Coco Smits

Authority in Arctic governance: changing spheres of authority in Greenlandic offshore oil and gas developments

The Arctic has rapidly transformed from a “frozen desert” into a theater for high-level politics. Climate change and socioeconomic interdependencies bring the World more and more to the Arctic and vice versa. Increased geological knowledge, new technologies, and high-energy prices make it possible to develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic; however, the effectiveness of oil spill response techniques remains a key concern. To understand oil and gas exploration in the Arctic governance setting, and especially the authority of Greenland, we combine a multi-level governance framework with the concept sphere of authority from post-international theory. The Arctic sphere of authority on oil and gas consists of many different governance arrangements, of which the most well-known governance arrangement is the Arctic Council. This paper focuses on the authority of Greenland in the changing oil and gas governance arrangements in the Arctic. Crucial is the changing Danish–Greenlandic relationship, in which the development of a Greenlandic oil and gas sector is seen as a tool to become financially independent. It can be concluded that the capacity of the Greenlandic government and civil society actors should be the primary guideline for the pace in which oil and gas activities are being developed. Taking this approach will ensure that the Greenland is retaining its central position and high degree of influence on the governance of oil and gas development in its country. Otherwise, it will lose influence and benefits will flow elsewhere.

Energy as a Developmental Strategy: Creating Knowledge-Based Energy Sectors in Iceland, Faroe Islands and Greenland

Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland share a history as overseas autonomies of the Kingdom of Denmark. It is relevant to compare their constitutional, political and socioeconomic trajectories, since there are processes of learning and spillover between these three microstates. Although only Iceland is fully independent, we refer to them as ‘microstates’ in this chapter, because that term highlights a central aspect of these societies: how they face the challenge of being very small societies located on the periphery. The three societies differ in size: Iceland has a population of about 310 000; the Faroe Islands, 48 000; and Greenland, 56 000. Some Icelandic commentators object to the label of ‘microstate’ for the island, but it is precisely Iceland’s socioeconomic success despite its very small population and remote location that is of interest here. Iceland is in a different position than the other Nordic countries that are typical small states. In this chapter, we examine the role of energy as a developmental strategy for these societies: historically, today and in the future. We enquire into the role of knowledge, competences and human capital for an environmental, socially and culturally sustainable use of energy resources for development. All three societies have been working determinedly to increase their political and fiscal independence, to diversify very narrow economic bases and to ensure human development and economic growth. And, as we will see in this chapter, energy continues to play a key role in these endeavours. These three North Atlantic societies came to be overseas territories of the Kingdom of Denmark through the early mediaeval expansion of the Kingdom of Norway for control of the Viking settlements of Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, followed by the 1397 Kalmar Union between Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and the Danish– Norwegian recolonization of Greenland in the 1700s. This constitutionalpolitical status defined Icelandic history, and has continued to define Faroese and Greenlandic politics and society. Iceland progressed through home rule to, first, sovereignty and then to a republic through a political process from 1845 to 1944. In 1845, the Icelandic Vikingage assembly, Althingi, was reconstituted as an advisory assembly to the absolute Danish monarch, and remained so until 1874 (Denmark became a constitutional monarchy in 1848, but Iceland kept its separate overseas status by remaining outside the unitary state). In 1874, the Althingi gained legislative and budgetary power, although executive and judiciary power remained Danish, with the administration of Iceland led by a Danish Minister for