Daniel P. Enemark

Knowledge and networks: An experimental test of how network knowledge affects coordination

Abstract Scholars in the social sciences use network theory to study a range of collective action problems. Often the goal is to identify how the structure of the network affects efforts to coordinate or cooperate, and research suggests that adding connections to a network can improve the performance of groups faced with such tasks. On the other hand, theory and empirics also suggest that additional connections can degrade the performance of a network. If connections can have negative effects then it is important to consider if there are alternatives to adding connections to a network that can also improve network performance. Because a primary function of connections in a network is to disseminate information, providing individuals with more information about the network may act as a substitute for adding connections to a network. We test experimentally whether providing subjects with more information about the structure of networks can improve coordination. We find that a more complete view of the network leads to faster coordination, but the magnitude of this effect depends on network structure. These results suggest that changing what actors know about a network can improve outcomes without having to add connections that may impede overall performance.

Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problems

A growing literature on human networks suggests that the way we are connected influences both individual and group outcomes. Recent experimental studies in the social and computer sciences have claimed that higher network connectivity helps individuals solve coordination problems. However, this is not always the case, especially when we consider complex coordination tasks; we demonstrate that networks can have both constraining edges that inhibit collective action and redundant edges that encourage it. We show that the constraints imposed by additional edges can impede coordination even though these edges also increase communication. By contrast, edges that do not impose additional constraints facilitate coordination, as described in previous work. We explain why the negative effect of constraint trumps the positive effect of communication by analyzing coordination games as a special case of widely-studied constraint satisfaction problems. The results help us to understand the importance of problem complexity and network connections, and how different types of connections can influence real-world coordination.

The Elements of Protest: Combining Coordination, Cooperation, and Communication in the Lab

Collective political action, such as protests, riots or social movements, requires the resolution of both cooperation and coordination problems. Solutions to these problems are widely seen to depend on the network that connects individuals to each other, because this network is a way for individuals to learn about the actions of others and decide if they want to participate. Although there is a general sense that networks and communication are important for collective political action there is little research exploring the relationship between network structure and group behavior. We address that gap in the literature by utilizing an experimental approach that combines both coordination and cooperation in a networked setting. We find that there are considerable differences in collective behavior based on the network structure that connects individuals. In particular, we find in our experiments that more connections in a network and the presence of highly connected nodes can both facilitate solutions to collective problems. This suggests that in building networks it would be useful to either build many connections or create recognizable leaders that can facilitate coordination.

Can We Think Locally, Act Globally? Understanding When Local Information Can Facilitate Global Coordination

In this paper we focus on a neglected aspect of common pool resource problems – whether or not actors in a group can find a solution to the underlying coordination issue. Using a simple networked model of coordination we demonstrate that coordination problems are very difficult to solve when there are few solutions and actors possess local information. However, if the number of solutions does not change, then increases in the number of connections in the network can make coordination more likely to occur. These results suggest connections can influence the ability to reach solutions in two different ways. First, if connections reduce the number of solutions to a problem, then coordination may be less likely. Second, if it is possible to build connections between actors without reducing the number of solutions, then these connections facilitate coordination. These insights can help shed light on how institutions may facilitate international policy coordination.