Cory A. Cassell

Does the Timing of Auditor Changes Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from the Initial Year of the Audit Engagement

We focus on the first year of the auditor-client relationship and investigate whether audit quality varies with the timing of the new auditor’s appointment. We find that audit quality is not lower for companies that engage new auditors before the end of the third fiscal quarter than for companies that do not change auditors. However, companies that engage new auditors during or after the fourth fiscal quarter are more likely to misstate their audited financial statements than companies that engage new auditors earlier in the year and companies that do not change auditors. In additional tests, we find that the decrease in audit quality associated with late auditor changes is more pronounced for companies with complex operations (i.e., more operating segments). These results suggest that the extent to which audit quality suffers in the first year of audit engagements is affected by both the amount of time required to understand the client’s business, assess risks, and perform the audit (all of which are driven by client complexity), as well as the amount of time available for auditors to perform these tasks.

The Hidden Risk of Auditor Industry Specialization: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

Abstract We identify situations in which auditor industry specialization could be detrimental for audit outcomes. We predict that during periods of heightened industry-specific risk, specialist auditors from the affected industry could struggle to secure and allocate sufficient resources to mitigate the heightened risk because they have client portfolios concentrated in the affected industry. Using a measure of office-level industry concentration/specialization (as opposed to a market-based measure), we find that banking auditor industry specialization is associated with higher audit quality and more timely audits during the period before the financial crisis. However, during the financial crisis, banking industry specialization is associated with lower audit quality and less timely audits. Collectively, our results suggest that auditor industry specialization can be detrimental in certain circumstances and that audit firms and audit regulators should consider whether the audit markets have become too specialized to handle the resource allocation problems that crisis situations present.