri Lanka in the absence of CFSP sanctions.

The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor

This is the second in a series of papers from a new project entitled “Who is a normative foreign policy actor? The European Union and its Global Partners”. The first paper – entitled Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners, by Nathalie Tocci, CEPS Working Document No. 279, December 2007 – set out the conceptual framework for exploring this question. The present paper constitutes one of several case studies applying this framework to the behaviour of the European Union, whereas the others to follow concern China, India, Russia and the United States. A normative foreign policy is rigorously defined as one that is normative according to the goals set, the means employed and the results obtained. Each of these studies explores eight actual case examples of foreign policy behaviour, selected in order to illustrate four alternative paradigms of foreign policy behaviour – the normative, the realpolitik, the imperialistic and the status quo. For each of these four paradigms, there are two examples of EU foreign policy, one demonstrating intended consequences and the other, unintended effects. The fact that examples can be found that fit all of these different types shows the importance of ‘conditioning factors’, which relate to the internal interests and capabilities of the EU as a foreign policy actor as well as the external context in which other major actors may be at work.

EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?

Nuclear weapons remain the unquestioned core of the defence postures of both France and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the European Union is progressively enhancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), notably through the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Yet, despite evident progress in the CFSP, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to a ‘common defence policy’, EU member-states still deal with nuclear issues on a predominantly national basis. What is the alleged purpose of European nuclear forces? How is the raison d’être of the French and British nuclear deterrents conceptualized against the background of progressing European (defence) integration? This article examines the construction of the rationale of the French and British nuclear forces and their compatibility with the emerging European defence policy, particularly with regard to a hypothetical integration of both arsenals into a common deterrent. Could and should a ‘European nuclear deterrent’ be envisaged as the final stage in the framing of a European defence?

One Swallow Does Not Make Spring: A Critical Juncture Perspective on the EU Sanctions in Response to the Arab Spring

Abstract This article examines to what extent the Arab Spring constitutes a critical juncture – a major turning point – for the EU’s sanctions policy towards Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. Based on a multidimensional critical juncture operationalization, we find that the Arab Spring only constitutes such a turning point for the EU’s sanctions policy towards Syria. Both the level and nature of measures differ substantially from previous years. By contrast, the EU’s sanctions practice towards Libya, Egypt and Tunisia shows more resilience. More generally, changes in the nature of the measures are prominent, whereas changes in the level of the policy instruments and in underlying norms and goals are limited.

The UN, regional sanctions and Africa

Sanctions are frequently applied by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as regional organizations. While the objectives sought often vary, a frequent commonality is that they target African states. Indeed, Africa is the most frequently targeted continent by the UNSC and regional organisations including the African Union, Economic Community of West African States and the European Union. However, little attention has been paid to the confluence of this sanctions activity by these different organizations. This article seeks to address this gap in the research. While the UNSC continues to focus on sanctioning to end hostilities, the regional organizations have assigned themselves unconstitutional changes to government as the principal reason to sanction African states. Drawing on data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), this article suggests that: 1) regional organisations are leading UNSC activity more often than is appreciated in the literature; 2) the UNSC has of late been expanding its sanctioning activity to consider issues of democracy and good governance; 3) the UNSC uses sanctions to endorse the activity of African regional organizations to deal with crises on the continent; and 4) UNSC and regional sanctions are intimately tied to crisis management in Africa

Are European Union sanctions “targeted”?

Abstract The emergence of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s was due to the humanitarian impact of embargoes, which were deemed unacceptable and compelled senders to shift to measures designed to affect only wrongdoers. Twenty years on, the present paper considers the extent to which autonomous sanctions are designed to affect those individuals and elites responsible for the behaviour the EU aims to condemn. How faithful has the EU remained to this concept in its sanctions policy? The enquiry scrutinizes diverse practices in three established sanctions strands of the EU, development aid suspensions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions and Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) withdrawals. It shows that it has been more faithfully implemented in some strands of EU sanctions than in others. Specifically in the flagship CFSP sanctions practice, the due process motivated court challenges of its blacklists have led the EU to modify selection criteria in a way that renders them potentially less targeted.

Sanctions and Embargoes in EU-Asia Relations

Sanctions and embargoes are a significant, yet controversial component of the EU policies towards Asia. The goal of our chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of EU sanction policy in the region. We examine the three most prominent episodes: the arms embargo on China, the sanctions against North Korea and the sanctions against Myanmar. We address the reasons why sanctions were wielded, their characteristics and their effectiveness. We also examine the ways in which the EU positions itself in relation to the sanctions strategies of the main actors in the region, notably the US, China, Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1

National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions

The implementation of the United Nations security council sanctions by member states has gained increasing importance in the sanctions debate over the past 15 years. Having remained long neglected in academic circles, the sanctions review process sponsored by the Swiss, German, and Swedish governments over the past decade has been instrumental in putting the question of implementation at the centre of the sanctions research agenda.1 One of the main innovations that has characterized the sanctions landscape in the aftermath of the Cold War is the transformation of sanctions

The Relationship between United Nations Sanctions and Regional Sanctions Regimes

One of the most notable developments in the sanctions landscape over the past couple of decades has been the proliferation of sanctions imposed by regional organizations. Of the sixty-three United Nations sanctions episodes studied by the consortium, forty-three involve regional organizations, in some cases a multiplicity of them. In twelve sanctions regimes, regional sanctions preceded the UN sanctions, and in ten cases, unilateral sanctions preceded UN sanctions. In fact, only six episodes are of stand-alone UN sanctions. This suggests that states subject to sanctions are increasingly targeted by a combination of UN and regional measures. This development is interesting for several reasons. First, the use of sanctions outside of the framework of the UN has illustrated the willingness of regional organizations to employ coercive measures within their regions, even in the case of organizations created fairly recently. From this vantage point, it is symptomatic of the rise of regional governance. Second, in the past, sanctions had been criticized by Third-World leaders as a tool to impose a Western agenda on them. Indeed, many regional organizations in the developing world emerged as post-colonial projects with the explicit aim of shielding sovereign governments from external interference. The fact that some regional organizations now employing sanctions most frequently are located outside of the Western world is indicative of these measures’ growing legitimacy and usefulness as foreign policy tools. In addition, the increasingly frequent resort to sanctions signifies that some regions in the developing world, which have been traditionally at the receiving end of sanctions, are taking ownership of their security governance. Despite the proliferation of sanctions adopted by regional arrangements, little attention has been devoted to them or to their relationship with UN sanctions. To date, research has focused primarily on regional organizations as implementers of UN sanctions – an issue that has gained currency especially following successful legal challenges to legislation giving effect to UN blacklists of individuals. But important questions as to the interrelationship between regional and UN sanctions exist – such as whether they complement or conflict with each other, and whether regional organizations follow the lead of UN sanctions or set the stage for the UN to act. This chapter explores the relationship between mandatory sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, on the one hand, and regional organizations, on the other.

The rise and fall of Spain's 'nuclear exceptionalism'

The present article looks at the evolution of Spanish views on deterrence and non-proliferation. Like every member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Spain is covered by the US nuclear umbrella and has accepted the logic of deterrence, while at the same time maintaining a denuclearised status and committing to the goal of disarmament enshrined in the non-proliferation treaty. This article explores the background of Spains apparently contradictory situation as a denuclearised member of NATO and how it positions itself in regard to the nuclear question in the current security context. It concludes that while Spanish nuclear ‘exceptionalism’ originally rested on the reluctance of the political elites to alter the precarious compromise that once allowed for Spains accession to NATO as a denuclearised member, it gradually withered away to give way to a close alignment with Alliance policies driven by a desire to preserve strong security links with its partners.