Francisco Javier Aparicio

Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Mexico

This paper uses a transaction-costs framework to link the policymaking process (PMP) and the outer features of public policies in Mexico, a middle-income developing country. It shows how a highly secretive PMP, centralized around the presidency, fashioned nationalist policies that were stable, adaptable, coordinated and private-regarding for the urban-based corporatist pillars of the regime. When growth faltered in the late 1970s, however, this PMP was unable to adapt to economic volatility, although it remained dominant in an increasingly turbulent polity. The paper explains how unified government and corporatist control of the economy made a constitutionally weak president the envy of executives around the world, even at the cost of being unable to enact reforms with short-term costs for the corporatist pillars of the regime. The article also explains why democratization in the 1990s is giving rise to a less centralized and more open PMP that benefits larger shares of the population. As the separation of powers enshrined in the 1917 constitution materializes, policymaking is increasingly wedded to the status quo. On the one hand, divided government preserves a macroeconomic framework consistent with an open economy (such as fiscally sound policies and a floating exchange rate). On the other, checks and balances are helping old and new parties and interest groups to veto agreement on the raising of chronically low tax rates (at 10 percent of GDP) and on reforming nationalist policies that limit private sector investment in the state-controlled energy sector.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

México 2015: Entre la fragmentación partidista y el descontento ciudadano

2015 fue un ano muy complejo para Mexico. No solo porque celebro unas elecciones criticas, que suponian la implementacion de una reforma electoral constitucionalxa0compleja, sino porque se dieron en un contexto de alta conflictividad social, inseguridadxa0y violencia politica, y en el marco de un cada vez mayor descontento ciudadanoxa0respecto de la politica. A tres anos del inicio de su mandato, el presidente Pena Nietoxa0experimento un escenario economico adverso y una caida significativa en los nivelesxa0de aprobacion ciudadana tras diversos sucesos como la tragedia de Ayotzinapa,xa0denuncias por corrupcion y las dificultades para satisfacer las expectativas de laxa0ciudadania sobre el crecimiento economico. Gracias a una fragmentacion ineditaxa0del voto, la coalicion gubernamental logro mantener la mayoria en el Congreso.