Roger Buehler
Wilfrid Laurier University
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Featured researches published by Roger Buehler.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 1997
Roger Buehler; Dale Griffin; Heather MacDonald
The authors explore the well-documented tendency for people to predict that they will finish tasks earlier than they actually do. Whereas previous research has tied this optimistic bias to the operation of specific cognitive processes, the present studies examine the interplay between motivation and cognition. Two studies supported the hypothesis that incentives to finish tasks quickly exacerbate the optimistic bias. An initial field study using a naturally occurring incentive manipulation demonstrated that individuals who expected an income tax refund were more (overly) optimistic in predicting when they would complete their income tax forms than those who did not expect a refund. A laboratory experiment using a word generation task replicated this general effect and identified mediating cognitive mechanisms: Monetary incentives for early completion led to optimistic predictions, increased attention to detailed future plans, and reduced attention to relevant past experiences.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 2001
Roger Buehler; Cathy McFarland
In five studies, university students predicted their affective reactions to a wide variety of positive and negative future events. In Studies 1 to 3, participants also reported the affective reactions they experienced when the target event occurred. As hypothesized, they tended to anticipate more intense reactions than they actually experienced. In Studies 3 to 5, a cognitive determinant of this “intensity bias” was examined. It was hypothesized that people anticipate stronger affective reactions when they focus narrowly on an upcoming event in a manner that neglects past experience and less intense reactions when they consider a set of relevant previous experiences. Evidence from thought-listing measures as well as an experimental manipulation of temporal focus supported this hypothesis.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | 1998
Cathy McFarland; Roger Buehler
Five studies examined how self-focused attention affects the impact of negative moods on autobiographical memory. It was proposed that self-focused attention to moods may increase the likelihood of both mood-congruent recall and mood-incongruent recall and that the type of recall effect that occurs will depend on the manner in which people focus on their moods. In these studies, participants were led to experience negative or neutral moods, exposed to a manipulation designed to affect some aspect of their attention to their moods, and then asked to report memories. This research revealed that when people adopt a reflective orientation to their moods, they are more likely to engage in mood-incongruent recall; in contrast, when they adopt a ruminative orientation to their moods, they are more likely to engage in mood-congruent recall. Thus, the way in which people focus on their moods moderates the relation between mood and memory.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes | 2003
Roger Buehler; Dale Griffin
Abstract The present studies examined cognitive processes underlying the tendency to underestimate project completion times. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that people generate overly optimistic predictions, in part, because they focus narrowly on their future plans for the target task and thus neglect other useful sources of information. Consistent with the hypothesis, instructing participants to adopt a “future focus”—in which they generated concrete, specific plans for the task at hand—led them to make more optimistic predictions about when they would complete their intended Christmas shopping (Study 1) and major school assignments (Study 2). The future focus manipulation did not have a corresponding effect on actual completion times, and thus increased the degree of optimistic bias in prediction. The studies also demonstrated that the optimistic prediction bias generalized across different task domains, relevant individual differences (i.e., trait optimism and procrastination), and other contextual variations.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 2007
Noelia A. Vasquez; Roger Buehler
Imagining future success can sometimes enhance peoples motivation to achieve it. This article examines a phenomenological aspect of positive mental imagery— the visual perspective adopted—that may moderate its motivational impact. The authors hypothesize that people feel more motivated to succeed on a future task when they visualize its successful completion from a third-person rather than a first-person perspective. Actions viewed from the third-person perspective are generally construed at a relatively high level of abstraction—in a manner that highlights their larger meaning and significance—which should heighten their motivational impact. Three studies in the domain of academic motivation support this reasoning. Students experience a greater increase in achievement motivation when they imagine their successful task completion from a third-rather than a first-person perspective. Moreover, mediational analyses reveal that third-person imagery boosts motivation by prompting students to construe their success abstractly and to perceive it as important.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 2005
Kent C. H. Lam; Roger Buehler; Cathy McFarland; Michael Ross; Irene Cheung
The impact bias in affective forecasting—a tendency to overestimate the emotional consequences of future events—may not be a universal phenomenon. This prediction bias stems from a cognitive process known as focalism, whereby predictors focus attention narrowly on the upcoming target event. Three studies supported the hypothesis that East Asians, who tend to think more holistically than Westerners, would be less susceptible to focalism and, consequently, to the impact bias. In Studies 1 and 2, Euro-Canadians exhibited the impact bias for positive future events, whereas East Asians did not. A thought focus measure indicated that the cultural difference in prediction was mediated by the extent to which participants focused on the target event (i.e., focalism). In Study 3, a thought focus manipulation revealed that defocused Euro-Canadians and East Asians made equally moderate affective forecasts.
Archive | 2010
Roger Buehler; Dale Griffin; Johanna Peetz
Abstract The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12 , 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12, 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 2009
Johanna Peetz; Roger Buehler
The authors extend research and theory on self prediction into the realm of personal financial behavior. Four studies examined people’s ability to predict their future personal spending and the findings supported the two main hypotheses. First, participants tended to underestimate their future spending. They predicted spending substantially less money in the coming week than they actually spent or than they remembered spending in the previous week. Second, the prediction bias stemmed from people’s savings goals—defined as the general desire to save money or minimize future spending—at the time of prediction. Participants who reported (Studies 2 and 3) or were induced to experience (Study 4) a stronger savings goal predicted they would spend less money. However, savings goals were not related to actual spending and thus contributed to the bias in prediction.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology | 2010
Roger Buehler; Dale Griffin; Johanna Peetz
Abstract The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12 , 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.The planning fallacy refers to a prediction phenomenon, all too familiar to many, wherein people underestimate the time it will take to complete a future task, despite knowledge that previous tasks have generally taken longer than planned. In this chapter, we review theory and research on the planning fallacy, with an emphasis on a programmatic series of investigations that we have conducted on this topic. We first outline a definition of the planning fallacy, explicate controversies and complexities surrounding its definition, and summarize empirical research documenting the scope and generality of the phenomenon. We then explore the origins of the planning fallacy, beginning with the classic inside–outside cognitive model developed by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures. TIMS Studies in Management Science, 12, 313–327]. Finally, we develop an extended inside–outside model that integrates empirical research examining cognitive, motivational, social, and behavioral processes underlying the planning fallacy.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | 2007
Cathy McFarland; Roger Buehler; Rebecca Von Rüti; Lewis Nguyen; Celeste Alvaro
This research program examined how self-focused attention to feelings affects the relation between mood negativity and self-enhancing thought. The primary hypothesis was that the particular manner in which people focus on their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) determines whether they reveal positive (i.e., mood-incongruent) or negative (i.e., mood-congruent) self-relevant thoughts in response to negative moods. Studies 1-4 revealed that social comparisons, temporal comparisons, and other self-enhancing cognitions (i.e., attributions, disidentification, relationship evaluations) are more likely to be mood incongruent when people adopt a reflective orientation to their negative feelings and more likely to be mood congruent when they adopt a ruminative orientation. Additionally, moods and mood orientations affected self-enhancing thoughts through the mediating influence of mood regulation goals and intentions (Studies 5 and 6).