Olivier Mahul

Government support to agricultural insurance : challenges and options for developing countries

Governments in developing countries have been increasingly involved in the support of commercial agricultural (crop and livestock) insurance programs in recent years. A striking example is China, where, with support (and premium subsidies) from the central and provincial governments, the agricultural insurance market grew dramatically to become the second largest market in the world (after the United States) in 2008. In India and Mexico, weather-based crop insurance has been developed on a large scale to protect farmers against the vagaries of the weather. Many other countries have investigated the feasibility of agricultural insurance, and some have implemented pilot programs. This book aims to inform and update public and private decision makers involved in promoting agricultural insurance about recent developments in agriculture insurance. The literature is heavily biased toward the practice and experience of a few very large public-private programs in Northern America and Europe, which are driven by large public financial subsidies. This book provides decision makers with a framework for developing agricultural insurance. It is based on an analytical review of the rationale for public intervention in agricultural insurance and a detailed comparative analysis of crop and livestock insurance programs provided with and without government support in more than 65 developed and developing countries. The comparative analysis is based on a survey conducted by the World Banks agricultural insurance team in 2008. Drawing on the survey results, the book identifies some key roles governments can play to support the development of sustainable, affordable, and cost-effective agricultural insurance programs.

Optimum Area Yield Crop Insurance

This article considers the problem of the optimal design of crop insurance when the indemnity is based upon the aggregate yield of a surrounding area. The optimal area yield crop insurance contract depends on the individual beta coefficient which measures the sensitivity of farm yield to area yield. Indemnity payments are made whenever the realized area yield is lower (higher) than a critical yield if the beta coefficient is positive (negative). The optimal contract contains a “disappearing deductible” if the beta coefficient is higher than unity. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing Countries : Principles for Public Intervention

Public intervention in catastrophe insurance markets, supported by the donor community and the World Bank, should be country specific. Low-income countries, where the domestic non-life insurance market is undeveloped, should focus in the short term on the development of sovereign catastrophe insurance solutions and the promotion of public goods related to risk market infrastructure. These countries are usually not mature enough for the promotion of catastrophe insurance pools for private homeowners. Middle-income countries, where the domestic non-life insurance market is more developed, should help the private insurance industry offer market-based catastrophe insurance solutions to homeowners and to small and medium enterprises, including the agricultural sector. This book offers a framework, with lessons drawn from recent experience, guiding principles for public intervention and potential roles for donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). These lessons are expected to be used in developing affordable, effective and sustainable country-specific catastrophe insurance programs.

Optimal Insurance Against Climatic Experience

An optimal insurance contract against a climatic risk is derived in the presence of an uninsurable and dependent aggregate production risk. The optimaldesign depends on the stochastic dependency between both sources of uncertainty and on the producers attitude towards risk, especially on his prudent behavior. Rationalweather insurance purchasing decisions are also derived. The prudent producer responds to actuarially fair weather insurance by increasing his exposure towards risk. Copyright 2001, Oxford University Press.

Optimal Insurance With Divergent Beliefs About Insurer Total Default Risk

This paper extends the classic expected utility theory analysis of optimal insurance contracting to the case where the insurer has a positive probability of total default and the buyer and insurer have divergent beliefs about this probability. The optimal marginal indemnity above the deductible is smaller (greater) than one if the buyers assessment of default risk is more pessimistic (optimistic) than the insurers. As an application of the model, we consider the market for reinsurance against catastrophic property loss and propose an expected utility theory explanation for the increasing and concave marginal indemnity schedule observed in this market.

Risk Modeling Concepts Relating to the Design and Rating of Agricultural Insurance Contracts

The authors identify the key issues and concerns that arise in the design and rating of crop yield insurance plans, with a particular emphasis on production risk modeling. The authors show how the availability of data shapes the insurance scheme and the ratemaking procedures. Relying on the U.S. experience and recent developments in statistics and econometrics, they review risk modeling concepts and provide technical guidelines in the development of crop insurance plans. Finally, they show how these risk modeling techniques can be extended to price risk in order to develop crop revenue insurance schemes.

