Daniel J. Carroll

Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults' ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker

Keysar et al. (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003) report that adults frequently failed to use their conceptual competence for theory of mind (ToM) in an online communication game where they needed to take account of a speakers perspective. The current research reports 3 experiments investigating the cognitive processes contributing to adults’ errors. In Experiments 1 and 2 the frequency of adults’ failure to use ToM was unaffected by perspective switching. In Experiment 3 adults made more errors when interpreting instructions according to the speakers perspective than according to an arbitrary rule. We suggest that adults are efficient at switching perspectives, but that actually using what another person knows to interpret what they say is relatively inefficient, giving rise to egocentric errors during communication.

How Do Symbols Affect 3- to 4-Year-Olds' Executive Function? Evidence from a Reverse-Contingency Task.

In two experiments, 330 3- to 4-year-olds competed for stickers in a game in which the optimal response strategy was to point to an empty box that their opponent would receive in order to obtain a baited box for themselves. When the baited box contained stickers, children showed a strong tendency to point at the baited box and therefore lose the stickers to their opponent. In Experiment 1 children performed better when the number of stickers to be won was represented with one of five different types of symbol: numerals, number words, dots, a photograph or sweets. In Experiment 2 children transferred their improved performance in symbolic conditions to non-symbolic conditions. These findings suggest that symbols enable children to formulate an efficient response strategy, and that this effect may be qualitatively different in children from the effect of symbols in non-human primates.

Supporting children's counterfactual thinking with alternative modes of responding

To speculate about counterfactual worlds, children need to ignore what they know to be true about the real world. Prior studies yielding individual differences data suggested that counterfactual thinking may be related to overcoming prepotent responses. In two experiments, we manipulated how 3- to 5-year-olds responded to counterfactual conditional and syllogism tasks. In Experiment 1 (N=39), childrens performance improved on both conditional and syllogism tasks when they responded with an arrow rather than pointing with a finger. In Experiment 2 (N=42), 3- and 4-year-olds benefited from both an arrow manipulation and, separately, the introduction of a delay before responding. We suggest that both manipulations help children to overcome an impulsive prepotent response to counterfactual questions arising from a default assumption that information about the past is true.

Different Executive Functions Support Different Kinds of Cognitive Flexibility: Evidence From 2-, 3-, and 4-Year-Olds.

Improvements in cognitive flexibility during the preschool years have been linked to developments in both working memory and inhibitory control, though the precise contribution of each remains unclear. In the current study, one hundred and twenty 2‐, 3‐, and 4‐year‐olds completed two rule‐switching tasks. In one version, children switched rules in the presence of conflicting information, and in the other version, children switched rules in the presence of distracting information. Switching in the presence of conflict improved rapidly between the ages of 3 and 3.5 years, and was associated with better working memory. Conversely, switching in the presence of distraction developed significantly between the ages of 2 and 3 years, and was associated with better inhibitory control.

A Short Executive Function Training Program Improves Preschoolers’ Working Memory

Cognitive training has been shown to improve executive functions (EFs) in middle childhood and adulthood. However, fewer studies have targeted the preschool years—a time when EFs undergo rapid development. The present study tested the effects of a short four session EF training program in 54 four-year-olds. The training group significantly improved their working memory from pre-training relative to an active control group. Notably, this effect extended to a task sharing few surface features with the trained tasks, and continued to be apparent 3 months later. In addition, the benefits of training extended to a measure of mathematical reasoning 3 months later, indicating that training EFs during the preschool years has the potential to convey benefits that are both long-lasting and wide-ranging.

How Do Alternative Ways of Responding Influence 3- and 4-Year-Olds' Performance on Tests of Executive Function and Theory of Mind?.

