Marc Slors

Early social cognition: Alternatives to implicit mindreading.

According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances.

Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition

Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge – knowledge how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment.

Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity

Abstract In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the ‘orthodox’ conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.

Conscious Intending as Self-Programming

Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this process? I argue that answers to these questions point to a picture of distal conscious intending as a form of self-programming. The metaphor of “self-programming” will be elucidated by using a distinction between “structuring” and “triggering” causes. Though the self-programming metaphor does not amount to a full theory of conscious intending, I argue that it may be a useful heuristic in developing such a theory. I also argue that the metaphor is phenomenologically plausible.

The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory

Abstract “Theory of Mind” (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with the rejection of this ubiquity. According to this explanation, we use ToM-talk primarily to model and thereby reconstruct non-mentalizing social-cognitive processes in order to explain our assessment of the behaviour of others. The intuition that ToM is ubiquitous is the result of mistaking the model for the real thing. This explanation is argued to be more complete than the “ToM-ist” explanation of the intuition that ToM is not ubiquitous.

From Brain Imaging Religious Experience to Explaining Religion: A Critique

Recent functional neuroimaging data, acquired in studies of religious experience, have been used to explain and justify religion and its origins. In this paper, we critique the move from describing brain activity associated with self-reported religious states, to explaining why there is religion at all. Toward that end, first we review recent neuroimaging findings on religious experience, and show how those results do not necessarily support a popular notion that religion has a primitive evolutionary origin. Importantly, we call into question an assumption—key to that account of religion—concerning a conceptual relation between ‘religion’ and ‘religious experience’. Then, we examine the conditions that must be met in order to explain religion on the basis of brain imaging findings. Moreover, we list principled reasons to be sceptical of explanations of religion in terms of the neural underpinnings of experiences. We conclude that the data from neuroimaging studies are not suited for an explanation of religion.

Rethinking Folk-Psychology: Alternatives to Theories of Mind

For at least the past 30 years it has been generally supposed that our so-called ‘mindreading’ or ‘mentalizing’ abilities are a conditio sine qua non for social interaction. Our capacity to interpret the behaviour of others and ourselves in terms of beliefs and desires is assumed to give rise to a ‘folk-psychological’ understanding of one another. And without this kind of understanding of each other’s behaviour, human social interaction is deemed impossible. How do we understand and anticipate each other’s actions if not by gaining access to each other’s minds, i.e. by knowing what the other believes, wants, thinks and feels? What our mindreading or mentalizing abilities in fact consist in has been a matter of fierce dispute. But the dispute exists against the background of a consensus over the fact that folkpsychology, mindreading or mentalizing is the backbone of the social world. Today, however, this consensus is showing hairline cracks. Although still being something near to consensus, the idea that social interaction hinges mainly on folk-psychological mindreading is no longer universally accepted. When it comes to explaining social interaction, the variety of competing theories purporting to account for folk-psychology and mindreading are no longer the only options available. In order to highlight this expansion of the landscape of options, and consequently in order to see in which ways the traditional accounts are being challenged, we first need to sketch the development of the so-called ‘theories of mind debate’.

What is a cognitive ontology, anyway?

This special issue brings together philosophical perspectives on the debate over cognitive ontology. We contextualize the papers in this issue by considering several different senses of the term “cognitive ontology” and linking those debates to traditional debates in philosophy of mind.

Social cognition in simple action coordination: A case for direct perception.

In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cognition involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception (DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. While we recognize the viability of a mindreading-based account such as e.g. Michael Tomasellos, we present an alternative DSP account that (i) explains simple action coordination in a less cognitively demanding manner, (ii) is better able to explain flexibility and strategy-switching in coordination and crucially (iii) allows for formal modeling. This account of action coordination is based on the notion of an agents field of affordances. Coordination ensues, we argue, when, given a shared intention, the actions of and/or affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances for another agent. This a form of social perception since in particular perceiving affordances for another person involves seeing that person as an agent. It is a form of social perception since it involves perceiving affordances for another person and registering how another persons actions influence ones own perceived field of affordances.

Two Claims that can Save a Nonreductive Account of Mental Causation

Right now I am acting. I am striking keys on my computer keyboard. l do so for a reason. I intend to write a paper. I believe that this intention causes me to act in the way I do. I believe, in other words, that my mental states have the causal powers to e.g. move my fingers over the keyboard and make them hit the appropriate keys.