Damien Kingsbury

Power politics and the Indonesian military

This book, based on extensive original research, examines the role of the military in Indonesian politics. It looks at the role of the military historically, examines the different ways it is involved in politics, and considers how the role of the military might develop in what is still an uncertain future.

The Free Aceh Movement: Islam and democratisation 1

Abstract The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has been characterised by some observers and the Indonesian government as being a radical Islamic organisation intent on establishing an Islamic state in northern Sumatra. This article explores GAMs relationship with Islam and shows that while GAM members are devout Muslims and that Islam pervades their political thinking, the organisation and its members are explicitly opposed to the creation of an Islamic state or the imposition of Islamic law. The article reports how senior members of GAMs hierarchy discuss their personal relationship with Islam, noting consistencies and differences in their approaches. A common theme is that Islam provides a motive for the struggle, based on notions of justice and equality, and that these and related aspects of Acehnese political organisation provide the groundwork for a functional form of democracy in Acehs post-peace settlement environment.

National identity in Timor-Leste: challenges and opportunities

Following a long independence struggle and international intervention, in 2006 the tiny impoverished state of Timor-Leste almost imploded in civil chaos and institutional collapse. The events of the time were quickly defined in terms of an east–west geographical and, broadly, linguistic and political divide, corresponding to pro- and anti-government groupings. International intervention quelled the worst of the violence, although elections in 2007 confirmed the general tendency, if not an absolute alignment, to the divide that had appeared in 2006. However, much also united Timor-Leste historically and culturally and, increasingly, in a broad acceptance of civic institutions. It was from this base that the small and sometimes fragile state began to build what promised to be a more coherent future.

TIMOR-LESTE: The Harsh Reality after Independence

Even set against its long history of misery, 2006 was one of Timor-Lestes worst years. While there have been other years in which more people have died and in which its physical infrastructure has been more destroyed, 2006 saw, if not the ending of a dream, then the harsh realization that the value of independence was only as good as its political community made it. In 2006, Timor-Lestes political community tore itself apart, setting in train an internal conflict that had scope to run well beyond the years end, and which threatened to relegate the country to the status of just another post-colonial failed state. Timor-Lestes descent into factional conflict and the related forced resigna tion of its Prime Minister reflected the type of political chaos that has affected many newly post-colonial states, in which competition for power overwhelmed a fragile and still fragmented political environment. So much had been hoped for and invested in Timor-Leste by the international community, by the United Nations, and not least by the people of Timor-Leste themselves, yet so little was shown to have been achieved. Despite the change of prime minister, with the ascendance of the popular Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, the establishment of a UN police presence,1 along with continuing external military support from some 3,000 foreign troops, violence and destruction continued, entrenching a regional divide that challenged Timor-Lestes future.

Post-colonial states, ethnic minorities and separatist conflicts : case studies from Southeast and South Asia

Abstract Post-colonial states in the Asian region have frequently been subject to political tensions derived from their multi-ethnic make-up and, what some have argued to be, the failure of states to adequately represent the interests of their ethnic minorities. This article will look at examples of where states in Asia have failed to adequately represent or otherwise incorporate their ethnic minorities as full and equal citizens. It also considers the range of responses to such perceived or actual state failure in adequately incorporating all citizens, including inter-ethnic and racial violence and separatist conflict. The article will conclude by considering conceptual and actual models of state organization intended to resolve racial and ethnic tensions in the Asian region.

Universalism and Exceptionalism in “Asia”

The purpose of human rights is, or should be, about increasing human freedom as an intrinsic good (see Sen 1999b). This is not freedom in the sense of personal irresponsibility, or the model where one is free to trample on the lives of others, but freedom from oppression and exploitation and, more positively, to explore one’s personal capacities and human potential. Such freedom does not exist in only abstract terms; however, on the political spectrum it is at the opposite end of power. Given that power in itself does not seek approval for its actions, a functional freedom requires certain guarantees in relation to power to be able to exist. These guarantees are usually referred to as civil and political rights.

