Daniel J. Clarke

Weather Based Crop Insurance in India

The weather index insurance market in India is the worlds largest, having transitioned from small-scale and scattered pilots to a large-scale weather based crop insurance program covering more than 9 million farmers. This paper provides a critical overview of this market, including a review of indices used for insurance purposes and a description and analysis of common approaches to design and ratemaking. Products should be designed based on sound agronomic principles and further investments are needed both in quantifying the level of basis risk in existing products, and developing enhanced products with lower basis risk. In addition to pure weather indexed products, hybrid products that combine both area yield and weather indices seem promising, with the potential to combine the strengths of the individual indices. A portfolio approach to pricing products, such as that offered by Empirical Bayes Credibility Theory, can be significantly more efficient than the standalone pricing approaches typically employed in the Indian market. Legislation for index insurance products, including consumer protection legislation, should be further enhanced, for example by requiring disclosure of claim payments that each product would have made in the last ten years. The market structure for weather based crop insurance products could better reward long-term development of improved product designs through product standardization, longer term contracts, or separating the roles of product design and delivery.

Cost-benefit analysis of the african risk capacity facility:

The African Risk Capacity (ARC), has been proposed as a pan-Africa drought risk pool to insure against drought risk in Africa south of the Sahara. If fully operationalized, the ARC will mark a major change in how donors fund emergency support to countries in Africa during times of need. In this paper, we undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the ARC pool and discuss how lessons can inform the design of the ARC.

Improving farmers' access to agricultural insurance in India

Indias crop insurance program is the worlds largest with 25 million farmers insured. However, issues in design, particularly related to delays in claims settlement, have led to 95 million farmer households not being covered, despite significant government subsidy. To address this and other problems, the Government of India is piloting a modified National Agricultural Insurance Scheme, a market-based scheme with involvement from the private sector. Compared with the existing scheme, the new program has a design that can offer more timely, claim settlement, less distortion in the allocation of government subsidies and cross-subsidies between farmer groups, and reduced basis risk. Implementation and technical challenges lie ahead which can be addressed but will require a comprehensive strategy, innovative solutions, and timely roll out. This paper describes and analyzes both programs, and discusses lessons learned in developing and implementing the new program.

Disaster Risk Financing and Contingent Credit: A Dynamic Analysis

This paper aims to assist policy makers interested in establishing or strengthening financial strategies to increase the financial response capacity of developing country governments in the aftermath of natural disasters, while protecting their long-term fiscal balance. Contingent credit is shown to increase the ability of governments to self-insure by relaxing their short-term liquidity constraints. In many situations, contingent credit is most effectively used to facilitate risk retention for middle layers, with reserves used for bottom layers and risk transfer (for example, reinsurance) for top layers. Discussions with governments on the optimal use of contingent credit instruments as part of a sovereign catastrophe risk financing strategy can be guided by the output of a dynamic financial analysis model specifically developed to allow for the provision of contingent credit, in addition to reserves and/or reinsurance. This model is illustrated with three country case studies: agricultural production risks in India; tropical cyclone risk in Fiji; and earthquake risk in Costa Rica.

Index Based Crop Insurance Product Design and Ratemaking: The Case of Modified Nais in India

Designing and rating insurance products requires both science and judgment. In developing and emerging economies, actuarial procedures must be robust and implementable, as well as offering a sufficient degree of transparency and flexibility so as to allow expert judgment to be incorporated. This paper outlines an approach to designing and rating a portfolio of index insurance products that uses both temporal and spatial aspects of the data to increase the efficiency of statistical estimates. The approach has formed the basis for the design and ratemaking methodology implemented by the Agriculture Insurance Company of India for the modified National Agricultural Insurance Scheme, which was initiated by the Government of India in late 2010.

