Joseph Ulatowski

Minimalism about truth: special issue introduction

The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich’s Truth (1990). Since its initial publication, Horwich’s book has become required reading for truth theorists and students alike. It not only cemented the deflationist thought that debates about the nature of truth can be fruitfully transformed into debates about the utility of truth predicates, but also re-oriented theories away from traditionalmetaphysical debates and concerns, such as whether a conception of truth must accommodate some form of metaphysical realism. Arguably, alethic minimalism is now the most dominant conception of truth on offer, and certainly among the most well-known. Horwich’s minimalism divides into two parts. One part is the minimal theory—socalled because of its form, although it is actually an infinite list of propositions. The other part is the minimal conception, which is a collection of philosophical theses, corollaries, and qualifications concerning the adequacy of the minimal theory. For instance, one qualification constitutive of the minimal conception is that paradoxical or paradox-generating propositions are excluded. Another is that propositions are the primary and proper bearers of truth. That instances of the equivalence schema,

The objectivity of truth, a core truism?

A typical guiding principle of an account of truth is: “truth is objective,” or, to be clear, judging whether an assertion is true or false depends upon how things are in the world rather than how someone or some community believes it to be. Accordingly, whenever a claim is objectively true, its truth conditions ought not depend upon the context in which it is uttered or the utterer making the claim. Part of our ongoing empirical studies surveying people’s responses to questions about truth involved prompts on objectivity. Our studies suggest the following: (1) overall, individuals tend to endorse claims that are consistent with the objectivity of truth; (2) not all conceptions of objectivity are equal, even people who endorse the objectivity of truth sometimes assent to one form of truth’s objectivity over other forms; (3) philosophers and non-philosophers both endorse the objectivity of truth, but the apparent commitment of philosophers is stronger.

Challenging Endoxic Alethic Pluralism

This chapter provides a series of arguments against potential criticisms of endoxic alethic pluralism. The chapter is sub-divided into substantive and methodological challenges. Methodological challenges suggest that empirical studies are irrelevant, suffer from poor experimental design or statistical analyses, or the folk suffer from serious confusion. Substantive challenges are those criticisms almost any alethic pluralism will have to face, including the individuation problem, the problem of mixed compounds, and the problem of mixed inferences. Favouring endoxic alethic pluralism, therefore, provides not only a substantive theory of truth but also circumvents common problems that arise for traditional forms of alethic pluralism.

Folk-Theoretic Foundations of Truth Theory

Theorists of truth have aimed to uncover the ordinary or folk view of truth. Any view that claims to provide the folk theory needs to account for what the common conception is and how it is that they have discovered it. While it has been generally accepted that a view need not engage in any formal undertaking of how it has come up with the folk view, our dependence upon observations about natural language no longer seems sufficient for the folk theory. Systematic empirical studies provide the truth-theorist with a richer understanding of how truth is employed by ordinary people in natural language. My argument shows that an expert’s intuitions alone cannot justify any claim about the ordinary folk view.

On Endoxic Alethic Pluralism

I argue for a new kind of alethic pluralism, endoxic alethic pluralism, which is informed in part by empirical studies on people’s notions of truth. While philosophers have generally assumed that the ordinary notion of truth aligns with their own intuitions about truth, data show that philosophers and non-philosophers’ notions of truth fail to align. Data exist showing that people’s responses to survey questions inquiring about a view of truth are incompatible with philosophers’ intuitions. What the data seem to suggest is that truth, through its many and varied uses, is fragmentary. The fragmented use of truth and its cognates, “… is true,” etc. reflect that truth is not singular and monolithic.

A Defence of Descriptive Metaphysics

Empirical data provide us with a descriptive snapshot of ordinary views about philosophical concepts. At least one part of any ‘folk theory’ is descriptive. This project follows on what Strawson termed ‘descriptive metaphysics.’ If normative inquiries should tell us which view is better than another view (a moderate view) or which view is the best one of any view (a radical view), then proponents must fully understand and appreciate what is constitutive of any view, good and bad. One way in which we may be able to do that is through empirical studies. Thus, a defence of descriptive metaphysics shows that experimental data are integral to a normative truth-theory.

The Unexamined Student Is Not Worth Teaching: Preparation, the Zone of Proximal Development, and the Socratic Model of Scaffolded Learning.

Abstract ‘Scaffolded learning’ describes a cluster of instructional techniques designed to move students from a novice position toward greater understanding, such that they become independent learners. Our Socratic Model of Scaffolded Learning (‘SMSL’) includes two phases not normally included in discussions of scaffolded learning, the preparatory and problematizing phases. Our article will illuminate this blind spot by arguing that these crucial preliminary elements ought to be considered an integral part of a scaffolding model. If instructors are cognizant of the starting position of students, then students are more likely to develop a proper sense of autonomy. We turn, then, to examples from Socrates, the archetypal teacher, that cast light on the importance of preparation and problematizing for the student. Finally, we address the concern that integrating these preliminary elements into scaffolded learning would unnecessarily complicate a useful and effective pedagogical method. Ultimately, if it is effective and autonomous learners we wish to cultivate in the classroom, then something like SMSL must include preliminary elements that calibrate the instructor’s approach to the members of the class. After all, the unexamined student is not worth teaching.