Daniel Crimston

Collective Futures How Projections About the Future of Society Are Related to Actions and Attitudes Supporting Social Change

We identified the active ingredients in people’s visions of society’s future (“collective futures”) that could drive political behavior in the present. In eight studies (N = 595), people imagined society in 2050 where climate change was mitigated (Study 1), abortion laws relaxed (Study 2), marijuana legalized (Study 3), or the power of different religious groups had increased (Studies 4-8). Participants rated how this future society would differ from today in terms of societal-level dysfunction and development (e.g., crime, inequality, education, technology), people’s character (warmth, competence, morality), and their values (e.g., conservation, self-transcendence). These measures were related to present-day attitudes/intentions that would promote/prevent this future (e.g., act on climate change, vote for a Muslim politician). A projection about benevolence in society (i.e., warmth/morality of people’s character) was the only dimension consistently and uniquely associated with present-day attitudes and intentions across contexts. Implications for social change theories, political communication, and policy design are discussed.

Toward a Psychology of Moral Expansiveness

Theorists have long noted that people’s moral circles have expanded over the course of history, with modern people extending moral concern to entities—both human and nonhuman—that our ancestors would never have considered including within their moral boundaries. In recent decades, researchers have sought a comprehensive understanding of the psychology of moral expansiveness. We first review the history of conceptual and methodological approaches in understanding our moral boundaries, with a particular focus on the recently developed Moral Expansiveness Scale. We then explore individual differences in moral expansiveness, attributes of entities that predict their inclusion in moral circles, and cognitive and motivational factors that help explain what we include within our moral boundaries and why they may shrink or expand. Throughout, we highlight the consequences of these psychological effects for real-world ethical decision making.

The moral psychology of resource use

Contents Chapter 1. In Search of homo moralis: The Social Psychology of Morality. Joseph P. Forgas, University of New South Wales, Lee Jussim, Rutgers University, and Paul A. M. Van Lange, VU University of Amsterdam. Part I. The Nature of Moral Values and Decisions. Chapter 2. God Save Us: A Terror Management Perspective on Morality. Tom Pyszczynski, University of Colorado Colorado Springs Chapter 3. Moral Opportunities versus Moral Tests. Dale T. Miller and Benoit Monin, Stanford University. Chapter 4. Threat, Morality and Politics: A Differentiated Threat Account of Moral and Political Values. Simon M. Laham and Chelsea Corless, Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne. Chapter 5. Computational Modeling of Moral Decisions. Molly J. Crockett, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford Chapter 6. Understanding Responses to Moral Dilemmas: Deontological Inclinations, Utilitarian Inclinations, and General Action Tendencies. Bertram Gawronski, University of Texas at Austin, Paul Conway, University of Cologne, Germany, Joel B. Armstrong, University of Western Ontario, Canada, Rebecca Friesdorf, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, and Mandy Hutter, University of Tubingen, Germany. Part II: Moral Aspects of Interpersonal Behavior. Chapter 7. A Relational Perspective of Social Influence on Moral Issues. Jeffry A. Simpson, University of Minnesota, Allison K. Farrell, University of Minnesota and Emma Marshall, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Chapter 8. When Perspective-Takers Turn Unethical. Adam D. Galinsky and Alice Lee, Columbia University. Chapter 9. Confessing to an Immoral Act: Consequences to Moral Beliefs and Inferences about Moral Dispositions. Joel Cooper, Princeton University. Chapter 10. Affective Influences on Moral Decisions: Mood Effects on Selfishness vs. Fairness. Joseph P. Forgas, University of New South Wales, Australia. Part III: Ironic and Paradoxical Effects of Morality Chapter 11. Can High Moral Purposes Undermine Scientific Integrity? Lee Jussim, Rutgers University, New Brunswick and The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Jarret T. Crawford, The College of New Jersey, Sean T. Stevens, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, Stephanie M. Anglin, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, and Jose L. Duarte, Arizona State University. Chapter 12. Concept creep: Psychologys Expanding Notions of Harm and their Moral Basis. Nick Haslam, University of Melbourne. Chapter 13. Ethical Norms and Moral Values among Scientists: Applying Conceptions of Morality to Scientific Rules and Practices. Klaus Fiedler, University of Heidelberg. Part IV. Morality and Collective Behavior. Chapter 14. Moralization and Intolerance of Ideological Outgroups. Mark J. Brandt, Tilburg University, Geoffrey Wetherell, DePaul University, Jarret T. Crawford, The College of New Jersey. Chapter 15. Sin, Morality, and Opponent Motives for Prosocial Behavior. William G. Graziano, Purdue University and David A. Schroeder, University of Arkansas. Chapter 16. The Moral Psychology of Resource Use. Brock Bastian and Daniel Crimston, University of New South Wales Chapter 17. Of Baboons and Elephants: Inequality and the Evolution of Immoral Leadership. William von Hippel, University of Queensland, Richard Ronay, VU University Amsterdam and William W. Maddux,INSEAD, France. Chapter 18. Groups Create Moral Superheroes to Defend Sacred Values. Jeremy A. Frimer, university of Winnipeg, Canada.

The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

Prominent theorists have made the argument that modern humans express moral concern for a greater number of entities than at any other time in our past. Moreover, adults show stable patterns in the degrees of concern they afford certain entities over others, yet it remains unknown when and how these patterns of moral decision-making manifest in development. Children aged 4 to 10 years (N = 151) placed 24 pictures of human, animal, and environmental entities on a stratified circle representing three levels of moral concern. Although younger and older children expressed similar overall levels of moral concern, older children demonstrated a more graded understanding of concern by including more entities within the outer reaches of their moral circles (i.e., they were less likely to view moral inclusion as a simple in vs. out binary decision). With age children extended greater concern to humans than other forms of life, and more concern to vulnerable groups, such as the sick and disabled. Notably, children’s level of concern for human entities predicted their prosocial behavior. The current research provides novel insights into the development of our moral reasoning and its structure within childhood.

Moral expansiveness short form: Validity and reliability of the MESx

Moral expansiveness refers to the range of entities (human and non-human) deemed worthy of moral concern and treatment. Previous research has established that the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) is a powerful predictor of altruistic moral decision-making and captures a unique dimension of moral cognition. However, the length of the full MES may be restrictive for some researchers. Here we establish the reliability and validity of a reduced moral expansiveness scale, the MESx. Consistent with the full version, the MESx is strongly associated with (but not reducible to) theoretically related constructs, such as endorsement of universalism values, identification with all humanity, and connectedness to nature. The MESx also predicted measures of altruistic moral decision-making to the same degree as the full MES. Further, the MESx passed tests of discriminant validity, was unrelated to political conservatism (unlike the full MES), only mildly associated with the tendency to provide socially desirable responses, and produced moderate reliability over time. We conclude that the MESx is a psychometrically valid alternative for researchers requiring a short measure of moral expansiveness.