Microinsurance Decisions: Gendered Evidence from Rural Bangladesh

Abstract Most index-based insurance products have been developed without giving explicit attention to gender. However, there is ample of evidence that shocks affect men and women differently and that they allocate resources in different ways. In Bangladesh, it is often assumed that women are less involved in agriculture, and, therefore, agricultural insurance might not be of interest to rural women. However, this assumption has not been tested in the field. This article draws from a field research experiment to examine the gendered aspects of willingness to pay for index-based insurance in Bangladesh. Participants were presented with risky lotteries and a specific insurance contract and were asked to choose how much, if any, of the insurance they wanted to buy at a given price. The probability structure, whether the risk was catastrophic or moderate and whether there was high or low basis risk, varied within sessions. The price of the insurance varied across sessions. Each participant was also given a short questionnaire, which collected information on the demographic characteristics, risk preferences, agricultural risks, knowledge of insurance products, and asset ownership. In the study, 97 percent of the participants decided to buy agricultural insurance, with no significant differences between men and women, even though women were less involved in agricultural decision-making. We found a small decrease in take-up for the low-probability event, driven by the women in the sample. When we examined the number of units bought, we found that men were likely to buy more units than women. Total wealth, as captured by total land owned, had no effect on the units bought. However, among women, total wealth mattered and had a positive correlation. Finally, we found that women had less education and lower financial literacy than their male counterparts, and did not have the experience possessed by men to understand agricultural risks. It placed them at a disadvantage when making insurance purchase decisions.

Learning from Lemons: The Role of Government in Index Insurance for Individuals

This paper considers the potential role of government in aiding the scale-up of high quality index insurance products in developing countries. In particular, we analyse optimal public policy in light of the fact that index insurance policies are typically credence goods - that is, the basis risk of a given policy cannot be distinguished by consumers before purchase and only to a limited extent after purchase. We discuss two potential market failures that stem from this property that governments may seek to correct: low takeup and low investment in reducing basis risk. In each case, we consider the costs and benefits of various alternative government policies. We show that policies aimed to improve take-up may improve or worsen incentives for investment, and that the precise nature of these effects will depend on the government’s ability to commit, the marginal cost of funds, and their potential to identify the inputs necessary for constructing a high quality index.

How to Measure Whether Index Insurance Provides Reliable Protection

Agricultural index insurance offers the promise of an affordable and sustainable insurance product for farmers that can help reduce their vulnerability to aggregate agricultural shocks such as large-scale drought or flooding. However, index insurance provides claim payments based on a trigger that is only imperfectly correlated with losses. This implies that it carries basis risk: it may provide claim payments in years when there are no losses, and no claim payments in years when there are losses. The impact of index insurance on poverty outcomes is highly sensitive to the degree to which the product offers reliable protection. Offering unreliable index insurance may lead to high reputation risk for donors, governments, and the private sector. This study proposes to measure the reliability of index insurance in terms of two policy objectives that stakeholders may have when offering index insurance: the extent to which the insurance captures losses caused by the peril covered by the contract (insured peril basis risk) and the extent to which the insurance covers losses from agricultural production (production smoothing basis risk). For both types of basis risk two indicators are proposed: the probability of catastrophic basis risk and the catastrophic performance ratio. Donors, governments, and insurers can use the proposed monitoring indicators without much prior technical knowledge. Although the indicators specifically focus on agricultural index insurance for low-income farmers, they can be applied to any context where payments are provided based on indices that are correlated with losses.

CROP MICROINSURANCE: TACKLING POVERTY, ONE INSURANCE POLICY AT A TIME *

Abstract Crop index microinsurance is a novel product that has been piloted and implemented in many developing countries. We attempt to give an overview of crop index microinsurance, covering the major issues needed to design, price and implement a crop index microinurance programme. In some ways, providing insurance to the poor is fundamentally different to providing insurance to the middle-income or rich; in other ways, including in the actuarial fields of product design, pricing and risk financing, there are strong similarities. We offer a stylised discussion of these differences and similarities, with particular reference to issues of potential interest to actuaries, and propose an actuarial framework for crop index microinsurance. Case studies from Malawi and the Philippines provide examples for what does and what does not seem to work in crop index microinsurance, and motivation for further work needed.

Solving commitment problems in disaster risk finance

Those at risk from natural disasters are typically under-protected, possibly because they expect benefactors such as governments and donors to come to their aid. Yet when relief comes, it is often insufficient, delayed or misallocated. Benefactors may wish to commit to provide an efficient amount of fast well-targeted relief, and leave the rest up to recipients, but such commitments are difficult. This article analyses how transferring risk to third-parties such as private insurers may help resolve these commitment problems. Using a simple model of disaster risk finance is used to identify three distinct commitment problems and then show how various properties of risk transfer schemes can help to resolve these problems. The paper illustrates how these commitment problems play out using examples from around the world, and demonstrates where risk transfer schemes seem to have helped in practice. Overall, the findings show that the benefits of such schemes depend on the relative severity of the different commitment problems.