Mathew D. McCubbins

Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms

Scholars have often remarked that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility. We argue that Congress does no such thing: what appears to be a neglect of oversight really is the rational preference for one form of oversight-which we call fire-alarm oversight-over another form-police-patrol oversight. Our analysis supports a somewhat neglected way of looking at the strategies by which legislators seek to achieve their goals.

A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion

Focuses on the theory of political control and government agency discretion in the United States. Process of policy execution; Definition of agency discretion; Roles of players in determination of policy.

The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure

Studies of Congress and the design of regulation have focused largely upon the origins of regulation and upon the motivations underlying the congressional delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies. In studying the delegation of legislative authority, however, little attention has been paid to how Congress exercises control over the subsequent bureaucratic selection of regulatory policy. This paper focuses on the how by developing a simple theoretical model of the design of institutional arrangements through which Congress attempts to control bureaucratic policymaking. Specifically, this paper examines the congressional choice of the substantive discretionary authority delegated to an administrative entity. This substantive discretionary authority is constructed through the choice of two structural design options: the regulatory scope of the administrative entity and the procedural requirements imposed on administrative decision making. Propositions concerning the influence of decision uncertainty and conflict of interest on the choice of these agency structural arrangements will be derived.

Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions

We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than they do; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than they do. This asymmetry derives from Constitutional limitations on the veto, the sequencing of the appropriations process provided by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1920, and the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level contained in continuing resolutions (Fanno, 1966). We find strong support for this proposition in a regression of presidential requests upon congressional appropriations decisions.

Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98

This article examines a general proposition about democratic legislatures--that their agenda will be cartelized by any majority government--in the context of a case study of the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). The main question is to identify when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Câmara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to veto the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Câmara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chooses to form such an alliance--a presidentially led agenda cartel--then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that split the governing coalition. The authors find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentially led agenda cartel. In this sense, the argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi, who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. The results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

Bonding, Structure and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House

The public policy benefits that parties deliver are allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority rule. Majority-rule decision make, however, does not lead to consistent policy choices; it is unstable. In this paper, we argue that institutions - and thereby policy coalitions - can be stabilized by extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership is support on the floor of the Caucus decisions for a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority partys caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence the policy decisions made in the House. We examine the rules of the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain the essential elements of an effective, extralegislative bonding mechanism.

Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed

Modern democracy requires delegation. Oneproblem with delegation is that principals andagents often have conflicting interests. A secondproblem is that principals lack informationabout their agents. Many scholars conclude that theseproblems cause delegation to become abdication. Wereject this conclusion and introduce a theory ofdelegation that supports a different conclusion. Thetheory clarifies when interest conflicts andinformation problems do (and do not) turn delegationinto abdication. We conclude by arguing that remediesfor common delegation problems can be embedded in thedesign of electoral, legislative, and bureaucraticinstitutions. The culmination of our efforts is asimple, but general, statement about when citizens andlegislators can (and cannot) control their agents.

Structure and policy in Japan and the United States

1. Introduction Peter Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins Part I. Structure and Politics: 2. The structural determinants of electoral cohesiveness: England Japan and the United States Gary W. Cox and Frances M. Rosenbluth 3. Party provision for personal politics: dividing the vote in Japan Mathew D. McCubbins and Frances M. Rosenbluth 4. The appearance of power: legislators bureaucrats and the budget process in the United States and Japan Mathew D. McCubbins and Gregory W. Noble 5. Perceptions and realities of Japanese budgeting Mathew D. McCubbins and Gregory W. Noble Part II. Politics and Policy: 6. Telecommunications policy: structure, process outcomes Roger G. Noss and Frances M. Rosenbluth 7. The politics of nuclear power in Japan and the United States Linda Cohen, Mathew D. McCubbins and Frances M. Rosenbluth 8. The politics of foreign policy in Japan and the United States Peter Cowhey 9. Coordinating economic policies: a schematic model and some remarks on Japan-US exchange rate politics Haruhiro Fukui and M. Stephen Weatherford 10. Conclusion Peter Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins.

Designing Bureaucratic Accountability

We investigate the extent to which legislators can use institutional design to adapt the the challenges presented by the complexity of policy making. In so doing, we produce new and more general conclusions about the consequences of institutional design for democratic decision-making and conclude that, in general, democracy can work.

When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement

In many states and localities, citizens make laws by initiative. Many winning initiatives, however, are later ignored or altered substantially. Why? Our answer emerges from two underappreciated aspects of the initiative process. First, many initiatives contain policies that powerful governmental actors once prevented from passing via traditional legislative channels. Second, implementation can require these actors to comply with policies they once opposed. The question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We use a model and examples to clarify the post-election politics of initiative compliance. Our findings defy conventional explanations of how initiatives change public policy.