Cynthia Macdonald

Knowing Our Own Minds

Introduction 1. Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy 2. Response to Crispin Wright 3. Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge 4. An Eye Directed Outward 5. Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge 6. Self-Knowledge: Special Access versus Artefact of Grammar-A Dichotomy Rejected 7. Self-Knowledge and Resentment 8. Reason and the First Person 9. What the Externalist Can Know A Priori [**this chapter previously published**] 10. Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge 11. Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant 12. First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs 13. The Simple Theory of Colour and the Transparency of Sense Experience 14. On Knowing Ones Own Language 15. On Knowing Ones Own Language Index

Mcdowell and His Critics

Notes on Contributors. Introduction. 1 Austerity and Openness: R. M. Sainsbury(University of Texas at Austin and Kings College London). Response to Sainsbury: John McDowell. 2 Reason and Language: Richard G. Heck, Jr. (Brown University and Arche). Response to Heck: John McDowell. 3 Some Philosophical Integrations: Akeel Bilgrami (Columbia University). Response to Bilgrami: John McDowell. 4 Self-Knowledge and Inner Space: Cynthia Macdonald (University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and Queens University Belfast). Response to Macdonald: John McDowell. 5 Personal Identity, Ethical not Metaphysical: Carol Rovane (Columbia University). Response to Rovane: John McDowell. 6 Acting in the Light of the Appearances: Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading and University of Texas at Austin). Response to Dancy: John McDowell. 7 External Reasons: Philip Pettit and Michael Smith (Princeton University). Response to Pettit and Smith: John McDowell. 8 Aristotles Use of Prudential Concepts: T. H. Irwin (Cornell University). Response to Irwin: John McDowell. 9 Julius Caesar and George Berkeley Play Leapfrog: Simon Blackburn (University of Cambridge). Response to Blackburn: John McDowell. 10 The Two Natures: Another Dogma?: Graham Macdonald (University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and Queens University Belfast). Response to Macdonald: John McDowell. Index

Self-Knowledge and the 'Inner Eye'

Abstract What is knowledge of ones own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that contentful properties in such cases have two features in common with observational properties of objects. In section three, I develop a quasi-observational account of self-knowledge for the cogito-like cases by considering various accounts of the nature of observational properties (specifically, secondary qualities) and by applying them to these cases. I conclude by addressing some important objections to the account.

Externalism and first-person authority

Externalism in the philosophy of mind is threatened by the view that subjects are authoritative with regard to the contents of their own intentional states. If externalism is to be reconciled with first-person authority, two issues need to be addressed: (a) how the non-evidence-based character of knowledge of ones own intentional states is compatible with ignorance of the empirical factors that individuate the contents of those states, and (b) how, given externalism, the non-evidence-based character of such knowledge could place its subject in an authoritative position. This paper endorses a standard strategy for dealing with (a). The bulk of the paper is devoted to (b). The aim is to develop an account of first-person authority for a certain class of intentional states that is capable of explaining (1) why knowledge of ones own intentional states is peculiarly authoritative, and (2) why such authority is compatible with externalism.

Rethinking Folk-Psychology: Alternatives to Theories of Mind

For at least the past 30 years it has been generally supposed that our so-called ‘mindreading’ or ‘mentalizing’ abilities are a conditio sine qua non for social interaction. Our capacity to interpret the behaviour of others and ourselves in terms of beliefs and desires is assumed to give rise to a ‘folk-psychological’ understanding of one another. And without this kind of understanding of each other’s behaviour, human social interaction is deemed impossible. How do we understand and anticipate each other’s actions if not by gaining access to each other’s minds, i.e. by knowing what the other believes, wants, thinks and feels? What our mindreading or mentalizing abilities in fact consist in has been a matter of fierce dispute. But the dispute exists against the background of a consensus over the fact that folkpsychology, mindreading or mentalizing is the backbone of the social world. Today, however, this consensus is showing hairline cracks. Although still being something near to consensus, the idea that social interaction hinges mainly on folk-psychological mindreading is no longer universally accepted. When it comes to explaining social interaction, the variety of competing theories purporting to account for folk-psychology and mindreading are no longer the only options available. In order to highlight this expansion of the landscape of options, and consequently in order to see in which ways the traditional accounts are being challenged, we first need to sketch the development of the so-called ‘theories of mind debate’.

In My 'Mind's Eye': Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is, broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

Constitutive properties, essences, and events

The property-exemplification account o f events has been subjected to attacks of various sorts since its conception. It is often said, for instance, that the account has unacceptable counterintuitive consequences because it individuates events too finely) I believe that many of these criticisms are based on features that are incidental to the account. On the other hand, I wish to argue that one wellknown way of developing it ought not to be pursued. Since there is a degree of confusion regarding the essentials of the account, I begin with an explication of these. The discussion to follow assumes that a large part of the point and interest in theories of events lies in whatever potential they may have to support the claim that events constitute an ontological category distinct from others.