Colin Gavaghan

Deregulating the Genetic Supermarket: Preimplantation Screening, Future People, and the Harm Principle

Robert Nozick, in what is surely one of the most intriguing and provocative footnotes in modern philosophical writing, referred in Anarchy, State and Utopia to the notion of a “genetic supermarket.” In keeping with the central arguments of that text, his suggestion was that choices about the genetic composition of future generations should, as far as possible, be left in the hands of private individuals, and should not be determined or restricted by the state. This free market in genetic screening would meet “the individual specifications (within certain moral limits) of prospective parents,” and would possess “the great virtue that it involves no centralized decision fixing the future human type(s).” In short, prospective parents would be allowed, to whatever extent was rendered possible by current technology, to choose the genetic traits of their future children.

Right Problem, Wrong Solution: A Pro-Choice Response to “Expressivist” Concerns about Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis

In August 2005, the United Kingdoms Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority (HFEA) launched a public consultation, seeking views on the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for the detection of cancer genes. The issue was considered by the Authority to be a possible source of particular controversy because it involved extending the range of conditions for which PGD can be licensed in a potentially important way: As well as testing for genes that would definitely cause disease traits, such as cystic fibrosis and muscular dystrophy, this would involve genes that would only possibly manifest themselves phenotypically. In other words, there is a very real chance that such an application of PGD would result in the destruction of perfectly healthy embryos.

Use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis to produce tissue donors: An irreconcilable dichotomy?

In 2002, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) published its decision in the case of Raj and Shahana Hashmi. The couple had sought to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to have a child that could be a viable donor for their son, Zain, who has thalassaemia. The HFEA decided that PGD could, in the present case, go ahead. Later in 2002, the HFEA reached the opposite decision in the superficially similar case of Michelle and Jayson Whitaker. This paper will present a critical overview of the decisions of the HFEA in these two cases, and of the opinions and discussions the HFEA published in support thereof. Although it is acknowledged that the two cases differ to some extent in their facts, it is argued that the difference upon which the HFEA relied is one without ethical significance.

Pregnancy and the Culture of Extreme Risk Aversion

Pregnancy and the Culture of Extreme Risk Aversion Angela Ballantyne, Colin Gavaghan, John McMillan & Sue Pullon To cite this article: Angela Ballantyne, Colin Gavaghan, John McMillan & Sue Pullon (2016) Pregnancy and the Culture of Extreme Risk Aversion, The American Journal of Bioethics, 16:2, 21-23, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2015.1120801 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2015.1120801

Saviour siblings: no avoiding the hard questions

Michelle Taylor-Sands is sceptical of the sorts of reasons that have typically been advanced in support of creating saviour siblings.1 In particular, she is critical of the claim that being created or serving as a tissue donor confers benefit to the child. Any such benefits, she contends, are ‘speculative and ultimately unconvincing’ (p. 60). With regard, for example, to the claim that the saviour sibling will sustain ‘psychosocial benefits’, she argues that this is contingent upon the success of the treatment; ‘where donation is unsuccessful, the psychosocial benefits to the donor child are outweighed by the psychosocial harms’ (p. 60). The precarious nature of such claims, Taylor-Sands maintains, provides a reason to be sceptical of an individualistic approach to the childs interests, and to seek instead to justify the creation of saviour siblings, and their role as donors, on several other grounds. These include: 1. that the saviour sibling shares ‘collective interests’ with its intimate family; and 2. that the future child himself/herself owes duties to family members, simply by virtue of having been born into that family. The first claim does more than reassert the familiar acknowledgement,2 ,3 that the child may come to sustain indirect …

Medical regulation of cognitive enhancement devices: some concerns

The authors present a cogent and detailed case for altering the Medical Devices Directive to allow regulation of cognitive enhancement devices (CEDs). Protection against significant risk of harm, especially for the vulnerable, and promotion of benefit through informed use of CEDs are all good features of the proposal. However, the pre-market approval process has limitations, which we explore. We raise the possibility of ‘risk compensation’ in response to the introduction of safety measures, which could alter its effectiveness. The proposal alludes to use of ‘formally trained practitioners,’ which provide a further tier of regulation for CEDs within the proposal. We consider some positive and negative implications of this aspect of the proposal that might warrant further consideration.

Can facilitated aid in dying be permitted by ‘double effect’? Some reflections from a recent New Zealand case

While the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) remains controversial in ethical circles, it continues to be recognised in common law courts. In 2015, the High Court of New Zealand became the latest to acknowledge the existence of the DDE, in a case that challenged the prohibition on physician assisted dying. In so doing, the possibility was raised that the DDE could potentially be used in an untraditional way to provide a prima facie justification of “facilitated aid in dying” (FAID) in some cases. In this article, we develop and offer justification for this line of reasoning. If it can be shown that FAID sometimes satisfies the conditions for DDE, this, we suggest, may have significant implications for the aid in dying debate, not only in New Zealand, but more widely. Even if all of the elements of the DDE are not met in such cases, though, we suggest that one of those elements – the doctors intent in providing FAID – may not always be such as to attract moral blame or criminal culpability.