Cori Vilella

The global carbon budget: a conflicting claims problem

An effective climate agreement is urgently required, yet conflict between parties prevails over cooperation. Thanks to advances in science it is now possible to quantify the global carbon budget, the amount of available cumulative CO2 emissions before crossing the 2 ∘C threshold (Meinshausen et al. Nature 458(7242):1158–1162, 2009). Countries carbon claims, however, exceed this. Historically such situations have been tackled with bankruptcy division rules. We argue that framing climate negotiations as a classical conflicting claims problem (O’Neill Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371, 1982) may provide for an effective climate policy. We analyze the allocation of the global carbon budget among parties claiming the maximum emissions rights possible. Based on the selection of some desirable principles, we propose an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget for the period 2000 to 2050 taking into account different risk scenarios.

Enjoying cooperative games

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of three solutions, the Shapley value for n agents, the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents and the per capita nucleolus. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud, the random arrival and the adjusted proportional rules.

An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

In this paper we axiomatize the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) over the class of weak superadditive games using constrained egalitarianism, order-consistency, and converse order-consistency.

The Proportional Set

In this paper we deal with asymmetric TU‐cooperative games where every player has an initial positive weight. In this framework we introduce a new set‐solution concept, the proportional set, which is based on equity considerations. We provide an algorithm to locate the proportional set inspired by Dutta and Ray [3] algorithm’s to find the egalitarian solution in a convex game, and we prove that, for superadditive games and for any weights of the players, the proportional set is included in the equity core, see [9]. For convex games the proportional set has only one element and it is in the core of the game. In the particular case of convex games where all players have the same weight the proportional algorithm coincides with the one given by Dutta and Ray [3] and the solution is the egalitarian solution.