Catastrophe Risk Pricing: An Empirical Analysis

The price of catastrophe risks is viewed by many to be too high and/or too volatile. Catastrophe risk practitioners point out that, contrary to standard insurance, such as automobile insurance, catastrophe re-insurance is exposed to infrequent but potentially very large losses. It thus requires keeping a large amount of capital in hand, generating a cost of capital to be added to the long-term expected loss. This paper pulls together data from about 250 catastrophe bonds issued on the capital markets to investigate how catastrophe risks are priced. The analysis reveals that catastrophe risk prices are a function of the underlying peril, the expected loss, the wider capital market cycle, and the risk profile of the transaction. The market-based catastrophe risk price is estimated to be 2.69 times the expected loss over the long term, that is, the long-term average multiple is 2.69. When adjusted from the market cycle, the multiple is estimated at 2.33. Peak perils like US Wind are shown to have a much higher multiple than that of non-peak perils like Japan Wind, revealing the diversification of credit from the market.

Weather Based Crop Insurance in India

The weather index insurance market in India is the worlds largest, having transitioned from small-scale and scattered pilots to a large-scale weather based crop insurance program covering more than 9 million farmers. This paper provides a critical overview of this market, including a review of indices used for insurance purposes and a description and analysis of common approaches to design and ratemaking. Products should be designed based on sound agronomic principles and further investments are needed both in quantifying the level of basis risk in existing products, and developing enhanced products with lower basis risk. In addition to pure weather indexed products, hybrid products that combine both area yield and weather indices seem promising, with the potential to combine the strengths of the individual indices. A portfolio approach to pricing products, such as that offered by Empirical Bayes Credibility Theory, can be significantly more efficient than the standalone pricing approaches typically employed in the Indian market. Legislation for index insurance products, including consumer protection legislation, should be further enhanced, for example by requiring disclosure of claim payments that each product would have made in the last ten years. The market structure for weather based crop insurance products could better reward long-term development of improved product designs through product standardization, longer term contracts, or separating the roles of product design and delivery.

Sovereign Natural Disaster Insurance for Developing Countries: A Paradigm Shift in Catastrophe Risk Financing

Economic theory suggests that countries should ignore uncertainty for public investment and behave as if indifferent to risk because they can pool risks to a much greater extent than private investors can. This paper discusses the general economic theory in the case of developing countries. The analysis identifies several cases where the governments risk-neutral assumption does not hold, thus making rational the use of ex ante risk financing instruments, including sovereign insurance. The paper discusses the optimal level of sovereign insurance. It argues that, because sovereign insurance is usually more expensive than post-disaster financing, it should mainly cover immediate needs, while long-term expenditures should be financed through post-disaster financing (including ex post borrowing and tax increases). In other words, sovereign insurance should not aim at financing the long-term resource gap, but only the short-term liquidity need.

Managing Agricultural Risk at the Country Level: The Case of Index-Based Livestock Insurance in Mongolia

This paper describes the index-based livestock insurance program in Mongolia designed in the context of a World Bank lending operation with Government of Mongolia and implemented on a pilot basis in 2005. This program involves a combination of self-insurance by herders, market-based insurance, and social insurance. Herders retain small losses, larger losses are transferred to the private insurance industry, and extreme or catastrophic losses are transferred to the government using a public safety net program. A syndicate pooling arrangement protects participating insurance companies against excessive insured losses, with excess of loss reinsurance provided by the government. The fiscal exposure of Government of Mongolia toward the most extreme losses is protected with a contingent credit facility. The insurance program relies on a mortality rate index by species in each local region. The index provides strong incentives to individual herders to continue to manage their herds so as to minimize the impacts of major livestock mortality events; individual herders receive an insurance payout based on the local mortality, irrespective of their individual losses. This project offered the first opportunity to design and implement an agriculture insurance program using a country-wide agricultural risk management approach. During the first sales season, 7 percent of the herders in the three pilot regions purchased the insurance product.