A total of 69 preschool children were tested on measures of false belief understanding (the Unexpected Transfer task), inhibitory control (the Grass/Snow task), and strategic reasoning (the Windows task). For each task, children indicated their response either by pointing with their index finger or by using a nonstandard response mode (pointing with a rotating arrow). The means of responding had no effect on childrens performance on the Grass/Snow task or on the Unexpected Transfer task, although children performed better on the Unexpected Transfer task when the key object in the story was removed. In contrast, performance on the Windows task was significantly better when children pointed with the rotating arrow. A follow-up experiment with 79 preschoolers found that this improved performance on the Windows task was sustained even after the nonstandard response mode was removed and children again pointed with their finger. These findings together suggest that nonstandard response modes do not help children to inhibit prepotent pointing responses but may help them to formulate response strategies on reasoning tasks by discouraging unreflective impulsive responding.

Prepotency in action : does children’s knowledge of an artifact affect their ability to inhibit acting on it?

Prepotent actions are actions that are strongly triggered by the environment and so tend to be carried out unless intentionally avoided. Understanding what makes an action prepotent is central to an understanding of inhibitory control. The current study investigated actions made on artifacts because in artifact-dense cultures much everyday behavior is focused on them. A total of 80 3-year-olds were tested on a Go/No-go task that required children to make an action on go trials and to withhold it on no-go trials. These actions were made on artifacts with which the actions were either associated (e.g., drawing with a crayon) or unassociated (e.g., drawing with a hammer). Failure to avoid the go action on no-go trials was taken as evidence that the action was prepotent. Results suggested that an action did not need to be associated with an artifact in order for it to be prepotent (so drawing with a hammer could be prepotent). However, associated actions were sometimes produced even when children had been instructed to make an unassociated action. Children sometimes drew with a crayon when told to hammer with it, but they never hammered when told to draw.

Why do alternative ways of responding improve children's performance on tests of strategic reasoning?

Changing the way in which children respond significantly improves performance across a variety of cognitive domains. However, the basis for this response-mode effect is unknown. To address this issue, the current study tested 78 preschool children on a measure of executive functioning (the windows task: Hala & Russell, ). The task requires children to point to an empty box to receive a box with a treat in it. There were four versions of the task, differing only in the way in which children made their responses. Children in the baseline condition, who pointed with their finger, performed poorly. However, children in three alternative response-mode conditions won the treat significantly more often. Strikingly, even children who pretended to be pointing with an arrow - but were in reality pointing with their finger - performed significantly better than baseline. We suggest that non-standard response modes encourage children to reflect on their actions and that this reduces the number of unreflective errors they make. The findings demonstrate that response-mode effects do not depend on the presence of a physical means of responding (such as an arrow), but can be achieved via a purely cognitive means (such as engaging in pretence).

Not all distractions are the same: Investigating why preschoolers make distraction errors when switching

When switching between tasks, preschoolers frequently make distraction errors-as distinct from perseverative errors. This study examines for the first time why preschoolers make these errors. One hundred and sixty-four 2- and 3-year-olds completed one of four different conditions on a rule-switching task requiring children to sort stimuli according to one rule and then switch to a new rule. Conditions varied according to the type of information that children needed to ignore. Children made significantly more distraction errors when the to-be-ignored information was related to the previous rule. When it was not related to a previous rule, even young preschoolers could disregard this information. This demonstrates that distraction errors are caused by childrens initial goal representations that continue to affect performance.

What's so special about verbal imitation? Investigating the effect of modality on automaticity in children.

Young children experience difficulty across a wide variety of situations that require them to suppress automatic responses. Verbal imitation, in contrast, is easy for children to suppress. This is all the more surprising because data from adult studies appear to be at odds with this observation. In two experiments, we investigated whether this surprising developmental finding with verbal imitation reflects a more general phenomenon-relating either to verbal responses or to auditory stimuli-or whether verbal imitation itself represents a unique case. In Experiment 1 (N=24), it was found that verbal responses were not inherently easier for 3-year-olds to inhibit than manual responses. Experiment 2 (N=24) showed that auditory stimuli did not evoke less automatic activation than visual stimuli. Taken together, these data suggest that verbal imitation is unique, or at least unusual, in being particularly easy for children to resist. It is suggested that the automaticity of verbal imitation may develop slowly and that the relation between word complexity and automaticity is likely to be a fruitful topic of further investigation.