Juan Manuel Sanchez

Earnings Restatements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers

We investigate involuntary chief financial officer (CFO) turnover following earnings restatements, the labor market penalties imposed on former restatement-firm CFOs, and whether these disciplinary consequences have increased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our results suggest that, relative to a control group of non-restating firms, firms restating earnings have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover, and that former restatement-firm CFOs face stiff labor market penalties. We generally find that the passage of SOX has not increased involuntary CFO turnover rates following restatements. However, we find that labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms are more severe in the post-SOX period, suggesting that SOX has increased ex post settling up costs. Our results suggest that the influence of SOX on the labor market has resulted in CFOs being held more accountable for their actions.

The Business Value of IT: A Synthesis and Framework of Archival Research

ABSTRACT: This paper synthesizes recent empirical archival research investigating the link between information technology investment and business value. It examines (1) financial and nonfinancial measures to represent different elements of business value, (2) IT investment measures and links with firm performance, (3) IT and business complementarities that affect firm performance, and (4) the impact of business context and IT alignment with business strategy on resulting performance. The review of prior research is guided by a balanced scorecard framework that places IT in a business context and highlights the role of potential drivers and contextual factors that impact the association between IT and firm value. The paper concludes by proposing several broad avenues of future research that may be of particular interest to archival accounting information systems researchers.

Returns to IT Excellence: Evidence from Financial Performance Around Information Technology Excellence Awards

The resource-based view has been used in IT business value research to theorize and investigate the impact of unique IT capabilities on sustainable competitive advantages. Prior research has empirically documented a positive association between superior IT capabilities and firm performance. However, such analyses have focused on IT capabilities of firms in the early 1990s. In this study, we examine the impact of superior IT capabilities on firm performance over the 1988–2007 period, which allows us to consider the structural shifts in the return of IT capability over time. Our results suggest that firms with superior IT capabilities are able to attain higher firm performance levels until 1999. However, such performance advantage disappears in the post-1999 time period. We also find that a subset of firms that sustain high levels of IT capabilities during the period 1988 to 2007 continue to perform better than their peers. We conclude that managers are able to achieve superior firm performance if they are able to maintain high levels of IT capability over time.

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.

Repairing Organizational Legitimacy Following Information Technology (IT) Material Weaknesses: Executive Turnover, IT Expertise, and IT System Upgrades

ABSTRACT: Since Information Technology (IT)-based internal controls are pivotal in providing access to, and security of, financial records, we argue that an IT-related material weakness (ITMW) is a significant threat to organizational legitimacy. Prior research suggests that firms work to repair legitimacy by disassociation with executives blamed for the deficiency and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to ensure the problem is addressed (Suchman 1995). As a test of disassociation, we find that, relative to a propensity-score-matched sample of non-ITMW firms, ITMW firms experience higher CEO, CFO, and director turnover. As a test of the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to repair organizational legitimacy, we find that ITMW firms hire CEOs, CFOs, and directors with higher levels of IT expertise, and make significant IT system upgrades. We find evidence that ITMW firms remediate deficiencies in a more timely fashion when they appoint a new CFO with IT expertise or upgrade their financial rep...

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Policy

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax avoidance. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk-appetite. To the extent that aggressive tax policies involve significant cash flow shortfalls, high cash flow volatility, and losses in firm and CEO reputation in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in risky tax strategies. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax avoidance. Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt-like compensation for firm tax policies.

How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation

While numerous studies have examined the impact that powerful CEOs have on their compensation and overall firm decisions, relatively little is known about how powerful CFOs influence their compensation and important firm financial reporting and operational outcomes. This is somewhat surprising given the critical role CFOs play in the financial reporting process of a firm. Using managerial power theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) and the theory of power and self-focus (Pitesa and Thau, 2013), we predict that powerful CFOs employ a two-part strategy to camouflage excessive incentive compensation above what efficient contracting would dictate. First, powerful CFOs use their power and influence to negotiate shorter incentive pay duration on a non-arms length basis to maximize the present value of cash flows. Second, when their incentive equity compensation vests, we suggest that CFOs manage earnings to further enhance their personal income. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find higher levels of income-increasing accrual-based earnings management and real transactions management, a potentially unethical practice, in firms with powerful CFOs who have short pay durations. We discuss the implications of our analysis in the context of mitigating CFO power and managing the ethical environment “tone at the top.�?

The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility on Investment Efficiency and Innovation

We examine two important channels through which corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects firm value: investment efficiency and innovation. We find that firms with higher CSR performance invest more efficiently: these firms are less prone to invest in negative NPV projects (overinvestment) and less prone to forego positive NPV projects (underinvestment). We also find that firms with higher CSR performance generate more patents and patent citations. Mediation analysis indicates that firms with higher CSR performance are more profitable and valuable, consequences partially attributable to efficient investments and innovation. These results, robust to alternate model specifications, lend support to enlightened stakeholder theory (Jensen 2001).

Non-compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: the Brazilian Experience: NON-COMPLIANCE IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE

We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security�?related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm�?specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security�?related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firms decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid�?ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.

Non-compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: The Brazilian Experience

We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security-related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm-specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security-related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firms decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid-ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.