Covadonga Meseguer

Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order

This article surveys the role of learning as mechanism of policy diffusion in the context of the creation of a new political order. The author discusses policy learning against the background of recent research on the diffusion of deregulatory and regulatory policies and attempts to distinguish learning from other mechanisms of diffusion. She then surveys the challenges entailed in testing this mechanism and sets out her particular approach: a rational version of learning. She also reports the results of preliminary efforts to test learning as applied to the diffusion of regulatory policies. The author concludes that learning cannot be rejected as a plausible mechanism of the diffusion of policies, although it shares its explanatory role with less rational mechanisms of diffusion, in particular policy emulation. Further research and analysis is needed to test learning in either its rational or its bounded version and, in doing so, to delve into the politics of learning.

What is new in the study of policy diffusion

This paper surveys what is new in the study of the international diffusion of policies and institutions. We critically review the most recent contributions on the topic, trying to identify the substantive and methodological novelties in this literature. Regarding mechanisms, we argue that whereas there is acknowledgement that they overlap, there is hardly any attention to the way in which they interact (either with other mechanisms of diffusion or with domestic factors). More generally, mechanisms are studied separately and are not integrated into a coherent model of diffusion. Regarding empirics, we argue that existing studies have concentrated on policies that seem to have diffused in an explosive way despite the fact that both theory and methods are appropriate to study any type of diffusion. We argue that new empirical work should tackle the difficult issue of how to better operationalize alternative diffusion mechanisms. More attention should also be given to modeling diffusion processes to account for the fact that causal patterns may be highly heterogeneous in time and space. Finally, we show that the last wave of studies on diffusion may have had the unintended consequence of opening up new questions. Some of these questions are about the mechanisms that initiate vs. accelerate the diffusion of policies and institutions, why policies diffuse in clusters rather than globally, why some policies diffuse faster than others and why some policies do not

What Role for Learning? The Diffusion of Privatisation in OECD and Latin American Countries

In this paper, I enquire whether 37 governments in industrial and in Latin American countries privatised as a result of learning from experience. Using a rational updating model, I examine whether the decision in the 1980s and 1990s to streamline the public sector was the outcome of a revision of beliefs about the effectiveness of privatisation or whether, alternatively, it was triggered by international pressures or mimicry. The results suggest that rational learning and especially emulation were two important factors in the decision to privatise. International pressures, here proxied by the presence or absence of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and by European Union membership, are irrelevant to explanations of the decision to privatise. Finally, domestic political conditions appear relevant to the decision to launch privatisation but only when the analysis is carried out for each of the regional sub-samples. In the OECD countries, centre-left governments were more likely to privatise whereas in Latin American more repressive regimes were more willing to divest.

Rational Learning and Bounded Learning in the Diffusion of Policy Innovations

In political science, rational learning and bounded learning are commonly studied as two opposing theories of policy choice. In this article, I use a rational learning approach to reach conclusions about bounded learning, showing that the two theories are not necessarily incompatible. By examining a rational learning model and the decisions of a set of developing countries to open up their trade regimes, I show that countries are particularly influenced by the choices of neighbouring countries and by particularly successful policy experiences. These are two typical contentions of the bounded learning literature. I argue that bounded learning and rational learning yield the same results as soon as one drops the rational learning assumption that there are zero costs to gathering new information. I use the discussion on rational learning versus bounded learning as a basis for exploring more general issues concerning the diffusion of policy innovations.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

The Spanish Case: Who Was Mobilized and How?

This contribution surveys the Spanish debate on the European Union (EU) Convention. We analyze the echo that the debate has had in the political arena, in civil society and in the media, and identify the main issues at stake. We argue that the Spanish debate on the EU Convention has been widely used as a framework to discuss matters of clear domestic interest, the most prominent of which is the distribution of power among national and sub-national units. We also argue that, overall, the topics of the Convention have been overshadowed by others with a greater relevance for Spanish public opinion. All in all, Spaniards show positive attitudes towards the EU and its enlargement, although they are only partially informed and interested in the Convention. Particular interest groups and civic organizations are looking to the Constitutional Convention to address issues of their own.

What Do You Fear? Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Latin America

In this article, we study the material determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment in Latin America. Based on new data on immigration to non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, we use the workhorse distributive theories that anticipate who wins and who loses from immigration and test their predictive capacity in labor-abundant countries. We exploit the variation in regional immigration rates, in the skill composition of natives versus migrants, and in the relative generosity of Latin American welfare states. We find that fears of labor-market competition are weak predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment. In contrast, fears of greater tax burdens are strong and robust predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment. We conclude that studying Latin American public opinion opens new avenues for theorizing about anti-immigrant sentiment in developing countries.

Sending money home in times of crime: the case of Mexico

ABSTRACT We explore at the municipality level how the climate of criminal violence has affected the flow of remittances to Mexico. Using a panel of municipalities in the years 2006 and 2010, we find that drug-related crimes and overall rates of homicides have reduced the percentage of families that receive remittances. This result is robust to controlling for net migration, political variables, and traditional socioeconomic explanations of remittance sending. It is also robust to potential threats to validity. We interpret this result as suggestive of self-interested concerns when sending money home amidst a climate of rampant violence. Nonetheless, mixed motivations to remit are evident in our analysis.