James Maclaurin

What is Analytic Metaphysics For

We divide analytic metaphysics into naturalistic and non-naturalistic metaphysics. The latter we define as any philosophical theory that makes some ontological (as opposed to conceptual) claim, where that ontological claim has no observable consequences. We discuss further features of non-naturalistic metaphysics, including its methodology of appealing to intuition, and we explain the way in which we take it to be discontinuous with science. We outline and criticize Ladyman and Rosss 2007 epistemic argument against non-naturalistic metaphysics. We then present our own argument against it. We set out various ways in which intellectual endeavours can be of value, and we argue that, in so far as it claims to be an ontological enterprise, non-naturalistic metaphysics cannot be justified according to the same standards as science or naturalistic metaphysics. The lack of observable consequences explains why non-naturalistic metaphysics has, in general, failed to make progress, beyond increasing the standards of clarity and precision in expressing its theories. We end with a series of objections and replies.

Reinventing Molecular Weismannism: Information in Evolution

Molecular Weismannism is the claim that: “In the development of an individual, DNA causes the production both of DNA (genetic material) and of protein (somatic material). The reverse process never occurs. Protein is never a cause of DNA”. This principle underpins both the idea that genes are the objects upon which natural selection operates and the idea that traits can be divided into those that are genetic and those that are not. Recent work in developmental biology and in philosophy of biology argues that an acceptance of Molecular Weismannism requires the tacit assumption that genetic causes are different in kind from other developmental causes. They argue that if this assumption proves to be unwarranted then we should abandon, not just gene selectionism and gene centred functional solutions to the units of selection problem, but also the very notion that there is any such thing as a “genetic trait”. A group of possible causal distinctions (proximity, ultimacy and specificity) are explored and found wanting. It is argued that an extended version of information theory, while not strong enough to support Molecular Weismannism, will support both the claim that traits can be divided into those that are genetic and those that are not as well as the claim that there is good reason to privilege genetic causes within evolutionary and developmental explanations. The outcome of this for the units of selection debate is explored.

On the mapping of genotype to phenotype in evolutionary algorithms

Analogies with molecular biology are frequently used to guide the development of artificial evolutionary search. A number of assumptions are made in using such reasoning, chief among these is that evolution in natural systems is an optimal, or at least best available, search mechanism, and that a decoupling of search space from behaviour encourages effective search. In this paper, we explore these assumptions as they relate to evolutionary algorithms, and discuss philosophical foundations from which an effective evolutionary search can be constructed. This framework is used to examine grammatical evolution (GE), a popular search method that draws heavily upon concepts from molecular biology. We identify several properties in GE that are in direct conflict with those that promote effective evolutionary search. The paper concludes with some recommendations for designing representations for effective evolutionary search.

The Value of Phylogenetic Diversity

This chapter explores the idea that phylogenetic diversity plays a unique role in underpinning conservation endeavour. The conservation of biodiversity is suffering from a rapid, unguided proliferation of metrics. Confusion is caused by the wide variety of contexts in which we make use of the idea of biodiversity. Characterisations of biodiversity range from all-variety-at-all-levels down to variety with respect to single variables relevant to very specific conservation contexts. Accepting biodiversity as the sum of a large number of individual measures results in an empirically intractable framework. However, large-scale decisions cannot be based on biodiversity variables inferred from local conservation imperatives because the variables relevant to the many systems being compared would be incommensurate with one another. We therefore need some general conception of biodiversity that would make tractable such large-scale environmental decision-marking. We categorise the large array of strategies for the measurement of biodiversity into four broad groups for consideration as general measures of biodiversity. We compare common moral justifications for the conservation of biodiversity and conclude that some form of instrumental value is the most plausible justification for biodiversity conservation. Although this is often interpreted as a reliance on option value, we opt for a broadly consequentialist characterisation of biodiversity conservation. We conclude that the best justified general measure of biodiversity will be some form of phylogenetic diversity.

What Shall We Do with Analytic Metaphysics? A Response to McLeod and Parsons

We defend our characterization of non-naturalistic metaphysics. Specifically we question McLeod and Parsonss interpretation of the idea of an auxiliary hypothesis. We further argue that our original article does not require that we abandon debate on important metaphysical issues. What it requires is that we reinterpret some metaphysical issues as conceptual analysis rather than ontological investigation.

Tourist Aviation Emissions: A Problem of Collective Action:

While transportation currently accounts for 23% of total global energy-related CO2 emissions, transport emissions are projected to double by 2050, driven significantly by continued high growth in global passenger demand for air travel. Addressing high growth in aviation emissions is critical to climate stabilization. Currently we rely on individual decisions to forego air travel as the means of reducing these high-risk emissions. In this paper we argue that encouraging voluntary responses to such risks cannot succeed because of the nature of human reason and the structure of the problem itself. We use decision-making theory to explore why individuals have been generally unwilling or unable to act upon these risks, and collective action theory to illustrate the futility of relying on uncoordinated actors in such cases. Participation in the high-carbon air travel regime is a social convention, and transition from social conventions requires coordination among players. Our theoretical discussions lead us to conclude that it is our moral duty to promote coordinated collective action, via national or global policy mechanisms, to address tourist aviation emissions. We offer various avenues of future research to advance this moral duty.

Universal Darwinism: Its Scope and Limits

Many things evolve: species, languages, sports, tools, biological niches, and theories. But are these real instances of natural selection? Current assessments of the proper scope of Darwinian theory focus on the broad similarity of cultural or non-organic processes to familiar central instances of natural selection. That similarity is analysed in terms of abstract functional descriptions of evolving entities (e.g. replicators, interactors, developmental systems etc.). These strategies have produced a proliferation of competing evolutionary analyses. I argue that such reasoning ought not to be employed in arbitrating debates about whether particular phenomena count as instances of natural selection. My argument is based on hierarchical functional descriptions of natural selection. I suggest that natural selection ought not to be thought of as a single process but rather as a series of processes which can be analysed in terms of a hierarchy of functional descriptions (in much the same way as many people think of cognition). This, in turn, casts doubt on the idea that it is possible in principle to settle debates about whether particular phenomena count as instances of natural selection.