Cristina Ramponi

Experiences of Remembering, Knowing, and Guessing

This article presents and discusses transcripts of some 270 explanations subjects provided subsequently for recognition memory decisions that had been associated with remember, know, or guess responses at the time the recognition decisions were made. Only transcripts for remember responses included reports of recollective experiences, which seemed mostly to reflect either effortful elaborative encoding or involuntary reminding at study, especially in relation to the self. Transcripts for know responses included claims of just knowing, and of feelings of familiarity. These transcripts indicated that subjects were often quite confident of the accuracy of their decisions, compared with those for guess responses. Transcripts for decisions associated with guess responses also expressed feelings of familiarity but additionally revealed various strategies and inferences that did not directly reflect memory for studied items. The article concludes with a historical and theoretical overview of some interpretations of the states of awareness measured by these responses.

Recognition memory and decision processes: A meta-analysis of remember, know, and guess responses

A meta-analysis of proportions of remember, know, and guess responses was carried out on observations from 86 experimental conditions in 23 different recognition memory experiments. Unlike remember and know responses, guess responses revealed no memory for the test items that elicited them. A signal detection analysis of these data showed that A′ estimates of the strength of the memory trace depended on response criteria. A′ estimates increased significantly when know responses were added to remember responses, and decreased significantly when guess responses were added to remember and know responses. It was guessing, rather than knowing, that was most strongly correlated with overall response criteria. Nor were remembering and knowing correlated significantly. These results do not support a quantitative trace strength model according to which these responses merely reflect different response criteria. They support theories that ascribe remembering and knowing to qualitatively distinct memory systems or processes.

Recollection deficits in dysphoric mood: an effect of schematic models and executive mode?

Depression and dysphoric mood states are often accompanied by quantitative or qualitative shifts in performance across a range of retention tasks. This study focuses on the recollection of both autobiographical events and word lists in dysphoric states. Recollection occurs when people are aware of some contextual detail allied to the encoding experience. This study establishes the presence of a recollection deficit in dysphoria in two distinct paradigms. In both autobiographical recall and in recognition memory, recollection in a dysphoric group was at lower levels than recollection in matched controls. The study examines the hypothesis that the extent of recollection is influenced by two factors: (1) the degree of differentiation of schematic mental models; and (2) the executive mode that predominates when memory tasks are carried out, with the latter assumed to be altered by rumination. The relationship between responses based on recollection and alternative mnemonic responses could be predicted by measures of these two factors. The results are discussed in terms of the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) and the perspective it offers on the relationship between meaning systems and executive functions (Barnard, 1999).

Anxiety and the deployment of visual attention over time

Two studies investigated the effects of anxiety on the time course of attention to threatening material. A rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm required report of words belonging to a prespecified semantic category with a distractor placed at varying positions preceding the target. Where there was little resemblance in meaning between distractors and targets, threat distractors briefly captured the attention of high state anxious individuals but only after a delay. Where distractors resembled the meaning of the targets, attention was captured more immediately, but processing of threat-related material was concentrated at different points in time as a function of both the degree of semantic resemblance between distractors and target, and state anxiety. The extent to which distractors are salient to the experimental task influences attentional capture and the temporal course of processing. The methodological implications of these results are discussed together with a new hypothesis about the effects of state anxiety on attention.

On Reporting Recollective Experiences and “Direct Access to Memory Systems”

Strack and F

Response deadline and subjective awareness in recognition memory

oUrster (1995) showed that, unlike remember responses, know responses in recognition memory were influenced by manipulating response bias. We describe an experiment that replicated theirs but additionally allowed subjects to report guesses. Only guess responses were influenced by this manipulation. Response bias had no effects on either know or remember responses. This outcome suggests that manipulating response bias influences know responses only when guessing is encouraged but not reported as such. Moreover, though know responses reflected memory for the study events, guess responses did not.

Reducing specificity of autobiographical memory in nonclinical participants: The role of rumination and schematic models

Level of processing and generation effects were replicated in separate experiments in which recognition memory was tested using either short (500 ms) or long (1500 ms) response deadlines. These effects were similar at each deadline. Moreover, at each deadline these effects were associated with subsequent reports of remembering, not of knowing. And reports of both knowing and remembering increased following the longer deadline. These results imply that knowing does not index an automatic familiarity process, as conceived in some dual-process models of recognition, and that both remembering and knowing increase with the slower, more controlled processing permitted by the longer response time.

Level of processing and the process-dissociation procedure: elusiveness of null effects on estimates of automatic retrieval.

Two experiments are reported in which nondysphoric participants, not prone to excessive levels of rumination in everyday life, were asked to retrieve autobiographical memories using the Williams and Broadbent (1986) procedure (AMT). In the first experiment, two variants of a self‐related category fluency task were interleaved among sets of autobiographical memory cues. In one variant (blocked) a normal model of analytic rumination was induced by grouping prompts on a single superordinate theme together. In the other (intermixed) prompts from several different themes were grouped together. It was predicted that the blocked variant would reduce the number of specific memories recollected and increase the number of categoric memories relative to the intermixed variant. This prediction was confirmed and provides the first demonstration of a bidirectional causal influence of analytic rumination on the balance between specific and categoric retrievals. A second experiment showed no alteration in this balance when the same fluency manipulation involved animal‐related categories rather than self‐related ones. The results support a two component model of autobiographical retrieval being driven in part by the extent to which an analytic mode of processing is adopted in the short term and in part by the level of differentiation in self‐related schematic models.

Disgust Enhances the Recollection of Negative Emotional Images

We describe two experiments that used the process-dissociation procedure to investigate the effects of level of processing on estimates of controlled and automatic retrieval processes in word-stem completion tasks. Despite our best endeavours, we found the null effect of level of processing on estimates of automatic retrieval reported by Toth, Reingold, and Jacoby (1994) elusive. Estimates of automatic retrieval were not independent of level of processing but inversely related to it. In part, the reason was that, following deeper levels of processing, instructions to exclude recollected words led to floor effects. But the inverse relationship persisted even when floor effects were avoided. Only participants who were not given strict instructions in the exclusion task–and who also qualified as lax responders based on answers in a structured post-test interview–showed no effect of level of processing on estimates of automatic retrieval. This null effect apparently occurred because these participants failed to exclude words that they in fact recollected from the study list. This finding violates the critical assumption that in this task participants exclude recollected words. The results are therefore paradoxical. Successful replication of the null effect occurred only under conditions that preclude the very use of the procedure. This paradox has important implications for views on how consciousness should be conceived in relation to memory.

Component processes of conceptual priming and associative cued recall: The roles of preexisting representation and depth of processing.

Memory is typically better for emotional relative to neutral images, an effect generally considered to be mediated by arousal. However, this explanation cannot explain the full pattern of findings in the literature. Two experiments are reported that investigate the differential effects of categorical affective states upon emotional memory and the contributions of stimulus dimensions other than pleasantness and arousal to any memory advantage. In Experiment 1, disgusting images were better remembered than equally unpleasant frightening ones, despite the disgusting images being less arousing. In Experiment 2, regression analyses identified affective impact – a factor shown previously to influence the allocation of visual attention and amygdala response to negative emotional images – as the strongest predictor of remembering. These findings raise significant issues that the arousal account of emotional memory cannot readily address. The term impact refers to an undifferentiated emotional response to a stimulus, without requiring detailed consideration of specific dimensions of image content. We argue that ratings of impact relate to how the self is affected. The present data call for further consideration of the theoretical specifications of the mechanisms that lead to enhanced memory for emotional stimuli and their neural substrates.