Democratic consolidation in Timor-Leste: achievements, problems and prospects

Timor-Leste has had three rounds of major elections, all of which have been widely regarded as meeting international criteria for being free and fair. There has also been one change of government on the basis of these elections. On these grounds, some observers have suggested that Timor-Leste has met the benchmark for having consolidated its democracy. Timor-Leste can be said to meet the criteria for an expanded minimalist definition of democracy, holding regular, free and fair elections within an open competitive political environment, with relatively little violence and intimidation and general freedom of expression. This political process has, as defined by the literature, also consolidated. However, Timor-Leste continues to face future economic challenges. The literature indicates that states with high levels of poverty, unemployment and with food shortages are more prone to political instability. Given that Timor-Lestes political party system relies heavily on charismatic individuals and, apart from Fretilin, has poor party structures, loss of current political leaders will add a further destabilising effect. Expected economic problems are likely to manifest around the same time that the current generation of political leaders are no longer active. The question will be, in this increasingly challenging environment, whether Timor-Leste can sustain its democracy.

Critical reflections on development

Introduction Damien Kingsbury 1. Reconceptualising Development: the Painful Job of Thinking Andrew Hewett & Chris Roche 2. The g7+ Group of Fragile States: Towards Improved International Engagement Simon Fenby 3. After the Washington Consensus John McKay 4. Civil War and the Limits of Decolonization Capitalism Rohan Bastin 5. The Good Governance-Human Rights Nexus Damien Kingsbury 6. Reconceptualising International Aid and Development NGOs Paul Ronalds 7. A Trojan Horse? International Development Agencies Embrace Business Practices and Mental Models Mark McPeak 8. Seeing the Forest for the Carbon: How Might REDD+ Schemes Impact Forest-dependent Communities? Craig Thorburn 9. The Turn to Civil Society? Sue Kenny 10. Feminist Reflection on the Declarations of Paris and Dili Elizabeth Reid 11. Reproduction and Real Property in Rural China: Three Decades of Development and Discrimination Laurel Bossen Conclusion Damien Kingsbury

The political economy of cross-border relations : the TNI and East Timor

Within a framework of formally increasingly cordial bilateral relations, the Indonesian military, the TNI, was engaging in and allowing extensive cross-border trade and smuggling while pursuing a policy of limited cross-border destabilization of East Timor. This seemingly contradictory policy, run from the TNIs ‘strategic command centre’ in Atambua, West Timor, met the TNIs continuing need to fund its own activities (and those of its proxies) through both legal and illegal means, to provide leverage for the coming talks about the formal demarcation of the border, and to provide a foothold to longer-term irredentist claims to the former occupied province and now independent state.

The role of resources in the resolution of the Western Sahara issue

The westernmost corner of Algeria, near the border with Morocco, Western Sahara and Mauritania, is a desolate and unforgiving place, where summer temperatures reach and sometimes exceed 50 degrees C. This barren plateau type of desert is known as hammada and has historically been referred to as ‘the Devil’s Garden’. It is an apt name for an environment where sustaining life is impossible without complete reliance on external support. It is in this area, near the Algerian town of Tindouf, that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Rio de Oro, or Polisario Front) administers refugee camps for Saharawi people displaced by Morocco’s 1975 invasion of Spanish Sahara (later known as Western Sahara). Between around 100,000 and 165,000 people live in the six camps in the area, surviving on aid from Algeria, South Africa and the wider international community. The Polisario Front also administers the ‘liberated’ territory of Western Sahara, known as the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). It is in this all but forgotten place that the four-decades-old claim to Western Saharan independence was again building towards armed conflict. A growing young population, educated but with very few jobs, almost no opportunities and little future, was pushing for its administration to reclaim their land from Moroccan occupation. As the Saharawi refugees wait in these remote and desolate camps, their compatriots in occupied Western Sahara are regularly subjected to abuse and oppression; dissent is not allowed in occupied Western Sahara and is dealt with harshly, often through extra-judicial means. Meanwhile the relative wealth that the Saharawi people regard as their birthright and which might provide a basis for them to build more complete lives in a future independent state is being sold off to foreign companies, in return for which they receive nothing. Almost all of these resources are finite and such financial legacy as might have been available to the SADR is being depleted by Morocco as a colonial occupier. Faced with being locked into an indefinite and futile future in ‘the Devil’s Garden’ or pressing the issue militarily, with some hope of breaking the current deadlock, the latter was increasingly the preferred option. The papers in the collection consider aspects of the role of Western Sahara’s resources in finding a resolution to the status of Saharawi refugees and Morocco’s illegal military occupation of Western Sahara. In part, Western Sahara’s natural resources might provide an avenue for finding a way towards a resolution of this issue but, probably more so, the lack of access to