Sarah R. Beck

Making tools isn’t child’s play

Tool making evidences intelligent, flexible thinking. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that 4- to 7-year-olds chose a hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a tube. In Experiment 2, 3- to 5-year-olds consistently failed to innovate a simple hook tool. Eight-year-olds performed at mature levels. In contrast, making a tool following demonstration was easy for even the youngest children. In Experiment 3, childrens performance did not improve given the opportunity to manipulate the objects in a warm-up phase. Childrens tool innovation lags substantially behind their ability to learn how to make tools by observing others.

Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Moderating Role of Ingroup Identification

Recent work developing interventions designed to reduce intergroup bias has sometimes yielded disparate findings. We tested whether the varying effectiveness of such interventions may have a motivational basis. In two experiments we examined whether differential ingroup identification moderated the effectiveness of a differentiation-reducing intervention strategy. In Experiment 1, thinking of characteristics shared between the ingroup and outgroup reduced ingroup favoritism to a greater extent for lower identifiers than for higher identifiers. In Experiment 2 we replicated this finding with different target groups and evaluative measures while controlling for information load. We discuss the implications of this work for developing social psychological models of bias-reduction.

Refining the understanding of inhibitory processes: how response prepotency is created and overcome

Understanding (a) how responses become prepotent provides insights into when inhibition is needed in everyday life. Understanding (b) how response prepotency is overcome provides insights for helping children develop strategies for overcoming such tendencies. Concerning (a), on tasks such as the day-night Stroop-like task, is the difficulty with inhibiting saying the name of the stimulus due to the name being semantically related to the correct response or to its being a valid response on the task (i.e. a member of the response set) though incorrect for this stimulus? Experiment 1 (with 40 4-year-olds) suggests that prepotency is caused by membership in the response set and not semantic relation. Concerning (b), Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) found that 4-year-olds could succeed on the day-night task if the experimenter sang a ditty after showing the stimulus card, before the child was to respond. They concluded that it was because delaying childrens responses gave them time to compute the correct answer. However, Experiment 2 (with 90 3-year-olds) suggests that such a delay helps because it gives the incorrect, prepotent response time to passively dissipate, not because of active computation during the delay.

Executive control and the experience of regret

The experience of regret rests on a counterfactual analysis of events. Previous research indicates that regret emerges at around 6 years of age, marginally later than the age at which children begin to answer counterfactual questions correctly. We hypothesized that the late emergence of regret relative to early counterfactual thinking is a result of the executive demands of simultaneously holding in mind and comparing dual representations of reality (counterfactual and actual). To test this hypothesis, we administered two regret tasks along with four tests of executive function (two working memory tasks, a switch task, and an inhibition task) to a sample of 104 4- to 7-year-olds. Results indicated that switching, but not working memory or inhibition, was a significant predictor of whether or not children experienced regret. This finding corroborates and extends previous research showing that the development of counterfactual thinking in children is related to their developing executive competence.

The development of children's regret and relief

Previous research found that children first experience regret at 5 years and relief at 7. In two experiments, we explored three possibilities for this lag: (1) relief genuinely develops later than regret; (2) tests of relief have previously been artefactually difficult; or (3) evidence for regret resulted from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N=162 4- to 7-year-olds) children chose one of two cards that led to winning or losing tokens. Children rated their happiness then saw a better (regret) or worse (relief) alternative. Children re-rated their happiness. Regret after winning was first experienced at 4, regret after losing and relief after winning were experienced at 5 years and relief after losing at 7 years. Experiment 2 (N=297 5- to 8-year-olds) used a similar task but manipulated childrens responsibility for the outcome. Greater responsibility for the outcome resulted in a greater likelihood of an experience of regret and relief. Results support that previous tests of relief were artefactually difficult and regret and relief are experienced earlier than previously thought.

