Dan Ariely

The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance

People like to think of themselves as honest. However, dishonesty pays—and it often pays well. How do people resolve this tension? This research shows that people behave dishonestly enough to profit but honestly enough to delude themselves of their own integrity. A little bit of dishonesty gives a taste of profit without spoiling a positive self-view. Two mechanisms allow for such self-concept maintenance: inattention to moral standards and categorization malleability. Six experiments support the authors’ theory of self-concept maintenance and offer practical applications for curbing dishonesty in everyday life.

Beautiful faces have variable reward value: fMRI and behavioral evidence.

The brain circuitry processing rewarding and aversive stimuli is hypothesized to be at the core of motivated behavior. In this study, discrete categories of beautiful faces are shown to have differing reward values and to differentially activate reward circuitry in human subjects. In particular, young heterosexual males rate pictures of beautiful males and females as attractive, but exert effort via a keypress procedure only to view pictures of attractive females. Functional magnetic resonance imaging at 3 T shows that passive viewing of beautiful female faces activates reward circuitry, in particular the nucleus accumbens. An extended set of subcortical and paralimbic reward regions also appear to follow aspects of the keypress rather than the rating procedures, suggesting that reward circuitry function does not include aesthetic assessment.

Effort for Payment A Tale of Two Markets

The standard model of labor is one in which individuals trade their time and energy in return for monetary rewards. Building on Fiskes relational theory (1992), we propose that there are two types of markets that determine relationships between effort and payment: monetary and social. We hypothesize that monetary markets are highly sensitive to the magnitude of compensation, whereas social markets are not. This perspective can shed light on the well-established observation that people sometimes expend more effort in exchange for no payment (a social market) than they expend when they receive low payment (a monetary market). Three experiments support these ideas. The experimental evidence also demonstrates that mixed markets (markets that include aspects of both social and monetary markets) more closely resemble monetary than social markets.

Seeing Sets: Representation by Statistical Properties

Sets of similar objects are common occurrences—a crowd of people, a bunch of bananas, a copse of trees, a shelf of books, a line of cars. Each item in the set may be distinct, highly visible, and discriminable. But when we look away from the set, what information do we have? The current article starts to address this question by introducing the idea of a set representation. This idea was tested using two new paradigms: mean discrimination and member identification. Three experiments using sets of different-sized spots showed that observers know a sets mean quite accurately but know little about the individual items, except their range. Taken together, these results suggest that the visual system represents the overall statistical, and not individual, properties of sets.

Neuromarketing: the hope and hype of neuroimaging in business

The application of neuroimaging methods to product marketing — neuromarketing — has recently gained considerable popularity. We propose that there are two main reasons for this trend. First, the possibility that neuroimaging will become cheaper and faster than other marketing methods; and second, the hope that neuroimaging will provide marketers with information that is not obtainable through conventional marketing methods. Although neuroimaging is unlikely to be cheaper than other tools in the near future, there is growing evidence that it may provide hidden information about the consumer experience. The most promising application of neuroimaging methods to marketing may come before a product is even released — when it is just an idea being developed.

Building a Better America—One Wealth Quintile at a Time:

Disagreements about the optimal level of wealth inequality underlie policy debates ranging from taxation to welfare. We attempt to insert the desires of “regular” Americans into these debates, by asking a nationally representative online panel to estimate the current distribution of wealth in the United States and to “build a better America” by constructing distributions with their ideal level of inequality. First, respondents dramatically underestimated the current level of wealth inequality. Second, respondents constructed ideal wealth distributions that were far more equitable than even their erroneously low estimates of the actual distribution. Most important from a policy perspective, we observed a surprising level of consensus: All demographic groups—even those not usually associated with wealth redistribution such as Republicans and the wealthy—desired a more equal distribution of wealth than the status quo.

Focusing on the Forgone: How Value Can Appear So Different to Buyers and Sellers

We propose that buying- and selling-price estimates reflect a focus on what the consumer forgoes in the potential exchange and that this notion offers insight into the well-known difference between those two types of value assessment. Buyers and sellers differ not simply in their valuation of the same item but also in how they assess the value. Buyers tend to focus on their sentiment toward what they forgo (typically, the expenditure), and buying prices are thus heavily influenced by variables such as salient reference prices. By the same token, sellers tend to focus on their sentiment toward surrendering the item, and selling prices are hence more heavily influenced by variables such as benefits of possessing the item. Four studies examining buying- and selling-price estimates of tickets for National Collegiate Athletic Association basketball games offer consistent support for these ideas. The studies show that naturally occurring differences among respondents in attitudes relating to the tickets that sellers forgo (e.g., significance of the game) corresponded more closely to variation in selling prices than in buying prices. Conversely, measures relating to the expenditure (e.g., respondents’ concern with money) corresponded more closely to buying prices than to selling prices. Using controlled manipulations we then showed that changes in aspects relating to the game (e.g., expected climate in the stadium) affected selling prices more than buying prices, but changes relating to the expenditure (e.g., list price of the ticket) influenced buying prices more than selling prices. We also showed that drawing attention to the benefits of possessing a ticket before asking for the price estimates influenced buying prices more than selling prices, supporting our claim that otherwise these benefits are naturally more salient to sellers than buyers. Similarly, drawing attention to alternative uses of money before asking for price estimates influenced selling prices more than buying prices.

Try It, You'll Like It: The Influence of Expectation, Consumption, and Revelation on Preferences for Beer

Patrons of a pub evaluated regular beer and “MIT brew” (regular beer plus a few drops of balsamic vinegar) in one of three conditions. One group tasted the samples blind (the secret ingredient was never disclosed). A second group was informed of the contents before tasting. A third group learned of the secret ingredient immediately after tasting, but prior to indicating their preference. Not surprisingly, preference for the MIT brew was higher in the blind condition than in either of the two disclosure conditions. However, the timing of the information mattered substantially. Disclosure of the secret ingredient significantly reduced preference only when the disclosure preceded tasting, suggesting that disclosure affected preferences by influencing the experience itself, rather than by acting as an independent negative input or by modifying retrospective interpretation of the experience.

Dishonesty in Everyday Life and its Policy Implications

Dishonest acts are all too prevalent in day-to-day life. This article examines some possible psychological causes for dishonesty that go beyond the standard economic considerations of probability and value of external payoffs. The authors propose a general model of dishonest behavior that includes internal psychological reward mechanisms for honesty and dishonesty, and they discuss the implications of this model in terms of curbing dishonesty.

Gestalt characteristics of experiences: the defining features of summarized events

In this paper we take stock of recent research on how people summarize and evaluate extended experiences. Summary assessments do not simply integrate all the components of the evaluated events, but tend to focus on only a few features (gestalt characteristics). Examples of these defining features include the rate at which the transient state components of the experience become more or less pleasant over its duration, and the intensity of the state at key instances, in particular the most intense (peak) and the final (end) moments. It is not yet suAciently clear which specific gestalt characteristics dominate summary assessments of experiences, nor how this diAers across types of experiences or measurement approaches. To address some of these issues, we describe new research in this area, discuss potential methodological diAculties, and suggest directions for future research. Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.