Philip J. Barnard
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit
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Featured researches published by Philip J. Barnard.
Memory | 2004
Cristina Ramponi; Philip J. Barnard; Ian Nimmo‐Smith
Depression and dysphoric mood states are often accompanied by quantitative or qualitative shifts in performance across a range of retention tasks. This study focuses on the recollection of both autobiographical events and word lists in dysphoric states. Recollection occurs when people are aware of some contextual detail allied to the encoding experience. This study establishes the presence of a recollection deficit in dysphoria in two distinct paradigms. In both autobiographical recall and in recognition memory, recollection in a dysphoric group was at lower levels than recollection in matched controls. The study examines the hypothesis that the extent of recollection is influenced by two factors: (1) the degree of differentiation of schematic mental models; and (2) the executive mode that predominates when memory tasks are carried out, with the latter assumed to be altered by rumination. The relationship between responses based on recollection and alternative mnemonic responses could be predicted by measures of these two factors. The results are discussed in terms of the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) and the perspective it offers on the relationship between meaning systems and executive functions (Barnard, 1999).
Journal of Abnormal Psychology | 2008
Tim Dalgleish; Jennifer Rolfe; Ann-Marie Golden; Barnaby D. Dunn; Philip J. Barnard
Reduced specificity of autobiographical memories retrieved to word cues on the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) is associated with increased posttraumatic stress in traumatized samples. Theoretical debates concerning the dominant influences on this effect have focused on affect regulation, whereby specific personal information is avoided more by those experiencing greater distress, versus compromised executive control, whereby increased distress is associated with an inability to set aside inappropriately general responses on the AMT. The present study compared these 2 views in a correlational design using a reversed version of the AMT (the AMT-R) for which trauma-exposed participants (N=36) had to generate general memories from the past and avoid specific memories. An emphasis on the role of affect regulation would predict that distress would be associated with reduced specificity (as in the standard AMT), whereas emphasis on the role of executive control would predict that this relationship would be reversed. The data supported the affect regulation account, with greater posttraumatic stress being associated with reduced memory specificity.
Visual Cognition | 2005
Philip J. Barnard; Cristina Ramponi; Geoffrey Battye; Bundy Mackintosh
Two studies investigated the effects of anxiety on the time course of attention to threatening material. A rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm required report of words belonging to a prespecified semantic category with a distractor placed at varying positions preceding the target. Where there was little resemblance in meaning between distractors and targets, threat distractors briefly captured the attention of high state anxious individuals but only after a delay. Where distractors resembled the meaning of the targets, attention was captured more immediately, but processing of threat-related material was concentrated at different points in time as a function of both the degree of semantic resemblance between distractors and target, and state anxiety. The extent to which distractors are salient to the experimental task influences attentional capture and the temporal course of processing. The methodological implications of these results are discussed together with a new hypothesis about the effects of state anxiety on attention.
Psychological Science | 2004
Philip J. Barnard; Sophie K. Scott; Julie Taylor; Jon May; Wendy M. Knightley
Several paradigms show that responses to one event compromise responses to a second event for around 500 ms. Such effects are generally attributed to attentional capacity limitations associated with processing information in the first event. In a task in which targets could be distinguished only by their meaning, we varied the semantic relationship between distractors and targets following at different lags. Semantic relatedness alone produced a classic attentional blink. We conclude by discussing how attention theory might best accommodate these new effects.
Cognition & Emotion | 2007
Philip J. Barnard; David J. Duke; Richard W. Byrne; Iain Davidson
It is often argued that human emotions, and the cognitions that accompany them, involve refinements of, and extensions to, more basic functionality shared with other species. Such refinements may rely on common or on distinct processes and representations. Multi-level theories of cognition and affect make distinctions between qualitatively different types of representations often dealing with bodily, affective and cognitive attributes of self-related meanings. This paper will adopt a particular multi-level perspective on mental architecture and show how a mechanism of subsystem differentiation could have allowed an evolutionarily “old” role for emotion in the control of action to have altered into one more closely coupled to meaning systems. We conclude by outlining some illustrative consequences of our analysis that might usefully be addressed in research in comparative psychology, cognitive archaeology, and in laboratory research on memory for emotional material.
