Colin Provost

The Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat

The events of 11 September 2001 have led to a higher perceived risk of terrorism in the United States. A better understanding of the political consequences of 9/11 requires a more complete accounting of the nature and consequences of perceived threat. Here, the distinction between perceived personal and national risks is examined in terms of two competing hypotheses: (1) The personal threat of terrorism has a pervasive influence even on national decisions and perceptions, in line with its highly arousing nature. (2) The effects of personal threat are highly circumscribed and overshadowed by the impact of perceived national threat, consistent with findings on the meager impact of self–interest and other personal concerns on public opinion. A survey of 1,221 residents of Long Island and Queens, New York, explored the degree to which personal and national threat affect perceptions of the consequences of, and possible solutions to, terrorism. As expected, there was a clear distinction between perceived personal and national threat, although the two are related. Perceived personal threat did not influence the perceived economic consequences of terrorism, although it had a narrow effect on personal behaviors designed to minimize risk. Overall, the findings imply that the effects of personal threat are circumscribed, consistent with past research on the limited personal basis of political judgments. However, the tests of these hypotheses were constrained by a limited set of dependent variables that included national consequences but not policy solutions designed to limit terrorism.

The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits

In the past 20 years, state attorneys general have reinvented the enforcement of consumer protection regulations. Prosecuting businesses through multi-state lawsuits has the effect of enforcing consumer protection laws at the national level. The participation of states in these lawsuits varies quite dramatically across states, yet little research has been done to explain these differences in consumer protection enforcement. Because state attorneys general are elected in 43 states, the electorate’s ideology and the state’s socioeconomic culture should help explain these discrepancies. A pooled time-series analysis of participation rates from 1989-1998 provides support for these hypotheses.

An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-State Litigation

Multi-state lawsuits, filed by U.S. state attorneys general (AGs), have become an important method by which state consumer protection laws are enforced. Patterns of participation in these lawsuits vary tremendously across the states, yet little is known about the factors driving this variation. I argue that state AGs are primarily concerned with achieving electoral and policymaking goals. Consequently, I expect AGs to be responsive to strong consumer interests and to participate in cases with severe infractions. Additionally, whether it is for public interest or electoral goals, AGs should be attracted to cases that promise bigger settlements. My analysis of each states decision to join each of 172 multi-state lawsuits filed and settled between 1989 and 2002 provides support for each of these hypotheses.

When to Befriend the Court? Examining State Amici Curiae Participation before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Over the past 30 years, the U.S. states have increased their participation as amici curiae significantly, in addition to winning more of their cases as direct parties. However, little attention has been paid to the factors that cause amici participation rates to vary among the states. The author examines the decision of state attorneys general (AGs) to initiate or join amicus curiae briefs in all 253 U.S. Supreme Court criminal procedure cases from 1990 through 2001. He hypothesizes that AGs are motivated largely by their own policy preferences and by their motivation to get reelected. Because amicus briefs are not particularly high-profile policy tools, reelection motivations ought to be demonstrated through responsiveness to elites in state government. The findings provide less support for this idea and more support for the idea that state AGs follow their own policy preferences through amicus participation.

Collective action problems in the contracting of public services: Evidence from the UK’s Ministry of Justice

In this paper, we examine collective action problems in the UK government in the process of contracting public services to the private sector. In particular, we examine the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and its evolution in contract monitoring as part of a larger effort of the government to join up departments in contract management. By analyzing MoJ’s management of the electronic tagging contract with G4S and Serco, we show that a lack of coordination within the department and with other departments was a major reason for the overbilling by the two companies. Recent efforts to join up contract management efforts throughout government show promise in rectifying these contracting issues.

Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation: The Financial Crisis of 2007–09

ABSTRACT The ability of businesses to shift regulatory jurisdictions has long raised questions about whether this generates a regulatory race to the bottom (RTB). Prior to the Financial Crisis of 2007–09, the structure of U.S. federal bank regulation raised similar questions, as banks could choose their regulator and regulators received fees for assessing banks. I investigate this question, through the theoretical lenses of bureaucratic structure, regulatory capture and bureaucratic reputation. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data, I find that the initial regulatory structure did induce a regulatory RTB, but once the Financial Crisis had begun, reputational fears on the part of federal agencies reversed the race, as the regulators strengthened standards and brought more enforcement actions. The paper ultimately shows that multiple theories help to explain what is going on with regulatory RTBs.

Evaluating Policy in the Bush II Presidency

Presidents are not necessarily remembered just for the policies they produce. They are remembered, for better or worse, for their personalities, their style of communication, their ability (or inability) to persuade, and for their managerial styles. In the case of President Bush, he will be remembered to a very significant extent for his management style and for the policies that accompanied this style of governing. As we have seen, President Bush continually pushed the boundaries of executive control outward, employing a multitude of means to consolidate further executive power, often at the expense of congressional, judicial, or state power. As we stated in chapter one, we are obviously not the first to speak at length about the Bush administration’s ambitious use of executive power. Many scholars and commentators have produced an abundance of research documenting this pattern in the Bush presidency. However, we have sought to go further and rigorously evaluate the effects of George W. Bush’s bureaucratic management on public policy, particularly in the arena of domestic policy.