Brock Bastian

When Group Membership Gets Personal: A Theory of Identity Fusion

Identity fusion is a relatively unexplored form of alignment with groups that entails a visceral feeling of oneness with the group. This feeling is associated with unusually porous, highly permeable borders between the personal and social self. These porous borders encourage people to channel their personal agency into group behavior, raising the possibility that the personal and social self will combine synergistically to motivate pro-group behavior. Furthermore, the strong personal as well as social identities possessed by highly fused persons cause them to recognize other group members not merely as members of the group but also as unique individuals, prompting the development of strong relational as well as collective ties within the group. In local fusion, people develop relational ties to members of relatively small groups (e.g., families or work teams) with whom they have personal relationships. In extended fusion, people project relational ties onto relatively large collectives composed of many individuals with whom they may have no personal relationships. The research literature indicates that measures of fusion are exceptionally strong predictors of extreme pro-group behavior. Moreover, fusion effects are amplified by augmenting individual agency, either directly (by increasing physiological arousal) or indirectly (by activating personal or social identities). The effects of fusion on pro-group actions are mediated by perceptions of arousal and invulnerability. Possible causes of identity fusion--ranging from relatively distal, evolutionary, and cultural influences to more proximal, contextual influences--are discussed. Finally, implications and future directions are considered.

Essentialist Beliefs about Personality and Their Implications

Two studies examine implicit theories about the nature of personality characteristics, asking whether they are understood as underlying essences. Consistent with the hypothesis, essentialist beliefs about personality formed a coherent and replicable set. Personality characteristics differed systematically in the extent to which they were judged to be discrete, biologically based, immutable, informative, consistent across situations, and deeply inherent within the person. In Study 1, the extent to which characteristics were essentialized was positively associated with their perceived desirability, prevalence, and emotionality. In Study 2, essentialized characteristics were judged to be particularly important for defining people’s identity, for forming impressions of people, and for communicating about a third person. The findings indicate that people understand some personality attributes in an essentialist fashion, that these attributes are taken to be valued elements of a shared human nature, and that they are particularly central to social identity and judgment.

Psychological Essentialism, Implicit Theories, and Intergroup Relations

Research on implicit person theories shows that beliefs about the malleability of human attributes have important implications for social cognition, interpersonal behavior, and intergroup relations. We argue that these implications can be understood within the framework of psychological essentialism, which extends work on implicit theories in promising directions. We review evidence that immutability beliefs covary with a broader set of essentialist beliefs, and that these essentialist beliefs are associated with stereotyping and prejudice. We then present recent studies indicating that associations between implicit person theories and stereotyping may be explained in terms of essentialist beliefs, implying a significant role for these beliefs in the psychology of group perception. Finally, we propose ways in which research and theory on essentialist beliefs might clarify and advance research on implicit person theories.

Don’t Mind Meat? The Denial of Mind to Animals Used for Human Consumption

Many people like eating meat, but most are reluctant to harm things that have minds. The current three studies show that this dissonance motivates people to deny minds to animals. Study 1 demonstrates that animals considered appropriate for human consumption are ascribed diminished mental capacities. Study 2 shows that meat eaters are motivated to deny minds to food animals when they are reminded of the link between meat and animal suffering. Finally, Study 3 provides direct support for our dissonance hypothesis, showing that expectations regarding the immediate consumption of meat increase mind denial. Moreover, this mind denial in turn reduces negative affect associated with dissonance. The findings highlight the role of dissonance reduction in facilitating the practice of meat eating and protecting cultural commitments.

The role of meat consumption in the denial of moral status and mind to meat animals

People enjoy eating meat but disapprove of harming animals. One resolution to this conflict is to withdraw moral concern from animals and deny their capacity to suffer. To test this possibility, we asked participants to eat dried beef or dried nuts and then indicate their moral concern for animals and judge the moral status and mental states of a cow. Eating meat reduced the perceived obligation to show moral concern for animals in general and the perceived moral status of the cow. It also indirectly reduced the ascription of mental states necessary to experience suffering. People may escape the conflict between enjoying meat and concern for animal welfare by perceiving animals as unworthy and unfeeling.

