Craig Mackenzie

Additional signals from VPAC/PAC family receptors.

The receptors for the neuropeptides vasoactive intestinal polypeptide and pituitary adenylate cyclase-activating polypeptide are strong activators of adenylate cyclase, but recent evidence suggests that they can elicit a number of additional intracellular signals. Some of these are likely to be downstream of the conventional adenylate cyclase pathway, but it is now clear that others reflect novel primary coupling events of the receptors.

Differential activation of phospholipase D by VPAC and PAC1 receptors.

Abstract: To investigate the phospholipase D (PLD) responses of the VIP/PACAP receptors, VPAC1 and VPAC2, and the PACAP‐specific PAC1 receptors (short and “hop” intracellular loop 3 (i3) splice variants), stable CHO cell lines expressing similar levels of each wildtype receptor were generated (except for the VPAC1 receptor clone which showed considerably lower expression and lesser responses in signalling assays). All clones caused activation of PLD in response to agonists, as monitored by [3H]phosphatidylbutanol production. The PLD responses of the PAC1“hop”, but not the “null” receptor, were sensitive to the ARF inhibitor, brefeldin A (BFA) (as were VPAC1 and VPAC2 responses). Chimeric constructs of VPAC2 receptors containing i3 of either PAC1 hop or PAC1 null receptors were transiently expressed in COS 7 cells and PLD responses were measured. Only the PLD response of the hop construct was sensitive to BFA. This suggests that i3 motifs in certain Group II GPCRs may play a key role in determining their linkage to ARF‐dependent PLD activation.

Do Responsible Investment Indices Improve Corporate Social Responsibility? FTSE4Good's Impact on Environmental Management

Manuscript Type. Empirical. Research Question/Issue. This study investigates the impact of a responsible investment index on environmental management practices. Firms that were included in the FTSE4Good index but failed to meet enhanced requirements were subject to both engagement by FTSE and the threat of expulsion from the index. We examine the combined effect of these actions, estimate the contribution of both elements separately, and the influence of concentrated equity ownership, corporate governance, and the institutional environment. We also evaluate whether the effect is persistent or transitory. Research Findings/Insights. For a sample of 1,029 firms from 21 countries, our findings demonstrate that engagement combined with the threat of expulsion from the FTSE4Good index doubles the probability that a firm failing to meet the environmental management criteria in 2002 would comply by 2005. The higher compliance rate for the firms receiving engagement persists until the end of our study in 2010. We also find that compliance is positively associated with low levels of concentrated ownership and with firms based in coordinated rather than liberal market economies. Theoretical/Academic Implications. Our results contribute to the understanding of the complexities of governance, where decision makers are constrained or influenced by equity holders, the firms governance system, institutional arrangements, and collective engagement by institutional equity holders. Our findings are consistent with both institutional and agency issues impacting on decision making. Practitioner/Policy Implications. Our study suggests that engagement via a responsible investment index reinforced by the threat of public expulsion from the index provides an effective route for large‐scale collaborative investor engagement on corporate social responsibility issues targeting large and internationally diverse firms. It also demonstrates why regulators may wish to encourage engagement of this type to achieve social benefits.

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Open Society

We analyse the FTSE4Good corporate social responsibility score of 1,825 firms in 25 countries and hypothesise that corporate social responsibility imposes costs on the firm’s owners, whereas benefits may only partially accrue to those owners or instead to various other stakeholders. Managers may then be expected to more enthusiastically adopt CSR practices where these other stakeholders are influential but they will be less committed where entrenched owners may resist discretionary expenditure. Our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis and corporate social responsibility, as measured by FTSE4Good, is higher where entrenched shareholders are absent, where internal firm governance is good, where firms are accountable through the FTSE4Good process and where the World Bank’s assessment of “voice and accountability” is high. We view these characteristics as generally descriptive of an open society.

The FTSE4Good Effect: The Impact of Responsible Investment Indices on Environmental Management

This paper provides results consistent with the proposition that engagement by and threat of deletion from a responsible investment index motivated persistent improvements to corporate environmental management practices, especially for firms where the threat of exclusion from the index was likely to be costly. We use the natural experiment provided by the FTSE4Good upgrade of their environmental management criteria in 2002 when they engaged with index member firms that would not meet the new requirements but did not engage with non-member firms that would similarly fail. By 2005 49% of the 388 large and internationally diverse firms that had received engagement and been threatened with exclusion from the FTSE4Good index had complied, as opposed to 23% of the 658 firms which were not subject to engagement or potential exclusion. This result is statistically significant even after controlling for environmental risk, industry, country, governance and financial performance. Further results indicate that the effect of FTSE engagement produces a difference in compliance which persists for at least five years.