Dana G. Munro

American Commercial Interests in Manchuria

The three Eastern Provinces of the Chinese Empire, collectively known as Manchuria, have a combined area of about 363,610 square miles, and a population variously estimated at from fifteen to twenty-five millions.’ They are remarkably rich, both in agricultural products and in minerals. The soil, with the aid of an abundant and fairly uniform rainfall, produces heavy crops of beans’ and grain year after year, without showing signs of depletion ; while underground there are immense deposits, as yet unexploited, of gold, silver, copper, lead, and coal. The population consists largely of immigrants, who are coming to Manchuria in great numbers from the less fertile provinces of the empire.2 2 These

The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933

Between 1921 and 1933, the United States moved from a policy of active intervention to a policy of noninterference in the internal political affairs of the Caribbean states. How the shift from the diplomacy of the Taft and Wilson administrations to the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt occurred is the subject of Dana Gardner Munros book. The author draws on official records and on his personal experience as a member of the Latin American Division of the United States Department of State to piece together the history of the transition in diplomatic policy.Professor Munro concentrates on several important issues that changed the tone of the relations of the United States with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the five Central American Republics: the failure to compel political reforms in Cuba from 1921 to 1923; the withdrawal of the occupations from the Dominican Republic and Haiti; the intervention in Nicaragua; the response to the Machado and Trujillo dictatorships; and the refusal to recognize revolutionary governments in Central America. The authors analysis sheds new light on the much-discussed Clark memorandum, on the degree to which policy furthered the interests of bankers and businessmen, and on the attitude of the American government toward dictatorial regimes.Originally published in 1974.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

A. W. SINGHAM. The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity. Pp. xiv, 389. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968.

an opponent’s political meeting, but in 1961, after another electoral victory, he became chief minister under the recently adopted constitution. He accomplished little. Neither the legislature nor the ministers had any real control over the bureaucracy, which looked for leadership to the British government’s representative, the Administrator. Gairy’s own imprudence and the hostility of the elite which dominated the island’s economic and social life made matters worse; and in 1962, after a noisy conflict, the Administrator suspended the constitution and removed the ministers from office. Gairy was defeated in elections held a few months later, but he continued to be a power in Grenada’s politics. In telling the story of Gairy’s colorful career, Mr. Singham discusses some of the difficulties that are apt to arise in the transition from colonial status to self-government. He suggests that similar difficulties have confronted many newly independent states both in the West Indies and in Africa. The colonial personality, he says, is authoritarian : submissive when confronted with superior power but aggressive when in a position to exercise power. Authoritarianism characterizes the relationship between the government and the people and between the elite and the proletariat, and carries

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beginning, that this is no objective analysis of our Navy’s strategy and tactics in the Atlantic. The authors have divided their book into eight parts, each part dealing with a separate phase of the Atlantic naval war: neutrality patrol; arctic operations; antisubmarine war; African invasion; opening of the Mediterranean campaign; the Normandy invasion; the final phase of the war in the Mediterranean; and the crossing of the Rhine. In each section the account of the naval action is well balanced and reasonably complete. There is an abundance of thrilling incident and vivid description. This is good narrative history, and will be both interesting and useful for many years. Its value is enhanced by the lack of parallel accounts comparable