Social reasoning in Tourette syndrome

Introduction. Tourette syndrome (TS) is thought to be associated with striatal dysfunction. Changes within frontostriatal pathways in TS could lead to changes in abilities reliant on the frontal cortex. Such abilities include executive functions and aspects of social reasoning. Methods. This study aimed to investigate executive functioning and Theory of Mind (ToM; the ability to reason about mental states, e.g., beliefs and emotions), in 18 patients with TS and 20 controls. A range of tasks involving ToM were used. These required participants to make judgements about mental states based on pictures of whole faces or the eyes alone, reason about humour in cartoons that featured sarcasm, irony or “slapstick” style humour, and make economic decisions. The executive measures assessed inhibition and verbal fluency. Results. Patients with TS exhibited significantly poorer performance than controls on all four tasks involving ToM, even when patients with comorbid obsessive-compulsive disorder were excluded. These difficulties were despite no inhibitory deficits. Patients with TS exhibited impairment on the verbal fluency task but their performance on executive and ToM tasks was not related. Conclusions. We propose that TS is associated with changes in ToM. The observed deficits could reflect dysfunction in frontostriatal pathways involving ventromedial prefrontal cortex.

The puzzling difficulty of tool innovation: Why can't children piece their knowledge together?

Tool innovation-designing and making novel tools to solve tasks-is extremely difficult for young children. To discover why this might be, we highlighted different aspects of tool making to children aged 4 to 6 years (N=110). Older children successfully innovated the means to make a hook after seeing the pre-made target tool only if they had a chance to manipulate the materials during a warm-up. Older children who had not manipulated the materials and all younger children performed at floor. We conclude that childrens difficulty is likely to be due to the ill-structured nature of tool innovation problems, in which components of a solution must be retrieved and coordinated. Older children struggled to bring to mind components of the solution but could coordinate them, whereas younger children could not coordinate components even when explicitly provided.

The development of tool manufacture in humans: what helps young children make innovative tools?

We know that even young children are proficient tool users, but until recently, little was known about how they make tools. Here, we will explore the concepts underlying tool making, and the kinds of information and putative cognitive abilities required for children to manufacture novel tools. We will review the evidence for novel tool manufacture from the comparative literature and present a growing body of data from children suggesting that innovation of the solution to a problem by making a tool is a much more challenging task than previously thought. Childrens difficulty with these kinds of tasks does not seem to be explained by perseveration with unmodified tools, difficulty with switching to alternative strategies, task pragmatics or issues with permission. Rather, making novel tools (without having seen an example of the required tool within the context of the task) appears to be hard, because it is an example of an ‘ill-structured problem’. In this type of ill-structured problem, the starting conditions and end goal are known, but the transformations and/or actions required to get from one to the other are not specified. We will discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the development of problem-solving in humans and other animals.

Impaired Comprehension of Nonliteral Language in Tourette Syndrome

ObjectiveTo investigate theory of mind and the understanding of nonliteral language in patients with Tourette syndrome (TS). BackgroundIn TS, striatal dysfunction could affect the functioning of the frontal cortex. Changes in frontal functioning could lead to impairments in theory of mind: the understanding of mental states, such as beliefs, emotions, and intentions. Poor understanding of a speakers mental state may also impair interpretation of their nonliteral remarks. MethodIn this study, patients with TS and healthy controls completed tasks to assess their understanding of sarcasm, metaphor, indirect requests, and theory of mind. These tasks were the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task, the Hinting task, and a faux pas task. Inhibitory ability was also assessed through the use of the Hayling task and a black and white Stroop test. ResultsPatients with TS exhibited significant impairment on the faux pas task and Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task despite limited evidence of inhibitory impairment. ConclusionTS may be associated with changes in theory of mind.

Is understanding regret dependent on developments in counterfactual thinking

Childrens understanding of counterfactual emotions such as regret and relief develops relatively late compared to their ability to imagine counterfactual worlds. We tested whether a late development in counterfactual thinking: understanding counterfactuals as possibilities, underpinned childrens understanding of regret. Thirty 5- and 6-year-olds completed tasks assessing counterfactual thinking and understanding regret. Performance on the counterfactual task was better than that on the regret task. We suggest that thinking about counterfactuals as possibilities is a necessary but not sufficient cognitive development in childrens understanding of regret. We discuss how other developments in counterfactual thinking may underpin childrens emotional understanding.