DSV-IS | 1995
Philip J. Barnard; Jon May
Advanced graphical interfaces are increasingly dynamic, multimodal and involve multithreaded dialogues. This paper provides a theoretical perspective that can support an analysis of the issues involved in their use: the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) framework. This framework is used to examine alternative ways in which information from different data streams can be blended within perception, thought and the control of action. The potential applicability of the core constructs to interface design is considered. The paper concludes by outlining a specific strategy for bringing this form of understanding into closer harmony with the formal methods community in computer science.
international conference on human-computer interaction | 1995
Jon May; Philip J. Barnard
Interface designers are increasingly relying on craft based approaches to compensate for a perceived lack of relevant theory. One such source is cinematography, where film-makers succeed in helping viewers follow the narrative across cuts which change the information on the screen. Cinematography has evolved over the last century, and its rules of thumb cannot be applied directly to interface design. We analyse film-makers’ techniques with a cognitive theory (ICS) and show that they work by preserving thematic continuity across cuts. Expressing this theoretically allows us to extrapolate away from film, applying it to screen changes in interface design.
Computer Graphics Forum | 2003
David J. Duke; Philip J. Barnard; Nick Halper; Mara Mellin
Previous studies at the intersection between rendering and psychology have concentrated on issues such as realismand acuity. Although such results have been useful in informing development of realistic rendering techniques,studies have shown that the interpretation of images is influenced by factors that have little to do with realism. Inthis paper, we summarize a series of experiments, the most recent of which are reported in a separate paper, thatinvestigate affective (emotive) qualities of images. These demonstrate significant effects that can be utilized withininteractive graphics, particularly via non‐photorealistic rendering (NPR). We explain how the interpretation ofthese results requires a high‐level model of cognitive information processing, and use such a model to account forrecent empirical results on rendering and judgement.
PLOS ONE | 2011
Camilla J. Croucher; Andrew J. Calder; Cristina Ramponi; Philip J. Barnard; Fionnuala C. Murphy
Memory is typically better for emotional relative to neutral images, an effect generally considered to be mediated by arousal. However, this explanation cannot explain the full pattern of findings in the literature. Two experiments are reported that investigate the differential effects of categorical affective states upon emotional memory and the contributions of stimulus dimensions other than pleasantness and arousal to any memory advantage. In Experiment 1, disgusting images were better remembered than equally unpleasant frightening ones, despite the disgusting images being less arousing. In Experiment 2, regression analyses identified affective impact – a factor shown previously to influence the allocation of visual attention and amygdala response to negative emotional images – as the strongest predictor of remembering. These findings raise significant issues that the arousal account of emotional memory cannot readily address. The term impact refers to an undifferentiated emotional response to a stimulus, without requiring detailed consideration of specific dimensions of image content. We argue that ratings of impact relate to how the self is affected. The present data call for further consideration of the theoretical specifications of the mechanisms that lead to enhanced memory for emotional stimuli and their neural substrates.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology | 2001
Sophie K. Scott; Philip J. Barnard; Jon May
The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework, ICS (Barnard, 1985) proposes that central executive phenomena can be accounted for by two autonomous subsystems, which process different forms of meaning: propositional and schematic (implicational) meanings. The apparent supervisory role of the executive arises from limitations on the exchange of information between these and other cognitive subsystems. This general proposal is elaborated in four experiments in which a total of 1,293 participants are asked to spontaneously generate a large verbal number to varying task constraints, with the intention of specifying the representations of number and task that underlie responses. Responses change systematically according to participants’ use of explicit propositional information provided by the instructions, and inferred implicational information about what the experimenter is requesting. There was a high error rate (between 6% and 24%), participants producing responses that did not fall within the large range indicated by the instructions. The studies support the distinction between propositional and implicational processing in executive function, and provide a framework for understanding normal executive representations and processes.