Cory Wright

Intractability and the use of heuristics in psychological explanations

Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity

The ontic conception of scientific explanation.

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Minimalism about truth: special issue introduction

is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.

First principles in the life sciences: The free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism

HighlightsThe hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain is not a grand unifying theory.Reward and value should not be absorbed into free‐energy.Explanatory pluralism is vindicated by the current hypotheses of dopaminergic activity.Scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to come in the form of a single overarching grand unifying theory. Abstract Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory.

Truth, explanation, minimalism

Wesley Salmons version of the ontic conception of explanation is a main historical root of contemporary work on mechanistic explanation. This paper examines and critiques the philosophical merits of Salmons version, and argues that his conceptions most fundamental construct is either fundamentally obscure, or else reduces to a non-ontic conception of explanation. Either way, the ontic conception is a misconception.

Mechanistic explanation without the ontic conception

The plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ in cognitive science is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Some have argued that intractability is a pseudoproblem, however, because cognizers do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by rational models; rather, they only behave as if they do. Whether or not the problem of intractability is dissolved by this gambit critically depends, inter alia, on the semantics of the ‘as if’ connective. First, this paper examines the five most sensible explications in the literature, and concludes that none of them actually circumvents the problem. Hence, rational ‘as if’ explanations must obey the minimal computational constraint of tractability. Second, this paper describes how rational explanations could satisfy the tractability constraint. Our approach suggests a computationally unproblematic interpretation of ‘as if’ that is compatible with the original conception of rational analysis.

Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge

The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich’s Truth (1990). Since its initial publication, Horwich’s book has become required reading for truth theorists and students alike. It not only cemented the deflationist thought that debates about the nature of truth can be fruitfully transformed into debates about the utility of truth predicates, but also re-oriented theories away from traditionalmetaphysical debates and concerns, such as whether a conception of truth must accommodate some form of metaphysical realism. Arguably, alethic minimalism is now the most dominant conception of truth on offer, and certainly among the most well-known. Horwich’s minimalism divides into two parts. One part is the minimal theory—socalled because of its form, although it is actually an infinite list of propositions. The other part is the minimal conception, which is a collection of philosophical theses, corollaries, and qualifications concerning the adequacy of the minimal theory. For instance, one qualification constitutive of the minimal conception is that paradoxical or paradox-generating propositions are excluded. Another is that propositions are the primary and proper bearers of truth. That instances of the equivalence schema,

Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable

The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences.