Dan Reiter

Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–88

The literature on the democratic peace has emerged from two empirical claims: (1) Democracies are unlikely to conflict with one another, and (2) democracies are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies as nondemocracies are with one another. Together these assertions imply that the democratic peace is a dyadic phenomenon. There is strong support for the first observation, but much recent scholarship contravenes the second. This paper assesses whether the democratic peace is a purely dyadic, a monadic, or perhaps a mixed dyadic and monadic effect. Our analysis offers two important advances. First, our model directly compares the dyadic and monadic explanations by using the state as the unit of analysis rather than the potentially problematic dyad. Second, our model controls for an important but overlooked confounding variable: satisfaction with the status quo. Our results indicate that the initiation of violence within crises is predominantly a dyadic phenomenon, but we also find evidence suggesting a strong monadic effect regarding the emergence of crises.

Exploring the Bargaining Model of War

The bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations, including cognitive psychology, organization theory, domestic politics, and constructivism. For comments, he thanks Risa Brooks, Hein Goemans, Ted Hopf, Robert Powell, Bruce Russett, Alastair Smith, Allan Stam, and Suzanne Werner. He would like to note that any remaining errors are exclusively his own.

Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992

The connection between domestic politics and international cooperation, specifically the relationship between regime type and alliance behavior, is examined to test two central hypotheses: democracies are more likely to ally with each other, and states of any similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other. These hypotheses emerge from three theories: constructivism, economic interdependence, and credible commitments. The authors use a data set of all pairs of states from 1816 to 1992. Results show that states with similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other after 1945, although two democracies are not more likely to ally than two autocracies during this period, and distance, learning, threat, and common culture affect alliance behavior, but trade does not. Results indicate sharp limits to the connection between democracy and international cooperation.

Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations

Event history models have become a dominant method of analysis in the study of international relations. Conventional event history models, however, retain the assumption that the effects of the covariates remain proportional to each other throughout the duration of the subjects phase. Nonproportional hazard (NPH) models are used, which allow for the effects of covariates to vary over time. These models are then applied to three previously established data sets on the duration of postwar peace, civil wars, and alliances. Results show that NPH analysis is a useful method for testing new hypotheses, as well as removing possible sources of bias from existing analyses.

Does Democracy Matter?: Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism

This article conducts quantitative tests on the relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism for 1980 to 2003. We present the recently popularized argument that democracies are more likely to experience suicide terrorism and a new hypothesis that mixed regimes are especially likely to experience suicide terrorism. We offer several improvements in research design, including using more controls, the nation-year as the unit of analysis, and more appropriate statistical techniques. Using both Freedom House and Polity data, we find that in general, regime type is uncorrelated with suicide terrorism. We do find that there is a statistically significant interaction between regime type and the number of religiously distinct minorities at risk (MARs) with suicide terrorism, but the statistical significance of this finding is limited, and its substantive impact is marginal. We also find that national size, Islam, national experience with suicide terrorism, and global experience with suicide terrorism affect the likelihood of suicide terrorism.

Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict

How do domestic political institutions affect the propensity to initiate international conflict? We improve theoretical understanding of and empirical knowledge on this question. We describe three major types of democratic institutional characteristics that have been hypothesized to increase the constraints on conflict initiation: public electoral participation, intra-legislative factors, and a stronger legislature in relation to the executive. Using a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) model to analyze 37 democracies in the period 1919-1992, we find that higher political participation levels decrease the likelihood of initiating an international dispute and that neither the number of parties nor the nature of the ruling coalition affects the likelihood of initiating a dispute. The evidence is mixed on whether variation in executive-legislative constraints makes initiation more likely. These findings highlight the significance of public consent for the formation of democratic foreign policy.

Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen

~ Concerns with preemptive war-war in which one side attacks to forestall what it sees as an impending attack on itself-have in recent years played a dominant role in discourse on the causes of war. In academic circles, preemption ties together two important theories of war, the spiral model and the offense-defense balance. In policy discussions, fears of preemptive war ran through the Cold War debate on U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, and continue to frame debates on a number of post-Cold War issues. Both academics and policy analysts have argued that preemption is in many environments the most likely path to armed conflict; they see the international system as a primed powder keg, waiting for a single spark to explode into war. However, the deep theoretical and policy interest in preemptive war has not been matched by extensive empirical scholarship. There have been no quantitative studies testing preemptive war hypotheses, and most case studies of preemption focus on the same small number of cases. As a result, our hunches about the dangers of preemption remain largely just that-hunches. This article fills this empirical gap to expand our understanding of preemptive war by focusing on the important question of how many preemptive wars have happened in the modern era. In other words, which modern wars have begun primarily because the attacking state feared it was about to be a target? In one sense, this is a rather limited ambition, as only the frequency of the event is measured, while hypotheses that predict its occurrence are not tested. However, providing a systematic account of the occurrence of preemptive war

Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness

Why do democracies win the wars they fight? The authors explore this question by examining whether the armies of democratic states fight with higher military effectiveness on the battlefield, testing two general propositions: that the higher legitimacy of democratic states spurs superior individual soldiering and that democratic militaries are likely to have higher organizational efficacy. The authors test their propositions on a comprehensive set of major battles from 1800 to 1982, using data compiled by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. The authors find that the armies of democratic states tend to fight with marginally better logistics, substantially better initiative, and superior leadership. They also find that all three of these advantages dwindle as wars lengthen and interpret the results as indicating that although soldiers are not more willing to die for democratic governments, the emphasis on individual initiative in democratic culture generates important advantages on the battlefield.

The United Nations Security Council and the Rally ’Round the Flag Effect

A principal agent model is used to test the hypothesis that when proposed uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the rally in support of the American president increases significantly. Regression analysis is applied to rallies during all militarized interstate disputes from 1945 to 2001. Results show that UN Security Council support significantly increases the rally behind the president (by as many as 9 points in presidential approval), even after including an array of control variables. This finding is generally robust across most model specifications. This effect is unique among international institutions because other actions by the UN or regional security organizations do not significantly affect rallies. These findings provide new insight into how international institutions can matter and influence the foreign policies of states by affecting public opinion.

Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy

The debate over the costs and beneats of enlarging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that preceded the March 1999 inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic retains policy relevance in the twenty-arst century. Nine more countries have formally applied for membership, requesting entry in 2002.1 Supporters of enlargement have argued that it would help to stabilize Eastern Europe in at least three ways. First, a strong Western commitment to former communist states in this region would deter any future Russian aggression. Second, enlargement would reduce the likelihood of conoict among NATO members, ameliorating security dilemmas and forcing them to accept current borders and pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes. Third, it would further democratization in the region, which in turn would help to stabilize the area because democracies are unlikely to aght each other. As former United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick explained, “There is . . . only one reliable guarantee against aggression. It is not found in international organizations. It is found in the spread of democracy. It derives from the simple fact that true democracies do not invade one another and do not engage in aggressive wars. . . . Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should be the United States’ central goal and top foreign policy priority in Europe, in Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy Dan Reiter