José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
Rovira i Virgili University
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Publication
Featured researches published by José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez.
Social Choice and Welfare | 2014
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; M. Carmen Marco-Gil
The solution for the contested garment problem, proposed in the Babylonic Talmud, suggests that each agent should receive at least some part of the resources whenever the claim exceeds the available amount. In this context, we propose a new method to define lower bounds on awards, an idea that has underlied the theoretical analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning (O’Neill, Math Soc Sci 2:345–371, 1982) to present day (Dominguez and Thomson, Econ Theory 28:283–307, 2006). Specifically, starting from the fact that a society establishes its own set of commonly accepted equity principles, our proposal ensures to each agent the smallest amount she gets according to all the admissible rules. We analyze its recursive application for different sets of equity principles.
European Journal of Operational Research | 2014
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; Josep E. Peris
In distribution problems, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. Nonetheless, when using the egalitarian division, agents may receive more than her claim. We propose a compromise between the proportional and the egalitarian approaches by considering the restriction that no one receives more than her claim. We show that the most egalitarian compromise fulfilling this restriction ensures a minimum amount to each agent. We also show that this compromise can be interpreted as a process that works in two steps as follows: first, all agents receive an equal share up to the smallest claim if possible (egalitarian distribution), and then, the remaining estate (if any) is allocated proportionally to the remaining claims (proportional distribution). Finally, we obtain that the recursive application of this process finishes at the Constrained Equal Awards solution (CEA).
Climatic Change | 2016
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; Jordi Teixidó-Figueras; Cori Vilella
An effective climate agreement is urgently required, yet conflict between parties prevails over cooperation. Thanks to advances in science it is now possible to quantify the global carbon budget, the amount of available cumulative CO2 emissions before crossing the 2 ∘C threshold (Meinshausen et al. Nature 458(7242):1158–1162, 2009). Countries carbon claims, however, exceed this. Historically such situations have been tackled with bankruptcy division rules. We argue that framing climate negotiations as a classical conflicting claims problem (O’Neill Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371, 1982) may provide for an effective climate policy. We analyze the allocation of the global carbon budget among parties claiming the maximum emissions rights possible. Based on the selection of some desirable principles, we propose an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget for the period 2000 to 2050 taking into account different risk scenarios.
European Journal of Operational Research | 2015
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; António Osório
In a bankruptcy situation individuals are not equally affected since each one has its own specific characteristics. These aspects cannot be ignored and may justify an allocation bias in favor of or against some individuals. This paper develops a theory of differentiation in claims problems that considers not only the vector of claims, but also some justified differentiating criteria based on other characteristics (wealth, net-income, GDP, etc.). Accordingly, we propose some progressive transfers from richer to poorer claimants with the purpose of distributing the damage as evenly as possible. Finally, we characterize our solution by means of the Lorenz criterion. Endogenous convex combinations between solutions are also considered.
Annals of Operations Research | 2018
Sebastián Cano-Berlanga; José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
China is the largest emerging capital market with a unique setup: it issues simultaneously both (i) Class A shares addressed to Chinese domestic investors, and (ii) Class B Shares addressed to foreign investors. After Chinese stock market resumed the operation, they feature dramatic fluctuations due to policy changes and over-speculative activity of individual investors. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of both the Shanghai A and B Markets through a Markov-switching asymmetric GARCH in four different time frames.
Social Science Research Network | 2017
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; Yabibal M. Walle; Yitagesu Zewdu Zergawu
The current migration and refugee crisis in Europe requires an understanding of the different migration drivers beyond the well-known economic determinants. In this paper, we view migration from a broader human security perspective and analyze the determinants of regular and irregular migration flows from Africa to Europe for the period 1990–2014. Our results show that, in addition to economic determinants, a combination of push and pull factors influence the migration decisions of individuals. In particular, rising political persecution, ethnic cleansing, human rights violations, political instability and civil conflicts in African source countries are all significantly associated with increased migration flows into European destination countries. Therefore, our results underscore the need for the EU and European countries to collaborate with the source countries, not only in terms of supporting economic development in the source countries, but also in promoting human security: human rights, democracy, peace and social stability.
Games | 2015
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; António Osório; Josep E. Peris
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.
Series | 2014
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; Josep E. Peris
Archive | 2013
Pedro Gadea-Blanco; José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez; María del Carmen Marco-Gil
Group Decision and Negotiation | 2014
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez