Dale Griffin

The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence

Abstract The pattern of overconfidence and underconfidence observed in studies of intuitive judgment is explained by the hypothesis that people focus on the strength or extremeness of the available evidence (e.g., the warmth of a letter or the size of an effect) with insufficient regard for its weight or credence (e.g., the credibility of the writer or the size of the sample). This mode of judgment yields overconfidence when strength is high and weight is low, and underconfidence when strength is low and weight is high. We first demonstrate this phenomenon in a chance setup where strength is defined by sample proportion and weight is defined by sample size, and then extend the analysis to more complex evidential problems, including general knowledge questions and predicting the behavior of self and of others. We propose that peoples confidence is determined by the balance of arguments for and against the competing hypotheses, with insufficient regard for the weight of the evidence. We show that this account can explain the effect of item difficulty on overconfidence, and we relate the observed discrepancy between confidence judgments and frequency estimates to the illusion of validity. Finally, we contrast the present account with a frequentistic model of confidence proposed by Gigerenzer and his colleagues, and present data that refute their model.

A Hubris Theory of Entrepreneurship

This paper develops a hubris theory of entrepreneurship to explain why so many new ventures are created in the shadow of high venture failure rates: More confident actors are moved to start ventures, and then act on such confidence when deciding how to allocate resources in their ventures. Building on theory and evidence from the behavioral decision-making literature, we describe how founders socially constructed confidence affects the manner in which they interpret information about their prior and current ventures. We then link founders propensity to be overconfident to their decisions to allocate, use, and attain resources. In our model, founders with greater socially constructed confidence tend to deprive their ventures of resources and resourcefulness and, therefore, increase the likelihood that their ventures will fail.

Self-esteem and the quest for felt security: how perceived regard regulates attachment processes.

The authors proposed that personal feelings of self-esteem foster the level of confidence in a partners regard critical for satisfying attachments. Dating and married couples described themselves, their partners, how they thought their partners saw them, and how they wanted their partners to see them on a variety of interpersonal qualities. The results revealed that low self-esteem individuals dramatically underestimated how positively their partners saw them. Such unwarranted and unwanted insecurities were associated with less generous perceptions of partners and lower relationship well-being. The converse was true for high self-esteem individuals. A longitudinal examination of the dating couples revealed that the vulnerabilities of lows were only exacerbated over time. A dependency regulation model is proposed, wherein felt security in a partners perceived regard is suggested as a prime mechanism linking self-esteem to relational well-being.

Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human Misunderstanding

Publisher Summary This chapter examines social psychological implications of human subjectivity—implications of the fact, and perhaps more importantly the insight, that people are governed not by the passive reception and recognition of some invariant objective reality, but by their own subjective representations and constructions of the events that unfold around them. The history of the subjective-objective distinction, first in some traditional theoretical and methodological concerns of social psychology, and then human motivation are discussed in this chapter. Social cognition, a research area that has held center stage in the field for most of the past two decades is expalined. The particular focus will be the problem of situational construal and its contribution to the difficulties of predicting social actions and making inferences or attributions about social actors. Construal processes are variable and uncertain, and they contribute heavily to the variability and unpredictability of a wide range of social responses. The second and less familiar thesis, social perceivers, fail to recognize, or at least fail to make adequate inferential allowance for, these “vagaries” of construal. People characteristically make attributions and other social judgments, and decisions predicated on a kind of naive realism. The process of subjective construal is fundamental to psychological inquiry at all levels of analysis.

Heuristics and Biases: Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice

One of the main ideas that has emerged from behavioral decision research is a constructive conception of judgment and choice. According to this view, preferences and beliefs are actually constructed – not merely revealed – in the elicitation process. This conception is entailed by findings that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation often give rise to systematically different responses (e.g., Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). To account for these data within a constructive framework, we seek explanatory principles that relate the characteristics of the task to the attributes of the objects under study. One such notion is the compatibility hypothesis, which states that the weight of a stimulus attribute is enhanced by its compatibility with the response. The rationale for this hypothesis is twofold. First, noncompatibility between the input and the output requires additional mental operations, which often increase effort and error and may reduce impact. Second, a response mode may prime or focus attention on the compatible features of the stimulus. Common features, for example, are weighted more heavily in judgments of similarity than in judgments of dissimilarity, whereas distinctive features are weighted more heavily in judgments of dissimilarity (Tversky, 1977). Consequently, entities with many common and many distinctive features (e.g., East and West Germany) are judged as both more similar to each other and as more different from each other than entities with relatively fewer common and fewer distinctive features (e.g., Sri Lanka and Nepal).

Once Hurt, Twice Hurtful: How Perceived Regard Regulates Daily Marital Interactions

A daily diary study examined how chronic perceptions of a partners regard affect how intimates interpret and respond to daily relationship stresses. Spouses each completed a diary for 21 days. Multilevel analyses revealed that people who felt less positively regarded read more into stressful events than did people who felt highly regarded, feeling more hurt on days after acute threats, such as those posed by a moody or ill-behaved partner. Intimates who felt less valued responded to feeling hurt by behaving badly toward their partner on subsequent days. In contrast, intimates who felt more valued responded to feeling hurt by drawing closer to their partner. Ironically, chronically activated needs for belongingness might lead people who are trying to find acceptance to undermine their marriage.

Overconfident prediction of future actions and outcomes by self and others.

In a follow-up study to Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, and L. Ross (1990), which had investigated the phenomenon of overconfidence in social prediction, two samples of first-year undergraduates were invited to make predictions about their own future responses (and, in the case of Sample 2, also those of their roommates) over the months ahead. These predictions were accompanied by confidence estimates and were evaluated in the light of actual responses reported later by the subjects in question. The primary finding was that self-predictions, like social predictions, proved to be consistently overconfident. As in Dunning et al., moreover, overconfidence could be traced to two sources. First, expressions of particularly high confidence rarely proved to be warranted; as confidence increased, the gap between accuracy and confidence widened. Second, predictions that went against relevant base rates yielded very low accuracy in the face of relatively unattenuated confidence levels. The implications of these results are discussed, and one potentially important underlying mechanism--the failure to make adequate inferential allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal--is proposed for further research.

The Mismeasure of Love: How Self-Doubt Contaminates Relationship Beliefs

The authors argue that individuals with more negative models of self are involved in less satisfying relationships because they have difficulty believing that they are loved by good partners. Dating and married couples completed measures of self-models, perceptions of the partner’s love, perceptions of the partner, and relationship well-being. The results revealed that individuals troubled by self-doubt underestimated the strength of their partners’ love. Such unwarranted insecurities predicted less positive perceptions of their partners. In conjunction, feeling less loved by a less-valuable partner predicted less satisfaction and less optimism for the future than the partner’s feelings of love and commitment warranted. A dependency regulation model is described, where feeling loved by a good, responsive partner is thought to represent a sense of felt security that diminishes the risks of interdependence and promotes closeness.

Heuristics and Biases: Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a series of papers by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman revolutionized academic research on human judgment. The central idea of the “heuristics and biases” program – that judgment under uncertainty often rests on a limited number of simplifying heuristics rather than extensive algorithmic processing – soon spread beyond academic psychology, affecting theory and research across a range of disciplines including economics, law, medicine, and political science. The message was revolutionary in that it simultaneously questioned the descriptive adequacy of ideal models of judgment and offered a cognitive alternative that explained human error without invoking motivated irrationality. The initial papers and a variety of related work were collected in a 1982 volume, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). In the time since, research in the heuristics and biases tradition has prospered on a number of fronts, each represented by a section of the current volume. In this opening chapter, we wish to put the heuristics and biases approach in historical context and discuss some key issues that have been raised since the 1982 book appeared. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Any discussion of the modern history of research on everyday judgment must take note of the large shadow cast by the classical model of rational choice. The model has been applied most vigorously in the discipline of economics, but its considerable influence can be felt in all the behavioral and social sciences and in related policy fields such as law and medicine.

The Role of Motivated Reasoning in Optimistic Time Predictions

The authors explore the well-documented tendency for people to predict that they will finish tasks earlier than they actually do. Whereas previous research has tied this optimistic bias to the operation of specific cognitive processes, the present studies examine the interplay between motivation and cognition. Two studies supported the hypothesis that incentives to finish tasks quickly exacerbate the optimistic bias. An initial field study using a naturally occurring incentive manipulation demonstrated that individuals who expected an income tax refund were more (overly) optimistic in predicting when they would complete their income tax forms than those who did not expect a refund. A laboratory experiment using a word generation task replicated this general effect and identified mediating cognitive mechanisms: Monetary incentives for early completion led to optimistic predictions, increased attention to detailed future plans, and reduced attention to relevant past experiences.