Cleansing the Soul by Hurting the Flesh The Guilt-Reducing Effect of Pain

Pain purifies. History is replete with examples of ritualized or self-inflicted pain aimed at achieving purification (Glucklich, 2001). Some people feel that they can achieve reparation for their sins by simply experiencing pain; this may be why seeking self-punishment is a basic response to feelings of guilt (Freud, 1916/1957; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Why are pain and suffering believed to serve as atonement for sin? One reason may be that the experience of physical pain alleviates feelings of guilt associated with immoral behavior (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). There has been very little research on the psychological benefits of experiencing pain. We tested two hypotheses relating to when and why people are likely to be motivated to experience pain—that people should be more motivated to subject themselves to a painful experience when they are reminded of their own immoral deeds, and that the experience of pain should reduce feelings of guilt.

Blaming, praising and protecting our humanity: The implications of everyday dehumanization for judgments of moral status

Being human implies a particular moral status: having moral value, agency, and responsibility. However, people are not seen as equally human. Across two studies, we examine the consequences that subtle variations in the perceived humanness of actors or groups have for their perceived moral status. Drawing on Haslams two-dimensional model of humanness and focusing on three ways people may be considered to have moral status - moral patiency (value), agency, or responsibility - we demonstrate that subtly denying humanness to others has implications for whether they are blamed, praised, or considered worthy of moral concern and rehabilitation. Moreover, we show that distinct human characteristics are linked to specific judgments of moral status. This work demonstrates that everyday judgments of moral status are influenced by perceptions of humanness.

Toward a Psychology of Human-Animal Relations

Nonhuman animals are ubiquitous to human life, and permeate a diversity of social contexts by providing humans with food and clothing, serving as participants in research, improving healing, and offering entertainment, leisure, and companionship. Despite the impact that animals have on human lives and vice versa, the field of psychology has barely touched upon the topic of human-animal relations as an important domain of human activity. We review the current state of research on human-animal relations, showing how this body of work has implications for a diverse range of psychological themes including evolutionary processes, development, normative factors, gender and individual differences, health and therapy, and intergroup relations. Our aim is to highlight human-animal relations as a domain of human life that merits theoretical and empirical attention from psychology as a discipline.

Experiencing Dehumanization: Cognitive and Emotional Effects of Everyday Dehumanization

Research into dehumanization has focused on its perpetrators and neglected the experience of its targets. Across two studies we present evidence that people experience interactions as dehumanizing when other peoples behavior undermines basic elements of personhood, such as identity and status. These experiences have cognitive and emotional consequences. Two forms of experienced dehumanization were apparent. In one, a failure to recognize the targets equal status is associated with aversive self-awareness and feelings of shame and guilt. In the other, a failure to recognize the targets basic existence as a person is associated with cognitive deconstructive states and feelings of sadness and anger.

When Closing the Human-Animal Divide Expands Moral Concern: The Importance of Framing

Humans and animals share many similarities. Across three studies, the authors demonstrate that the framing of these similarities has significant consequences for people’s moral concern for others. Comparing animals to humans expands moral concern and reduces speciesism; however, comparing humans to animals does not appear to produce these same effects. The authors find these differences when focusing on natural tendencies to frame human–animal similarities (Study 1) and following experimental induction of framings (Studies 2 and 3). In Study 3, the authors extend their focus from other animals to marginalized human outgroups, demonstrating that human–animal similarity framing also has consequences for the extension of moral concern to other humans. The authors explain these findings by reference to previous work examining the effects of framing on judgments of similarity and self-other comparisons and discuss them in relation to the promotion of animal welfare and the expansion of moral concern.